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ALBERT VANDAL AND FRANCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1740-1746

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SOMEHOW or other the study of the direct relations between France and Russia in the middle of the eighteenth century has been neglected or added as an appendage to the recounting of the general diplomatic history of the times. A few extant works, which deal with the subject in some detail, have either overdrawn the imminence of a Franco-Russian accord or denied its possibility. All semblance of objectivity seems to have been lost. It seems desirable to clarify the picture of the political intercourse between both these mighty states in the early phase of the War of the Austrian Succession.

Until the débâcle of Soubise at Rossbach, France, still *"la grande nation"*, strove to exercise hegemony over Western Europe, while Petersburg was, in fact, the arbiter of the East since Poltava, Hangö and Belgrade. A stable military and economic alignment of Versailles and Peterhof easily would have enabled both powers to consolidate their respective positions and to have achieved a bilateral domination of the Continent some seventy years in advance of Tilsit. It would have constituted a realistic and spectacular coup. How close did such a project come to fulfillment in the 1740's? What was the extent of the French effort and how was it received by Tsaritza Elizabeth's government? Did French money finance the palace revolution of December 5, 1741, in Russia? Was the French ambassador, the Marquis de la Chétardie, a power in Elizabeth's entourage of councillors? Was it possible for the d'Argenson ministry to purchase the friendship of the chief maker of Russian foreign policy in the critical year of 1745?

Albert Vandal's study of these problems attempted to discover in the past precedents for the forging of diplomatic bonds between Versailles and St. Petersburg, and was therefore part and parcel of the propaganda barrage which served to rationalize the Dual Alliance of 1894.[1] Vandal also failed

[1]Albert Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth,* (Paris, 1882).

to employ any Russian sources for the period.[2] His *Louis XV et Elisabeth,* still the fullest single treatment of the subject, is marked by overenthusiasm, sentimentality, wishful thinking, neglect of economic factors and above all, failure to make use of available sources. Unfortunately, his presentation and interpretation have influenced considerably the work of most of the subsequent writers like Fagniez, Ménéval, De Grunwald, an anonymous writer in the *Russkaya Starina,* and even Soviet historians like Potemkin.[3] On the other hand, M. Waliszewski, a Gallicized Pole, undertook the task of disproving Vandal's didactic generalizations to the effect that circumstances were favorable for a rapprochement between Versailles and St. Petersburg. In his brilliant and excellently documented *L'Héritage de Pierre le Grand* and *La Dernière des Romanov*[4] he dismissed satirically Vandal's vagaries concerning the consistency of French purpose, the myth of de la Chétardie's effectiveness in the coup of 1741 and the alleged receptivity of the Russian court to French approaches. Between the polarity of the Vandal "school" of enthusiasts and the cynicism of Waliszewski, there is a middle ground.[5]

Bain's work, while not a special study of diplomatic affairs in this period, presents, on the whole, a more scholarly sketch of Franco-Russian relations than does that of M. Vandal. The English historian employed available Russian sources. He was cognizant of French machinations to install Elizabeth as Empress, but he castigated the ineptness of the French Ambassador who is supposed to have played a leading role in the coup. As to French subsidization and management of the revolution, he was categorically negative. " . . . The merit and glory of that affair belong to Elizabeth alone."[6] While this general approach is warranted, it is certainly an oversimplification to attribute Elizabeth's success to her personal deeds alone. Several other criticisms of Bain's study may be noted. He overestimated the position and influence of the small clique of confidants

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[2]Vandal employed only French sources, notably the Archives des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères containing the correspondence of French ambassadors at St. Petersburg with Versailles. *Ibid.,* Introd. p. XIII.

[3]Gustave Fagniez, "Les Antécédents de l'Alliance Franco-Russe, 1741-1762", *Revue Hebdomadaire,* (Paris, August, 1916), pp. 316-338; Baron de Ménéval, "L'Avènement d'Elizabeth, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique* (1922), pp. 196-201; Constantin de Grunwald, *Trois siècles de diplomatie russe,* (Paris, 1945), pp. 65-78; Anonymous, "Rossia I Frantzia V Pervoi Polovine XVIII Veke", *Russkaya Starina,* (Sept., 1897), pp. 449-479; Vladimir Potemkin, *History of Diplomacy,* (Moscow, 1941), Vol. I, Ch. IV, "The Diplomacy of European States in the 18th Century" by S. V. Bakhrushin and S. D. Skazkin.

[4]Kazimierz Waliszewski, *L'Héritage de Pierre le Grand,* (Paris, 1900), pp. 352-366; Kazimierz Waliszewski, *La Dernière des Romanov,* (Paris, 1902), pp. 282-317. 328-350.

[5]Walther Mediger, *Moskaus Weg Nach Europa,* (Braunschweig, 1952). This recent work in general confirms the Waliszewski picture of French ineptness at Petersburg and the very dim prospect of any Franco-Russian rapprochement. However, it gives too early a date for the French ambassador's sincere conversion to the idea of a Franco-Russian entente, still overstates the role of the French in the elevation of Elizabeth to the throne and exaggerates the Francophile orientation of the latter. The book is as complete an account of Russian diplomacy in the mid-eighteenth century as one can find in any Western language and contains an excellent bibliography.

[6]R. Nisbet Bain, *The Daughter of Peter the Great,* (Westminster, 1899), p. 51.

around Elizabeth, and tended to magnify the real importance of de la Chétardie's presence at Peterhof in the first few months following the palace revolution of December 5, 1741. There is little mention in his work of the crucial months in 1745 when a Franco-Russian alliance seems in the balance.

Enough material exists to indicate that alliance schemes were hatched (Waliszewski notwithstanding), and that they might have matured. Though the diplomatic picture changed from month to month, there were several high points during which an *entente* of some sort seemed imminent. These were: the months following the French connivance in the revolution of December 1741 which raised Elizabeth to power; the return of the Marquis de la Chétardie for the expressed purpose of winning over Russia in the winter of 1743-44; and the last great alliance offensive of d'Argenson and Dalion in 1745.

The first question to be considered will be the circumstances both favorable and unfavorable attending the effectuation of the kind of volte-face that would be constituted by a Franco-Russian alliance in the 1740's. Vandal has very little doubt concerning the feasibility of an alliance. He takes the government of Louis XV to task and attempts to show that a few painful sacrifices made in the interests of far-sighted statesmanship might easily have brought about this favorable outcome. Both nations were close enough to the realization of an alliance, so that the big question was not its impossibility but rather why it failed to be carried through to completion. ". . . The Court of France in its relations with that of Petersburg had to choose between two grand policies. The first and bolder would have been to unite quite overtly with Russia, which on several occasions sought our friendship and seemed drawn toward us by some inner empathy. To effect this union, it would have been necessary for us to surrender our most venerable traditions. . . . Unfortunately, our diplomacy in the eighteenth century with respect to Russia suffered from indecision. At times the French Cabinet ventured timid attempts at alliance with the Great Northern Monarchy; sometimes it feebly opposed its progress; at no time did it devise a sure, feasible and persevering program of action."[7]

Continuing the Vandal tradition and writing with the animus natural to a French historian living through the days of Verdun, Fagniez expressed the hope that a further study would vindicate the thesis of Franco-Russian amicability in the eighteenth century. Remonstrating against the blindness of Louis XV's government and its muddling of a splendid opportunity, he predicted: "To clarify things, it only remains for an historian enlightened by underlying events to show the opportunity from the middle of the eighteenth century for an alliance between France and Russia."[8]

The Vandal-Fagniez thesis rests on at least three important misconceptions: the feasibility of Franco-Russian political rapprochement, the Franco-

[7]Vandal, *op. cit.*, Introd., pp. VII-VIII.
[8]Fagniez, *loc. cit.*, p. 331.

phile predilections of the St. Petersburg court, and the failure of the French Court to inaugurate a movement for a direct, practical alliance. Actually, (1) the legacy of Franco-Russian relations until 1740 was that of discord and estrangement rather than of harmony; (2) the leading faction of the nobility surrounding Elizabeth after 1741 were on the whole antagonistic to a Franco-Russian alliance; (3) considering the limitations imposed on France by her geography, recent history, existing arrangements with Russia's enemies and her humiliating disappointments, she did make a heroic diplomatic effort to capture Peterhof. The amazing thing is not that Versailles failed to grasp a golden opportunity, but that it humbled itself as much as it did in its effort to consummate it.

When the fabulous Marquis de la Chétardie arrived at St. Petersburg in January, 1740, as French Plenipotentiary for the purpose of a *"tour d' horizon,"*[9] he came after a generation of rapidly deteriorating Franco-Russian relations. Elizabeth inherited a tradition of Francophobia which had dominated the thinking of the High Secret Council since at least the epoch-making changes wrought by her illustrious father. Versailles had looked askance at Peter's gains in the North and had postponed for some time the dilemma of recognizing the Nystadt revision of the Northern System.[10] In the early twenties, the Regent Philip had rejected an alliance offer of the great Tsar (of course, so had other powers).[11] The Duc d'Orléans, furthermore, had snubbed the Romanov's proposal of a marriage between Elizabeth and the young Louis XV. Instead, he had chosen the heiress of a king of Poland without a throne, the daughter of Stanislaus Leszczynski. Other proposals for a French match for Elizabeth were also treated with indifference.[12] Russia then turned to a nearer source for introduction into European society and the gaining over of dependable allies. In 1726, it signed a military pact with Vienna. In the 1730's, Franco-Russian relations deteriorated further. Versailles rejected Tsaritza Anna's overtures for alliance because the French did not wish to guarantee Russian recovery of Azov in case of a Russo-Turkish conflict.[13] Fleury ranged himself on the side of the Northern System supporting anti-Russian confederations in Poland and Ottoman resistance to Russian pressure.

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[9]*Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva (1867-1916)*, (St. Petersburg), Ed. G. Stedman, (Dispatches of Fleury to Ostermann and De la Chétardie to Fleury, February 1738 to September 1740). Vol. 86, p. 239. De la Chétardie, News of Russia, July 10, 1740.

[10]Vandal, *op. cit.*, p. 22 and pp. 25-29; Alfred Rambaud, *Recueil d'instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de la France*, Vol. VIII, Part I, "Russie," pp. 176-188; *Mémoir secret pour M. de Tessé*, Sept. 1721, Ch. X, "le Maréchal de Tessé".

[11]*Ibid.*, pp. 247-249, Memoir of Baron de Schleinetz, pp. 253-256 and pp. 258-261, (The King to M. Campredon) Feb. 7, 1726, rejecting alliance offers. Vandal, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-78 and pp. 98-101.

[12]Vandal, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Waliszewski, *L'Héritage de Pierre le Grand*, Chap. III, pp. 43-44.

[13]Rambaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300, De Chauvelin to the Marquis de Villeneuve at Constantinople.

Though France did not participate actively against the Muscovites in the War of the Polish Succession, one gallant gentleman, M. de Plélo, expecting chivalrous French intercession, at the head of a small force became a martyr in the cause of Louis XV's Polish father-in-law. Fleury again intervened in 1739 to frustrate an Austro-Russian drive for the partitioning of Turkey's European territories. The great French ambassador at the Porte, Villeneuve, converted the Treaty of Belgrade, following the Russo-Turkish War (1735-1739), into a diplomatic triumph for France.[14] French mediation bolstered the Sultan's position and helped to keep the Russians away from the Black Sea littoral. In economic matters, St. Petersburg's close commercial ties with Britain were reaffirmed in the Anglo-Russian trade convention of 1734 which, for practical purposes, shut the door to any French commercial advances.[15] It would have been no easy task to effect a diplomatic revolution in the relations between the two courts in the face of a recent past of ill will, divergent political ends, mutual snubbings and a Russian phobia of French interventionism. On the latter point there was some cause for suspicion in St. Petersburg. The attitude of Versailles toward Eastern, if not all of Europe, since at least the days of Louvois, was that French representatives abroad might install themselves as indispensable advisors of a foreign government.

Bonneval, a French renegade with a Turkish title, had become practically the unofficial grand vizier of the Sultan.[16] For a long time, the Duc de Broglie had a hand in directing Polish foreign affairs (though his government never supported him). At Stockholm, the French ambassador, Lanmary, occupied a position analogous to that of Bonneval at Constantinople. Therefore, when France finally condescended to treat with St. Petersburg in the summer of 1739 (after a twenty years' lapse of direct relations), her minister plenipotentiary was directed to assume many more prerogatives than those becoming an emissary. But Russians were not Turks or Poles, and even under a Baltic Baron Court would tolerate no such direction, especially after a resounding defeat of Sweden in 1725 and a victory over Turkey in 1739. Of course, other powers equally fearful of Russia and equally dependent on her neutrality or assistance intrigued with officials of the Russian government; perhaps they were less arrogant, less obvious and above all more obsequious. French pride would not permit self-abasement at Peterhof until it became too late to effect a rapprochement. France so neglected her opportunities in Russia as to permit the Baltic Barons and other petty Teutonic princes to dominate the Russian court.

Vandal was well aware of the negative background which confronted French statesmanship in any hope for a sudden reconciliation with Russia.

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[14]Albert Vandal, *Revue de France*, 1880; Vandal, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112; Rambaud, *op. cit.*, p. 248, Instructions to de la Chétardie, July 1, 1739.

[15]Douglas K. Reading, *The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734*, (New Haven, 1938), p. 158. Reading maintains that the treaty resembled closely a modern treaty of reciprocity.

[16]Count de Bonneval, *Memoirs*, (London, 1750).

His optimism was based on several factors; namely: (1) the diplomatic exigencies imposed on Versailles by the course of the first two Silesian Wars, especially the need of its ally, Prussia, for Russian friendship or immobilization; (2) French subvention of the coup of December 1741 which brought Elizabeth to the throne of all the Russias; (3) the supposed Francophile leanings of the new Tsaritza and a powerful court faction; and, above all, (4) the empathy of the Russian nobility for Gallic civilization. These considerations, especially the latter two, were based on an erroneous evaluation of the facts which the French historian either ignored or had not investigated. The leading governing circles in Russia were predisposed to an anti-French policy and with two exceptions carried it out during the years 1740-1748. Vandal failed to understand this because he apparently was limited in his sources mainly to the correspondence of de la Chétardie with the French government. Thus, he has perpetuated errors concerning the nature of the Russian government in the eighteenth century which de la Chétardie and other diplomatic representatives made at the time, and which have not yet been entirely dispelled in Western historiography.

Since an erroneous evaluation of the organs of the Russian government constituted a cardinal explanation for the failure of the French at St. Petersburg, it is worthwhile considering wherein the fallacy lay. A tacit assumption inherent in the Eastern diplomacy of Versailles was the divine-right absolutism of Russian rulers. A superficial observation of formal court etiquette might lead to the conclusion that the Tsars occupied the position of Oriental potentates— omnipotent and sanctified by the state-controlled Orthodox Church. The reverent, awe-inspiring silence of the courtiers in Her Majesty's presence, the grovelling of princes of the blood at her feet, and the obsequious usages of address fostered the illusion of unmitigated despotism. Ignorance of earlier Russian history blinded many foreign observers to the true facts. By 1740, a *dvoriantsvo* military and bureaucratic class was in the process of consolidating into a corporate group capable of directing national politics without the brutal autocratic control it had sustained under Peter. The "service" aristocracy, in spite of some factiousness, maintained a fairly consistent policy on two major issues: (1) the intensification of its powers over the government and the serf economy; (2) the pursuit of objectives in external affairs resulting in maximum diplomatic and territorial aggrandizement.[17] Following Peter, the façade of autocracy was retained, but it had altered its nature and had become a convenient device for camouflaging the economic, judicial and national interests of this dynamic class. How else can one explain the continuum in Russian imperialism abroad, and the extension of feudalism internally in spite of sporadic surface changes in the personnel of eighteenth century governments? It was the landlord bureaucracy which engineered every coup d'état of the century of palace revolutions. De la Chétardie,

[17]Potemkin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Ch. IV, p. 283, (S. V. Bakhrushin and S. D. Skazkin).

the ambassador, and Vandal, the historian, had little cognizance of this *modus operandi* in Russian politics.

Was Elizabeth, then, the autonomous executor of the foreign policy of her country, or rather an agent of the *dvoriantsvo*? Fleury and his successors, Amelot and d'Argenson, gambled on the former proposition.[18] Yet evidence exists to show that it was an important, disgruntled faction of leading native families led by the Dolgorukis, Golytsins and Naryshkins which inspired a Romanov restoration because of their jealousy of Baltic Baron ascendancy at the Germanized courts of Anna of Courland and Anna of Brunswick. Smarting under the onus of the disgraceful domination of the court by imported Germans and Baltic Barons during the "Bironovshchina" period, a native camarilla may have approached the Princess Elizabeth long before the December 1741 palace revolution. Locatelli, a French spy in Russia under the guise of a theatrical director, wrote about the extreme xenophobia which characterized the Russian court at this time. He spoke of a faction which favored Elizabeth's ascension.[19] Volynski, at that time the "ober-egermeister" to Anna Ivanovna, may have been a partisan of the anti-German clique which veiled its jealousy of the Courlanders under the banner of Russian patriotism. The same Volynski, interestingly enough, had written a book during the reign of Peter the Great describing the theory of a corporate noble estate and called it *The Theory of a Graded Monarchy*.[20] It would seem that for the attainment of power, Elizabeth had consorted with the representatives of the *dvoriantsvo* who supported the expansion of aristocratic prerogatives as opposed to autocratic rule.[21] These nobles, to a great extent, also controlled the Palace Guards regiments, the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, which had been created by Peter to replace the untrustworthy *Streltsy*. Elizabeth had not only won the affection of these praetorian troops before her ascension to the throne, but she continued to pamper them with promotions and generous gratuities.[22]

It is futile to seek a clear-cut or consistent French policy toward Russia from the time Cardinal Fleury reluctantly arrayed the might of France against The Pragmatic Sanction (June, 1741) until his death on January 9, 1743. While much has been written either to exonerate or to inculpate the aged Cardinal for his acquiescence in Belle-Isle's ill-starred attempt to

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[18]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 86, Instructions of Fleury and Amelot to de la Chétardie, July 1, 1739. De la Chétardie might help to bring about an internal revolution raising to power the assumedly pro-French Elizabeth.

[19]Francesco Locatelli, *Lettres Muscovites*, (London, 1737), Introd., pp. V and VI, and pp. 165-180. Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-93, pp. 170-180.

[20]Zapiski b Artemy Volynskom, *Obschestvo Istorii I Drevnostei Rossisskikh*, (Moscow, 1858), pp. 136-138, pp. 148-168.

[21]Mikhail Pokrovsky, *A History of Russia from Earliest Times*, (Moscow, 1923), Vol. III, p. 24. Pokrovsky claims the plot was in the offing for five years and the event of December 5, 1741, was no fortuitous accident.

[22]Alexander C. Chicherin, *A History of the Preobrazhensky Palace Regiment*, (St. Petersburg, 1883), Vol. II, pp. 547-579, pp. 579-584.

join Frederick II in the spoliation of the Hapsburg domains,[23] it is clear that once France permitted itself to become involved in a war on the Continent, it became imperative to reckon with the disposition of Russia's might.

Earlier, Fleury had supported, in a halting and cautious way, France's traditional Eastern Barrier or Northern System, i.e. the bolstering of Versailles' old allies, Sweden, Poland and Turkey, as much against the physical expansion of the Muscovites as against the intrusion of an alien and unpredictable factor in the time-honored balance of power.[24] The Cardinal may have been close to ninety in the last two years of his administration, but he was by no means inflexibly attached to the doctrinaire pursuit of the Eastern Barrier formula.[25] At the outset of the Austrian

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[23]Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-104. Mediger claims that Fleury sanctioned French aggression against Maria Theresa by dispatching Belle-Isle to the Electoral Diet in Germany with instructions to work for the Imperial election of Charles Albert of Bavaria and to block by all means the successful candidacy of Duke Francis of Lorraine, the husband of Maria Theresa. Any resistance at Versailles to the violent dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire was overcome when Belle-Isle presented to the Cardinal a complete and brilliant military plan to destroy Austria and to establish the hegemony of France in Europe.

Paul Vaucher, *Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury,* (Paris, 1924), pp. 340-345, 388-390. Vaucher maintains that Fleury in 1740 still favored the status quo on the Continent, a point of view now generally supported. His main objective was the isolation of England and its severance from any potential European allies, so that in the inevitable conflict between England and France for trade and overseas possessions, the latter might concentrate its naval and military might on a colonial war while maintaining a free hand on the Continent. In order to prevent Russia's succoring of Austria according to the Austro-Russian Alliance of 1726, it was necessary to revive and to fortify the "Eastern barrier." Belle-Isle's pact of aggression with Prussia upset the whole configuration of the Cardinal's patient, carefully laid and secret plans to oust the English system of subsidized alliances from the Continent. By the end of 1740, even Walpole, the perennial partner of Fleury's pacific policies and a supporter of George II's concern for his Electorate in Hanover, began to be alarmed. The British Prime Minister was ready to send a naval squadron to the Baltic in order to threaten Sweden so that Petersburg, without the fear of aggression from Finland, might send aid to the beleaguered Maria Theresa and might move against Frederick if the latter should have designs against Hanover.

Arthur M. Wilson, *French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury,* (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 327-337. Wilson takes the stand that Fleury was primarily interested in the election of Charles Albert of Bavaria as Holy Roman Emperor. The titular head of French diplomacy was not ready, however, to embark on a risky bellicose policy of robbing the young Hapsburg Empress of her realms, guaranteed by Fleury's own adherence to the Pragmatic Sanction. At the end of 1742 following the débâcle of Belle-Isle in Prague, Fleury informed Maria Theresa with regret that the robber alliance with Frederick had been entered into against his will.

Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire,* (New York and London, 1940), pp. 141-144. Dorn is a strong partisan of the theory that Fleury utterly opposed any anti-Hapsburg ventures. The Cardinal did not even consider the election of Maria Theresa's husband to the Imperial throne as an unmitigated evil for France. However, he was swept aside by Louis XV and Belle-Isle.

[24]Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 337. At the outset of the first Silesian war, Russia was to be immobilized by persuading Sweden to declare war on her Eastern neighbor. Thus the primary objective would be achieved, namely rendering France's ally, Prussia, secure on its Eastern flank, so that a joint Franco-Prussian assault on Austria could be launched.

[25]Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-71. Fleury had not been too keen about active French participation in the War of Polish Succession. He had tried unsuccessfully to procure an anti-Hapsburg alliance with Russia, or at least to keep the great Slavic Empire neutral.

Succession question in 1740, he may have hoped that if both France and Sweden supported a Russian palace revolution against the pro-English, pro-Austrian Brunswick dynasty in favor of Princess Elizabeth, he could ignore the Russian problem.[26] It was expected that Elizabeth, as a devout Orthodox Empress, would return Russia to a pre-Petrine isolation from Europe and that her realm would lose its significance as a great power on the European chess-board.[27] However, France was to attain this objective secretly, without antagonizing the Russian court or becoming directly involved. Sweden and Turkey were to be encouraged to intercede or to threaten intervention at about the time Elizabeth was to be raised to the throne. The new Empress, out of gratitude to Louis XV for his aid, would now accept French mediation in a Russo-Swedish conflict.[28] Thus by getting Stockholm and Constantinople to pull Versailles' chestnuts out of the fire, the French might reestablish their bygone influence in Eastern Europe with the expenditure of comparatively little effort. To Fleury's credit, it must be added that he never fully endorsed these chimerical schemes so recklessly propounded at Petersburg by his envoy, de la Chétardie. The Cardinal urged the maximum circumspection in committing France to the support of an internal revolution in the Russian Empire.[29] With the slowing down of the French offensive across Bavaria and the dismal showing of the Swedish army at Wilmanstrand in August, 1741, the Cardinal, ever realistic, began to toy with the idea of a new orientation in the East. Sweden could be abandoned (as Poland had been in 1738) and even inculpated with aggressive designs to recover Esthonia and Livonia. Versailles might still carry off at Petersburg the honor of mediating the conflict with Sweden and thus be assured of Russia's benevolent neutrality in the Bourbon-Hapsburg grapple.[30]

Was Fleury then prepared for a drastic revision of the Eastern Barrier system and a reconciliation with Russia? Considering his realistic appraisal of the whole diplomatic picture, i.e. the extrication of France from the war in Europe in order to prepare for a decisive colonial and maritime

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Having failed, he saw no point in continuing a fruitless war to oust the Austro-Russian favorite, Augustus of Saxony, as king of Poland in favor of Louis XV's father-in-law, Leszczynski. The Cardinal desired a lasting peace with Austria in order to concentrate all of France's efforts against its greatest antagonist—England.

[26]See below.

[27]Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107, p. 180.

[28]Rambaud, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, pp. 342-353. Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 86, p. 86. Instructions of Amelot to de la Chétardie, July 1, 1740.

[29]Rambaud, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, pp. 348-350; Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-94. De la Chétardie was urged to study the political leanings of the leading court families, the strength of Elizabeth's partisans, the state of the Russian economy and indeed the whole complexion and orientation of the Russian government.

Ibid., p. 92-95. It is remarkable how ill-informed French cabinets were on Russian affairs. De la Chétardie wrote to Versailles that Russia was exhausted, financially and militarily weak, and would collapse at the first sign of a Swedish invasion.

[30]*Ibid.*, pp. 196-198. Simultaneously, France could still urge (in secrecy of course) the Turks to assume a bellicose attitude, so that Tsaritza Elizabeth would be impressed by the value of the good offices of France.

struggle with England, it is not improbable that he was beginning to think of some entente with the Romanov Empire.[31] However, the Russian problem appears to have remained a secondary one at Versailles, at least until the second mission of de la Chétardie (December, 1743-June, 1744) after the Cardinal's death. Furthermore, Fleury was hampered on all sides during the last two years of his administration. Tencin and d'Argenson had been appointed as his aides; Belle-Isle had superseded him, while Louis XV remained ever reluctant to change the traditional policy of cooperation with Sweden, Poland and Turkey. The confusion at Versailles increased with Fleury's passing. France failed to befriend Russia in spite of several heroic démarches during those years not only because the objective situation for a rapprochement was on the whole not favorable, but also because of its multi-faceted, inept, contradictory, self-defeating policy based on no long-range objectives. For example, the French hesitated for years trying to determine whether it was wiser to propose a Russo-Turkish reconciliation or to encourage a continuation of the Muscovite-Ottoman imbroglio in order to distract Russia from meddling in Central European affairs.

The French miscalculated both the power and the Francophile sympathies of the Tsaritza. When Elizabeth came to the throne, her inexperience, uncertainty of tenure and lack of financial means caused her to rely on the guidance of her Vice-Chancellor and (after 1744) Chief-Chancellor, Bestuzhev-Riumin. The latter's pro-English orientation was pleasing to the Russian landlords' interests as importers of British manufactures, exporters of agricultural products to Britain and recipients of English subsidies.[32] How unfounded then is Vandal's notion that ". . . Elizabeth was devoted to Louis XV without even knowing him, and this love from afar would exercise a strange influence on the destiny of the young Empress . . . But Louis did not understand the indispensable prerequisites for an accord between the two states. He discouraged Elizabeth's goodwill and persisted in protecting Sweden and Turkey, the long-standing enemies of Russia, thus permitting Russia to fall again into an Austrian alliance in spite of the personal preferences of the Tsaritza."[33] This idyllic picture

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[31]*Ibid.* Mediger believes that Fluery intended to drop Sweden, if necessary, in the interests of *realpolitik*. However, Louis XV wished to save face and to obtain better terms for Sweden by urging a renewed Swedish offensive and the encouragement of a Turkish attack on the south of Russia.

[32]Dietrich Gerhard, *England und der Aufstieg Russlands,* (Munich and Berlin, 1933), pp. 9-13. The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1734 was renewed and strengthened in 1742. England's motives were as much political as economic, namely to draw Russia into the Silesian War on the side of Austria. Since the allies of France (Sweden, Turkey, a party of pro-Leszczynski Polish noblemen, Prussia and Denmark) were by implication the enemies of England, Whitehall found it convenient to support Tsaritza Elizabeth's desire for a dynastic union of Russia and Sweden under the Holstein-Gottorp dynasty. This project was opposed by Denmark and Prussia so that the Russian vice-chancellor's anti-French, anti-Danish and anti-Prussian orientation coincided in the main with England's interests during most of the War of the Austrian Succession.

[33]Vandal, *op. cit.*, pp. VII-X.

of an eager Empress and a reticent France constitutes a gross oversimplification.

The main prop of Vandal's optimism remained the supposed Versailles-inspired plan to help effect an overthrow of the reigning Brunswick dynasty, for the moment under the regency of Anna Leopoldovna. The plot had important ramifications. Lanmary, the French ambassador at Stockholm, worked hand in glove with the pro-French party of "Hats" in the Swedish Diet, a group which aspired to restore Swedish territories sacrificed to Russia at Nystadt in 1721. A Swedish army was to be stationed at the Finnish frontier near St. Petersburg and was to move into the Russian capital at the very moment that Elizabeth, with French aid and goodwill, was being borne to the throne of her Romanov predecessors. The results of such an intrigue, if successful, would redound to the immense advantage of Versailles: (1) France would gain the friendship and gratitude of the new Tsaritza and would acquire, at the least, a passive ally; (2) the pro-Austrian, pro-English advisors of Anna Leopoldovna, Ostermann and Münnich, would be ousted, and such a beneficent change in Russian government circles would relieve France's ally, Frederick of Prussia, of the dread of Russian intervention and thus permit Versallies and Berlin to proceed with Belle-Isle's aggressive plan to violate the Pragmatic Sanction and to destroy Hapsburg power;[34] (3) Elizabeth could be persuaded as to the desirability of a retrocession of territory acquired from Sweden in 1721, in the interest of a future Franco-Swedish-Russian alliance to maintain harmony and cooperation in Northern Europe; (4) France could be restored to the position of giving leverage to her traditional "Northern System," namely, of relying on Swedish, Polish and Turkish alliances to further her interests in the East while immobilizing and dominating the Germanies; (5) Versailles might exculpate itself for its dishonorable conduct toward Sweden, raise the prestige of that power and bind it both to itself and to the late enemy, Russia.

Fantastic as such a scheme might appear, it was not at all improbable in the climate of eighteenth century dynastic diplomacy. The plot was hatched in the febrile imagination of the French Minister Plenipotentiary at Peterhof—the Marquis de la Chétardie. It received the faint-hearted support of the senescent Fleury, the incompetent Amelot[35] (director of French foreign policy) and, above all, the hearty endorsement of His Most Christian Majesty, Louis XV.[36] The indictment of Elizabeth for receiving French monetary and diplomatic support has been taken for granted by most historians (Waliszewski and Bain excepted) dealing with the period, and accounts for the fact that Vandal and many who followed have suc-

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[34]Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

[35]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 92, p. 302. (Vol. 92, ed. G. Stedman, contains the de la Chétardie correspondence from October, 1740 to May, 1741).

[36]*Ibid.*, Vol. 96, p. 225, The King to de la Chétardie. (Vol. 96, ed. G. Stedman, covers the correspondence of de la Chétardie from May to December, 1741).

cumbed to this legend.[37] The plot is of pivotal importance to the understanding of Franco-Russian relations in the 1740's.

The idea of a Franco-Swedish sponsoring of the beautiful but neglected Princess Elizabeth came to de la Chétardie during the course of a year of failure and frustration in Russia, after his arrival in January 1740. Ostermann, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, quite overtly stated his distrust of de la Chétardie and informed Fleury that the former was an intriguer and meddler who was trying to perpetuate an imbroglio between Peterhof and the Porte. The Frenchman was accused of stirring up the Swedes to invade Russia and of being involved in anti-Brunswick machinations.[38] The Marquis had also antagonized Russian court circles by insisting upon a personal presentation of his credentials to the infant Ivan VI. This ridiculous affair dragged on for months until an arrangement was made whereby the Frenchman addressed himself to the babbling infant who was flanked by the Regent Mother and Ostermann.[39] The Swedish aggression had effected a boomerang in French plans; for in August 1741 the Swedes were turned back at Wilmanstrand, a fact which caused considerable discomfiture to the Marquis who had hoped to curb Russia with the Swedish checkmate.[40] He had failed to impress the Turkish ambassador in St. Petersburg with the necessity of staging a Tartar invasion of the Ukraine to restrain Russia's potential aggressiveness and to force her to comply with the provisions of the Treaty of Belgrade.[41] De la Chétardie was so unpopular as to be considered an enemy agent at St. Petersburg. The French embassy was practically barricaded in fear of an impending attack and was prepared to undergo a siege.[42]

However, the Marquis' boldness increased in direct proportion to his desperation. He decided on the brazen démarche of cooperating with the Lestocq-Brummer entourage of Princess Elizabeth to effect a palace revolution against the Brunswick regency. In return, he deemed it certain that the mighty Slav empire would in gratitude restore the influence of France in the North.

Vandal and his successors have seized upon de la Chétardie's self-glorified account of his participation in the coup as a key factor in the determination of Franco-Russian relations for the next few years. "To organize a conspiracy, put an end to a régime of foreigners, Baltic Barons and Germans; in particular to return the nation to itself, to elevate to the throne a princess, French in heart and mind, this is what he attempted in

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[37]Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98, pp. 189-190, also seems to overrate the moral and material effect of de la Chétardie's assistance to Elizabeth and her party before she became Tsaritza.

[38]Sergei Soloviev, *Istoria Rossii*, (Moscow, 1871), Vol. 21, pp. 116-118.

[39]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 96, p. 226, Louis XV to de la Chétardie.

[40]Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[41]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 96, pp. 490 and 506, de la Chétardie to Amelot, Oct., 1741.

[42]Rambaud, *op. cit.*, Introd., p. xxxix; Constantin de Grunwald, *Trois siècles de diplomatie russe*, (Paris, 1945), p. 65.

a country whose language he did not know and where the inhabitants spoke of public affairs in quaking low voices."[43] Unfortunately for the enthusiasts of diplomatic drama, the lurid accounts of the Marquis' deeds in the conspiracy must be modified by several sober qualifications. Enough evidence exists to indicate that far from being the catalyst of a Romanov restoration, the Frenchman's efforts were of incidental consequence, or perhaps merely a by-product of a plot hatched much earlier among a certain segment of the *dvoriantsvo*.[44] Perhaps, it was rather Princess Elizabeth who used de la Chétardie. Then again, a reexamination of the actual events in the unfolding of the intrigue gives a much diminished picture of the importance of Versailles and its agent in the actual proceedings. For this reason a somewhat detailed examination of the coup is warranted.

De la Chétardie prepared himself for the role of agent-provocateur and maker of monarchs with all the extravagance, chivalry, secrecy and folly so characteristic of the conduct of French diplomacy under Louis XV. There was many a personal tête-à-tête with the beautiful Elizabeth, fête champêtre conspiracies in a gondola on the Neva,[45] and secret messages in clumsy code between de la Chétardie, his King, his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other French diplomats abroad.[46] By September, the French diplomat's manoeuvers were open gossip in the Winter Palace.[47] He tried to convince Fleury that Elizabeth in power could be relied upon to revise Nystadt and uphold the Versailles-sponsored Northern System.[48]

To what extent was de la Chétardie actually justified in his evocation of a pro-French, pro-Swedish Princess Elizabeth? How much Gallic money was conveyed across ice-bound Lithuania and Livonia to the Russian capital? Was a fraud perpetuated on the Russian people on the night of December 5, 1741; was their beloved "Matushka" a vile sycophant in the pay of Versailles? In the attempt to answer these questions one may evaluate better the French role in St. Petersburg both before and after the so-called de la Chétardie-inspired revolution.

That Elizabeth toyed with the impetuous Marquis is more than obvious from any cursory survey of the effulgent prospects the latter dangled before his court. However, not even he definitely stated that Elizabeth had made any direct commitments concerning Swedish territory or a future political alliance. Four days before the Swedes took the field, Amelot was urging de la Chétardie to be cautious and was writing in vague and contradictory terms of not implicating Louis XV prematurely in the internal affairs of

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[43]Vandal, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[44]See page 129.

[45]Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[46]Rambaud, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, Letter of Feb. 2, 1741. De la Chétardie (to Amelot) wrote that the affair deserved all the King's attention. Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 96, p. 338. De la Chétardie to M. Mondamert, Sept. 10, 1741.

[47]Rambaud, *op. cit.*, Introd., p. xxxix.

[48]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 96, pp. 186-189, De la Chétardie to St. Severin. Soloviev, *op. cit.*, Vol. 21. p. 130 and p. 134.

the Russian Empire.[49] In partial exoneration of the Marquis, it must be stated that at this moment the conduct of French foreign policy was confused.[50] It is doubtful whether Amelot knew exactly what Fleury and the King desired or whether the latter had any concrete objectives in the maelstrom of Northern politics. Under such conditions, for practical purposes, an ambitious courtier like the Marquis possessed what was tantamount to a *carte blanche.*

By August 1741 he reported that, with proper financial support, Elizabeth would engage herself to: (1) reimburse Sweden for the expense of a campaign in Finland in her behalf; (2) accord Sweden subsidies all her life; (3) confer on Sweden all the commercial privileges hitherto enjoyed by England; (4) renounce the Anglo-Austrian orientation of Russia forever and ally herself with Sweden and France.[51] There is no record of such a treaty in Russian documents. Even if it did exist, it is to be noted that no direct commitments on territorial retrocession to Stockholm had been made. Furthermore, the future benevolence of Princess Elizabeth would depend on the contingency of forthcoming louis d'or. Was the French government willing to risk generous disbursements to support the double risk of the fate of the revolution and the sincerity of Elizabeth's promises?

The Versailles cabinet set the stage in Stockholm, Warsaw and Constantinople while Louis the Well-Beloved reaffirmed his tender regard for the unjustly deprived Princess.[52] However, the Marquis claimed that as more tangible evidence of Gallic goodwill, the future Empress was soliciting 15,000 *chervontsi.*[53] De la Chétardie had committed himself before the full sanction of his government had been obtained. He had advanced 2,000 ducats on his own to enable the pro-Romanov faction to bribe the Semenovsky guards.[54] After much delay, a mere 2,000 ducats were conveyed from Versailles through the intermediary of M. de Magne in the latter part of October.[55] Waliszewski states of the paltry sum, "This is what they called putting at the disposition of the future Tsaritza the treasure and credit of France."[56] The overbearing weight of evidence then suggests no extensive subvention of the palace coup of December 5th by French money.

How significant was de la Chétardie's role during the St. Petersburg *putsch?* Vandal accepts the myth of his omnipotence with a few qualifications.

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[49]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 96, p. 234, Amelot to de la Chétardie, July 24, 1741.

[50]Mediger, *op. cit.*, p. 106. Amelot, the state secretary in charge of correspondence, showed little faith in the whole project of relying on Swedish arms to secure the throne for Elizabeth or the influence of the so-called Francophile party around Elizabeth.

[51]*Ibid.*, p. 293, De la Chétardie to Amelot, August 19, 1741. The treaty is confirmed by Soloviev, *op. cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 140, who apparently also accepted the French correspondence in the Russian archives.

[52]Fyodor Martens, *Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères,* Vol. XIV, p. 64.

[53]Sbornik., *op. cit.*, Vol. 96, De la Chétardie to Amelot, September 26, 1741.

[54]*Ibid.*, De la Chétardie to Amelot, September 2, 1741.

[55]*Ibid.*, De la Chétardie to Amelot, October 26, 1741; Vandal, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

[56]Waliszewski, *L'Héritage de Pierre le Grand,* p. 352.

Yet he was being pressed for funds by the Lestocq-Brummer camerilla as late as November. Contrary to Vandal's presentation, Waliszewski's contention is that no further money or material assistance came after the Magne dispatch.[57] Except for an authorization of the king for a pension of 4,000 livres to Princess Dolgoruky for services, Waliszewski is correct.[58] Throughout October and November, the French envoy was exceedingly pusillanimous and apparently balked by Elizabeth's reticence in the matter of the Swedish guarantees. Even Vandal attempts to exonerate Elizabeth: "France did not count on the patriotism and filial piety of Elizabeth. Nolken (the Swedish ambassador at Peterhof) could not get her to send a written appeal for aid to the Swedish king."[59] After a check of Lewenhaupt at Wilmanstrand, de la Chétardie revised his original plan of capitalizing on Elizabeth's gratitude for Swedish payments and began working toward an out and out Franco-Russian alliance.[60] Such a volte-face in France's traditional support of the Northern System needed time—indeed, it did not occur until the Second Treaty of Versailles in 1756! Meanwhile, the Frenchman stalled for time and money while supposedly ingratiating himself with the charming Elizabeth, denouncing the pro-Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Ostermann, and exhorting Versailles. His descriptions to Amelot of the Princess' popularity, her very warm reception in the Semenovsky barracks,[61] and her appeal to the native *dvoriantsvo,* while all probably quite valid, had fairly little to do with his own machinations. One is tempted to believe that Elizabeth used the Frenchman's activities as a foil to cover up an incipient conspiracy in which she possessed the fairly certain support of powerful elements among the *dvoriantsvo* and the army.

According to later dispatches, de la Chétardie is supposed to have accosted Elizabeth on the third of October and to have urged her to consummate the *putsch,* warning her that Ostermann's preparations in the capital boded ill for the Princess.[62] He would send a message to Lewenhaupt and the Finnish regiments to accelerate their campaign. There is a snag, however, which undoes the whole heroic picture of himself on the eve of the great event. The dispatch of a courier to Lewenhaupt, the Swedish commander, would have to go by the circuitous route of Stockholm. Even according to Vandal, de la Chétardie's earliest possible fixing of the supreme moment was for the 11th and 12th of January, 1742, more than a month after the revolution had occurred. Vandal's thesis of a de la Chétardie directed revolution is therefore patently inadequate.

What actually impelled the "recalcitrant" Elizabeth to move rapidly

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[57]*Ibid.,* pp. 325-355.
[58]Sbornik, *op. cit.,* Vol. 96, pp. 573-574, Amelot to de la Chétardie, November 13, 1741.
[59]Vandal, *op. cit.,* p. 140.
[60]Sbornik, *op. cit.,* Vol. 96, p. 499, De la Chétardie to Amelot, October 26, 1741.
[61]Soloviev, *op. cit.,* Vol. 21, p. 135.
[62]Sbornik, *op. cit.,* Vol. 96, pp. 625-626. "Finch, the English ambassador, confirmed the Brunswick plot to send Elizabeth to a nunnery in his letter of September 2nd."; Sbornik, *op. cit.,* Vol. 91, p. 53.

was the Brunswick government's order on the morning of December 5 to the guards of the capital, to be ready to march in twenty-four hours. Martial law was proclaimed in St. Petersburg;[63] yet Ostermann knew that the Swedes were still at the Western end of Finland.[64] Elizabeth needed no coaching from the Marquis to clarify her own precarious situation. Soloviev indicates that Lestocq, the Hanoverian chamberlain of the Princess, was a more effective persuader than the impetuous Marquis.[65] Apparently, the capital was being readied for action against Elizabeth's band of revolutionists.

Where was the conspirator, de la Chétardie, in the crucial hours? There are six extant accounts of the December 5 revolution: (1) de la Chétardie's official report in Volume 96 of the Sbornik collection; (2) An anonymous "Relation de la Revolution Arrivée en Russie le 6 Decembre, 1741;" (3) Soloviev's Volume XXI of the *Istoria Rossii;* (4) The English Ambassador, Finch's, account; (5) Mannstein's Memoirs; (6) Kostomarov's account in his *Russkaya Istoria.* The anonymous account indicates that de la Chétardie slept soundly during the night of December 5 and was not informed of the proceedings in the Semenovsky barracks or the Winter Palace until about 8 a.m. on December 6, at least six hours after the successful staging of the coup. Vandal had nothing to say of this lamentable absence of de la Chétardie as a participant in the revolution, because of his unequivocal acceptance of de la Chétardie's self-glorification in his letter of December 7 to Amelot.[66]

Furthermore, the same letter tells how, on the morning of the 5th, Lestocq did come to him (no other confirmation) and excitedly informed him of the order given to the Guards to march. In spite of his diplomatic immunity, the Marquis could find nothing in Lestocq's account which interested him.[67] This on the very eve of the event! De la Chétardie, while distinctly in favor of a coup, was obviously hindered at the moment by at least two considerations: (1) The revolution was not an end in itself, so that the preponderant interests of France and Sweden had to be masked (this was the French court's desire); (2) the success of the enterprise was only problematic, so that he could not afford to be implicated. There is little to indicate that he had knowledge of a definite plan or possessed a concrete organization.[68]

De la Chétardie's December 7 dispatch to Amelot recounts that Elizabeth and her party paid a visit to his quarters at midnight to inform him that the glorious enterprise was about to begin.[69] The anonymous version

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[63]Soloviev, *op. cit.,* Vol. 21, pp. 148-149.
[64]Bain, *op. cit.,* p. 54.
[65]Soloviev, *op. cit.,* Vol. 21, p. 148 (p. 64).
[66]Vandal, *op. cit.,* pp. 135-182; Sbornik, *op. cit.,* Vol. 96, p. 632, de la Chétardie to Amelot, December 7, 1741.
[67]*Ibid.*
[68]Waliszewski, *L'Heritage de Pierre le Grand,* pp. 354-356.
[69]Sbornik, *op. cit.,* Vol. 96, p. 632, de la Chétardie to Amelot, December 7, 1741.

in Sbornik does not even mention this incident and indicates that the Frenchman was not aware of the event until the following morning, at the earliest, at a time when the great news was public property.[70] That he was caught napping is made clear from his correspondence to Amelot on the very day before the coup. "An outbreak, the success of which can never morally be certain, especially now that the Swedes are not in a position to lend a hand, would be very difficult to bring about unless it could be substantially backed up."[71]

Another account states, "During the revolution, M. de la Chétardie was extremely nervous. He foresaw that if the affair failed he was lost. He was running the risk of his life and that of his whole entourage. He watched what was going on in the street from behind a curtain. He had ordered his entire household to be awake but all lights were out . . . What a contrast to the time when, not being able to show proper credentials and not being even covered by diplomatic immunity, he had converted his residence into a fortress!"[72] Quite a different picture from the heroics depicted in the two letters of the Sbornik account, that of December 7 to the King and the undated one in which he states that hourly couriers from Elizabeth kept him informed of the progress of events.[73]

One can understand how embarrassing it would be for Elizabeth to have to admit that she had been elevated to the throne by means of Franco-Swedish support and connivance. However, the painful consequences of such a confession might be balanced by a firm alliance with Versailles buttressed by subsidies. Yet, shortly after the coup, when asked if she employed French means, the response was categorical. "I had nothing to do with the enemies (note the word!) of my country, neither with the alliances nor the correspondence which my doctor gave out to the French envoy. I merely asked him to keep me documented."[74] Bain, who examined all six of the reports of the Revolution, can state, " . . . Elizabeth, without any help from without, overthrew the existing government in a couple of

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[70]Prince Jacob Petrovich Shakhovsky (Ober-procurator of Holy Synod and Conference Minister of Elizabeth), Zapiski (St. Petersburg, 1872), pp. 30-36.

[71]Waliszewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-362. Waliszewski even satirizes to the effect that Elizabeth may have told de la Chétardie she was flying to glory without his aid. Mediger, *op. cit.*, p. 98, pp. 189-193. Mediger confirms the fact that the December 5th revolution was spontaneous and unplanned. However, he takes for granted the de la Chétardie dispatches to Versailles in which the Marquis depicted himself as a key figure in the uprising and therefore as enjoying the full confidence and gratitude of the newly installed Empress of all the Russias. Interestingly enough, Mediger claims that Elizabeth was prompted to revolutionary action by the failure of the Swedes to declare in her favor, and depended on France to mediate the war with Sweden. There is little to confirm Mediger's view except the French ambassador's unreliable correspondence.

[72]Rambaud, *op. cit.*, p. 367 cite. Extract from the Journal of Sieur Mondamert, *Affaires Etrangères Russie;* t.I. folio 192.

[73]Pekarski, *op. cit.*, p. 273; Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 96, pp. 651-660, Account of the Revolution, December 6, 1741.

[74]H. I. Tikhonravov, *Account of Elizabeth's Accession to the Throne in a letter of I. A. Scherbatov, English Resident of Russia in London, December 18, 1741,* in *Russki Arkhiv,* 1872, p. 1173.

hours, a circumstance carefully to be borne in mind, as many historians, rashly relying on certain ex-post facto statements by de la Chétardie, have credited that diplomatist with a leading part in the revolution which placed the daughter of Peter the Great on the throne. As a matter of fact, de la Chétardie, beyond lending the Tsarevna 2,000 ducats instead of the 15,000 she demanded of him, took no part whatever in the actual coup d'état which was as great a surprise to him as to everyone else. The merit and glory of that affair belong to Elizabeth alone."[75] Waliszewski is the most adamant and sarcastic denigrator of de la Chétardie's assumption of credit for the revolution:

"It happened on the 22nd of November (3rd of December 1741),[76] in a last inefficacious interview between the French envoy and Elizabeth and the role of the Marquis de la Chétardie ends on this date. Several hours later, like a gathering avalanche, the other elements in the plot, despised or ignored by him, were put spontaneously into motion, under the influence of a convergence of events entirely unanticipated; but he counted for nothing in all of this, and neither France nor Sweden had any part in the events—the letters from de la Chétardie and those the cabinet received simultaneously from Stockholm reconstruct the event sufficiently for us to prove that the participation of France in the adventure was still a vague plan and contrary to a version universally accepted; even this plan did not proceed from the initiative of the young representative of French diplomacy at St. Petersburg." In a moment of candor the Prince de Conti (a candidate for the hand of Elizabeth, the Duchy of Courland and the Crown of Poland at one time) wrote: "The revolution occurred without us," adding that, "one could not pardon the King's envoy for not having made the best of his position and for having shown an adventuresome spirit at all times except when it was most necessary, viz, during the coup."[77]

Certainly, from all accounts, Elizabeth behaved in a most effective manner in arming the Preobrazhentsy, in arresting the Grand Duchess Anna Leopoldovna and the leading ministers in the Regency government, and in installing herself on the afternoon of December 6 in the Winter Palace. De la Chétardie proclaimed himself unofficial grand vizier of the new Empress and ostentatiously took the credit for ordering a draconian treatment of the Brunswick government ministers.[78]

Aside from the perpetuation by historians of the myth of de la Chétardie's instrumentality in financing and engineering the coup, the French connection had several reverberations on the diplomatic relations of Europe for the next few years.[79]

Not only did Louis XV's government accept his envoy's account

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[75]Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
[76]Waliszewski alone uses the dates the 3rd and 4th December.
[77]Waliszewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 356 and 232.
[78]Vandal, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
[79]Potemkin, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

of his standing at Peterhof, but so did the emissaries of the powers.[80] For a brief period, it strengthened the hand of Versailles in dealing with its ally, Frederick II.[81]

De la Chétardie, suffering from a kind of paranoia on the subject, may have sincerely believed that he had been responsible for Elizabeth's success. Apparently, he overdrew on the draft of gratitude he felt was his due, and installed himself as an intriguer. Far from consolidating the relations between Peterhof and Versailles, he exacerbated them by assuming foolishly a *carte blanche* to draw Russia into France's Northern System by use of persuasion and cajolery. Vandal rather superficially attributes his tragic failures in 1742 and 1744 to the boorish antagonism of that arch-villain Bestuzhev-Riumin. The French historian, however, omits three very important factors: (1) though de la Chétardie may have been used by Elizabeth's camarilla, he was by no means indispensable and could be disposed of without any serious repercussions on Russian interests; (2) the Marquis mistook a purely personal favoritism on the part of the Empress for an empathy toward Gallic civilization and political alignments; (3) Elizabeth had made no concrete commitments either to France or Sweden, and de la Chétardie's overt insistence was embarrassing to her personal integrity and the well-advertised patriotism of the new régime at St. Petersburg; (4) the Marquis exaggerated the Francophile proclivities of the Empress to such a degree that he convinced Louis XV that Russian alliance or at least benevolent neutrality in the Silesian Wars were readily obtainable. This funereal legacy dominated the French King's Eastern policy for at least a year and a half after the tragi-comic expulsion of his favorite de la Chétardie from the Russian capital in June 1744.

Vandal and those who have followed his interpretation have then either misjudged or omitted the following factors in Franco-Russian relations during the 1740's: (1) The economic ties binding the Russian nobility to England were so strong that only a complete reversal in the traditional Eastern diplomacy of Versailles could have substituted a French for a British alliance. (2) Considering the unfavorable diplomatic climate for a Franco-Russian entente, the French court did extend itself to a considerable degree in order to achieve an understanding.[82] (3) That the effort did not succeed was not due mainly, as M. Vandal would have us believe, to the personal foibles of de la Chétardie or the hostility of the Russian chancellor, Bestuzhev-Riumin. The French were undone rather by mis-

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[80]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 100, Finch to Harrington, December 8, 1741, the English ambassador to St. Petersburg, "Here France finds herself 'in benediction' ".

[81]Frederick II, *Politische Correspondenz*, eds. J. G. Droysen, M. Duncker, G. B. Volz, (Berlin, 1879-1938), Vol. II. p. 47.

[82]Sbornik, *op. cit.*, Vol. 105, pp. 52-56, pp. 71-77. Memoir of de la Chétardie. Mediger, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-234. Before his second mission to Petersburg, (December 1743), de la Chétardie had worked out a plan for the inclusion of Russia in a new Eastern Barrier system. He saw his opportunity in the disgrace of the Austrian ambassador to Russia, Botta, who had been expelled in 1743 on the grounds of complicity in a plot directed against Elizabeth. Bestuzhev-Riumin, the anti-French vice-chancellor of Russia, seemed

taken notions of both Elizabeth's autonomous power and the extent of her Francophile sympathies. The whole structure of Versailles diplomacy was ill-adapted to the exigencies of *realpolitik* in Eastern Europe and within itself constituted an uncoordinated mechanism. It was inhibited by doubt, suspicion, over-complexity, the cleverness of its rivals at Peterhof and often sheer adversity of circumstances. These factors tended to obscure and emasculate the partly sincere reorientation of the French *vis-à-vis* the Russians during the first two Silesian Wars.

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to be indirectly involved in the conspiracy and destined for a downfall. De la Chétardie proposed that Elizabeth could be won over to a military and commercial alliance with Versailles. Russia and Sweden could be reconciled under a joint dynasty—the Holstein-Gottorp—with both Russian and Swedish troops subsidized to operate against Hannover and Austria. The French were to organize an enormous coalition including Russia, Sweden, Poland and Turkey. It is notable that the alliance was directed as much against Prussia as against Austria. The plan received the endorsement of Louis XV and Amelot, the temporary director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

THE NORTHERN EPIRUS QUESTION RECONSIDERED

by Stavro Skendi

I

On February 28, 1953, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed in Ankara a treaty of friendship and collaboration. The aim of this Pact is peaceful. All the three countries are "resolute to live in peace with all peoples and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace." They are further "decided to defend the liberty and independence of their people as well as their territorial integrity against any violence exercised from outside" and "to unite their efforts in order to make more effective the organization of their defense against every external aggression."[1] This external aggression can come only from the USSR or her satellites.

But the Balkan Treaty is not exclusive. Any state is welcome to participate in it "under the same conditions and with the same rights as the three contracting states," if its collaboration is thought "useful to the materialization of the aims of the Pact."[2] In this way the Treaty leaves the door open for the satellites, if they throw away their Soviet shackles. Of all the satellites, Albania has the greatest possibilities of being liberated from Soviet domination, for she is completely isolated.

On July 11, 1953, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia made a declaration in Athens agreeing "on the point that the independence of Albania would constitute an important element for the peace and stability of the Balkans."[3] It was indeed a sound step. The Albanian government was compelled to react. On August 2, Premier Enver Hoxha in his speech in the People's Assembly denounced the Balkan Pact as an instrument of aggression and interpreted, owing to Greece's claims to southern Albania, the Athens declaration of Albanian independence as a dismemberment of the country and its subjugation by the neighboring Balkan states.[4] The Albanian democratic forces abroad, represented mostly in the National Committee for a Free Albania, formed in Paris in 1949 and enjoying the support of the Western Powers, while partially satisfied by the Tripartite declaration of July 11, raised their voice for territorial integrity.[5]

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[1]Text in Greek of the Tripartite Treaty, *To Vēma* (The Tribune), Athens, March 1, 1953, p. 1.

[2]Article IX, in *ibid.*

[3]See text of the declaration in Greek, *To Vēma,* July 12, 1953, p. 1.

[4]Excerpts of the speech in *Dielli* (The Sun), organ of the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, "Vatra" (The Hearth), Boston, Mass., September 16, 1953, p. 1.

[5]See July and August issues of the Albanian émigré press: *Shqipëria* (Albania), organ of the NCFA, Rome (Italy); *Flamuri* (The Flag), organ of the Albanian Agrarian-Democratic Party "Balli Kombtar" (The National Front), Rome (Italy); *I Mërguemi* (The Émigré), independent, Marseilles (France); *L'Albanie Libre,* organ of the National Independent Bloc, Rome (Italy).

Albanian territorial integrity is at the root of Greco-Yugoslav differences. Greece claims the southern part of Albania, which she calls Northern Epirus, and Yugoslavia does not support her. In August 1953 the dispute was even divulged publicly by the Belgrade radio. The Yugoslav broadcast denounced the suggestion from Athens' semi-official newspaper, *Messager d'Athènes,* that Albania ought to be "liberated" and "that many reasons speak on behalf of those who believe direct action is the best way to overthrow the Enver Hoxha régime".[6] Citing the Athens Tripartite conference in which the independence of Albania was backed, the Belgrade radio stressed that Albania was expected to liberate herself.[7] The desire to see Albania independent was reaffirmed by Tito in his speech at Skoplje on October 11, 1953, in which he also stressed that Yugoslavia would not consent to any one interfering in Albanian internal affairs.[8] With Yugoslav assistance, however, another Albanian Committee (Union of Albanian Political Emigrés in Yugoslavia), hostile to the Tirana régime, was established in 1951 in Prizren, a city in Yugoslavia but near the Albanian frontier.

It is well known that the USSR tries her best to destroy the efficacy of the Balkan Pact. She views it as NATO's child, although Yugoslavia is not a member of the latter. Any disagreement, therefore, among the Signatories of the Balkan Treaty would play into the hands of Russia and endanger that Treaty.

It is not the first time that the Northern Epirus question has become an obstacle to Balkan understanding or settlement. When it originally appeared after the first Balkan War, at the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913, it created such a delicate situation that it imperilled the Conference. After World War I, Greece again presented her claims at the Paris Conference of 1919. The question was discussed lengthily, passing from the Peace Conference to its successor, the Conference of Ambassadors and, after Albania had acquired membership in the League of Nations, to consideration by the League itself. There, Lord Robert Cecil took an energetic stand for the solution of the problem, declaring that "delay in this matter was criminally dangerous to the peace of the world."[9]

After Italy attacked Greece in 1940 and the Greek armies had advanced into Albania, the Greek demands for Nortern Epirus were revived. They were presented officially in a memorandum to the Council of Foreign Ministers of April 1946, the Council having been empowered by the Potsdam Conference "to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe".[10] The Greek claims were set forth in the speeches of Premier Tsaldares, during August, 1946, in the Paris Peace Conference.

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[6]Text as cited in *New York Times,* August 29, 1953 [4:6].
[7]*Ibid.*
[8]Text of speech in *Borba* (The Battle), Zagreb, October 12, 1953 [1:5].
[9]E. P. Stickney, *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in International European Affairs* (Stanford University, 1926), p. 141.
[10]Potsdam Declaration, Section II, 3a; London *Times,* April 17, 1946 [4:2].

In the autumn of 1948 a UN Conciliation Committee, headed by Dr. Evatt, was formed in order to explore the possibilities of reaching an agreement as to the methods and procedure to be adopted for a settlement of the differences among Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia.[11] The Committee immediately began talks with the representatives of the four Balkan governments, but it soon met a stumbling block. Greece was unwilling to withdraw her claims to Northern Epirus. On December 14, 1948, Dr. Evatt declared that the efforts of the Conciliation Committee had failed because the Greek government refused "to treat existing boundaries between Albania and Greece as definitive."[12] When in April, 1949, the Committee resumed its discussions at Lake Success, the Northern Epirus question emerged again as the chief obstacle to a Balkan settlement.

II

In order to understand this Greco-Albanian controversy, it is necessary to review at the outset the main arguments and refutations presented by both sides.

But first, what is really meant by Northern Epirus? It is difficult even today to define exactly its meaning. The Greek Premier Tsaldares was as vague, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, about the exact limits of Northern Epirus as he was about the "ethnic frontier". The expression, which is a Greek invention, is elastic and its interpretation has varied according to the necessity to adapt the Greek demands or the interests of the Great Powers to changing international conditions. However, the area generally referred to as Northern Epirus is that part of southern Albania which is comprised between the northern Greek frontier, as in 1940 (and today), and a line drawn from a point north of Korça (Koritza), near Lake Prespa, to a point south of Valona, on the Adriatic. It includes the prefectures of Korça and Gjinokastër (Argyrokastro), an area of approximately 2,800 square miles,[13] with a total population, Moslem and Christian, of 272,581, according to the 1945 census. In Albanian this region is called southern Albania and constitutes part of *Toskëria*. The Greeks, apparently considering it a continuation of their northern province of Epirus, have named it Northern Epirus.

At the London Conference of 1913, the Greeks endeavored to prove the Greek character of this region. They based their argument on the Turkish census of 1908, according to which Northern Epirus was inhabited by 120,000 *Roums* and 80,000 Albanians. The Albanian delegation not only contested the exactness of the figures but also rejected the use of the terms "Greeks" and "Albanians". It asserted that in the Ottoman Empire

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[11] *United Nations Bulletin,* November 15, 1948, p. 940.

[12] *New York Times,* December 15, 1948 [1:2].

[13] In an American report of 1919 in P. M. Pipinelēs, *Europe and the Albanian Question* (New York, 1945), p. 69, the area claimed by Greece is given as 2400 square miles.

all Christians dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople were called *Roum,* meaning Greek. As the Christian Albanians of the South, during the Ottoman régime, were dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople, it was natural for the Turks to have regarded them as *Roums. Roum,* then, in the 1908 census, did not mean Greek but Orthodox Christian.

The next argument introduced by the Greek delegation concerned the question of schools and the church. It was maintained that, since the Orthodox Christian population attended Greek educational institutions and the liturgy in their churches was in the Greek language, this population was of Greek nationality. The Albanians admitted the premises but disputed the conclusion. During the Ottoman occupation, they argued, Albanian schools had been forbidden. There were only two kinds of institutions for the people of Southern Albania: Greek and Turkish, the former for the Christians, the latter for the Moslems. It was one of the privileges of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, they continued, to monopolize the education of the Christians in the Balkans, a fact often mentioned during the struggle of the Balkan nations to free themselves from Greek cultural propaganda. This privilege also served the policy of the Ottoman Empire: *divide et impera.* But whenever Orthodox Christian Albanians were free to show their feelings and to use their own language, as in the United States and other countries, they did so.

At the Paris Conference of 1919 the arguments set forth by the Greeks were basically identical with those of the London Conference. Only one argument was new. When, in 1914, Greek troops were ordered by the Conference of Ambassadors to withdraw from Northern Epirus, a revolt took place and a provisional autonomous government of Northern Epirus was established at Gjinokastër. This event was interpreted by them as being a manifestation of the Greek sentiments of the population who rejected Albanian rule and desired union with Greece. The Albanian representatives contended that the insurrection was an act of the Greek government, and that this was clear from the fact that the bands were composed of supposed deserters from the Greek army,—Cretans and Peloponnesians,—and that the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of Northern Epirus was an active officer of the Greek army, Colonel Doulis. A stronger Albanian argument, however, lay in the fact that the Provisional Government of Northern Epirus did not ask for union with Greece but simply for a certain local autonomy.[14] The issue was so blurred that the American delegation felt obliged to state officially: "The Delegation of the United States is unable to accept as satisfying evidence the history of the troubled years 1913-1914 in which foreign intrigue was active, or testimonies of parties to the contest on either side."[15] In 1922, "Greek schools for the Greek-speaking minority,

[14]For a detailed account of the Greek and Albanian cases, both in 1913 and 1919, see E. P. Stickney, *op. cit.,* Ch. III and V.

[15]Report of Committee on Greek Territorial Claims, text as published in the appendix of *ibid.,* p. 165.

which numbers about 16,000, are already established and are subsidized by the Albanian Government in accordance with the rules laid down for the protection of minorities."[16] They continued to function—with a short interval—until the occupation of Albania by Mussolini's forces.

In the speeches of Premier Tsaldares, at the Paris Conference of 1946, the old arguments of the 1908 census and of the national character of the population were reiterated, with the reservation, however, that "before the war and after it, the Albanians applied systematic tactics to change the ethnic character of Northern Epirus."[17] He then accused Albania of having declared war on Greece in 1940: "Greece saw standing up against her, beside the Italian divisions, 14 Albanian battalions," and added that "the state of war existing between Albania and ourselves must come to a natural and just end through the cession of Northern Epirus to Greece." As the Italian invasion came from Albania, the other argument which the Greek Prime Minister used was "security." Greece needed the range of mountains of the southern part of Albania and the island of Saseno, opposite Valona, for her self-defense.[18]

On August 21, 1946, the Albanian Premier Hoxha delivered a long speech. He traced the history of the Italian invasion: "The small Albanian people, alone and without any aid, was the first victim of Italian aggression. . . . When Italy attacked Greece, the Albanian people with their strong actions aided the Greek people." He cited Marshal Badoglio as having testified to the damage the Albanians did to Italian convoys when Italy attacked Greece. To M. Tsaldares, who said that 14 battalions fought side by side with the Italians, the Albanian Prime Minister answered that the Albanian quislings were able to recruit but a few battalions, and tried to show the effectiveness of the Partisan movement against the Axis Powers by quoting from Allied sources. He added that the "Albanian nation never attacked Greece. . . . It would be ridiculous to think that a decree of Victor Emmanuel[19] could bind a courageous nation." As for the Greek population in southern Albania, he declared that, according to the 1945 census, it amounted to 35,000. At the end, General Hoxha attacked the Greek Premier for allegedly having proposed to a member (Mose Pijade) of the Yugoslav delegation but a few days ago, the dismemberment of Albania.[20]

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[16]League of Nations, *General Report of the Commission of Enquiry and Resolutions Adopted by the Council,* May 14, 1922, p. 10.

[17]*Atlantis,* national daily Greek newspaper, New York, Aug. 5, 1946 [2:2].

[18]*New York Times,* Aug. 4, 1946 [1:1]; Aug 6, 1946 [12:3]. London *Times,* Aug. 5, 1946 [4:3]; August 13, 1946 [3:3]; Aug. 23 [4:6]. *Atlantis,* Aug. 5, 1946 [1:6] and [2:2].

[19]The decree referred to was that of June 9, 1940, article 1 of which read: "The Albanian Kingdom is considered to be at war with those states with which the Italian Kingdom will be at war." Royal Decree No. 194, *Fletorja Zyrtare* (Official Gazette), No. 93, June 10, 1940.

[20]Speech in *Bashkimi* (The Union), central organ of the Democratic Front, Tirana, Aug. 23, 1946 [1:1, 3, 4]; cf. also *New York Times,* Aug. 22, 1946 [4:3]; London *Times,* Aug. 22, 1946 [3:4].

III

The Northern Epirus question has always deeply involved the Great Powers because of the strategic position of Albania and their conflicting interests in the Balkans. In fact, it has been as much of an issue among them as between Greece and Albania.

At the London Conference of 1913 Italy was afraid that Austria-Hungary might expand and become entrenched on the Albanian shore of the Adriatic and thus frustrate her desire to make the sea an Italian lake. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, feared that Italy might lay hold on the opposite coast and block her ambition to dominate the Adriatic, as well as check her expansion in the Balkans. To this fear was added the possibility of Serbia's falling under the influence of Tsarist Russia and threatening Austria-Hungary's position in the Adriatic. In their common interests they rejected the Greek claims and supported the creation of an independent Albania.

At the Paris Conference of 1919 the conflict was between Italy, on one side, and the United States, France and England, on the other. The solution of the Northern Epirus question was closely tied up with the question of the fate of the London Pact of 1915. At the outset Italy's attitude favored the recognition of the Albanian state within the frontiers of 1913, with the exception of Valona, which she coveted for strategic reasons. But when she failed to obtain Dalmatia, she claimed the whole of Albania. France and England, desiring to restrict Italy's sphere of influence in the Balkans, favored Albania's partition between Greece and Yugoslavia. Their various proposals show the elasticity of the territory termed as Northern Epirus. The United States, however, on principles of justice, had always stood firm against any dismemberment of Albania. American support and the victory of the Albanians over the Italian army in the battle of Valona, in 1920, provoked mainly by the secret treaty Tittoni-Venizelos, secured the territorial integrity and independence of Albania.

At the Conference of 1946, in Paris, there was not an open conflict among the Great Powers but a frontal attack of the Eastern bloc against the Greek claims and the Greek government. The régime established in Tirana was then under the dual control of Yugoslavia and Russia, and it was reported that Russians were fortifying the island of Saseno, claimed by Greece. Roads were being built joining Albania to Yugoslavia, which eventually would give the USSR a valuable outpost in the Mediterranean, neutralizing definitely the then much disputed port of Trieste. Judging *a posteriori,* Albania was intended to become a base for pressure on Greece, and the Soviet Union desired to win the sympathy of the Albanian people and blame the Greek government for frontier complications which might arise in the future, by accusing her of imperialist expansion. The Ukrainian representative, Manuilsky, assailed the Greek demands and extolled the contribution of the Albanian partisans during the war. Shortly after, at

Lake Success, he lodged a complaint against Greece as a trouble-maker and a danger to the peace of the Balkans. When the Greek representative asked, in the General Conference, for the inclusion of the Nortern Epirus question in the agenda of the Foreign Ministers' Council, Molotov and the representative of Yugoslavia, Kardelj, fought strenuously against it.

Great Britain, on the other hand, was inclined to support the Greek claims. She was indebted to Greece for a great contribution during the war. As early as December, 1942, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, in his statement on Albania's struggle against Fascism and the right to independence, added the reservation that the frontiers of the Albanian state after the war would have to be considered at the peace settlement, if direct agreement between Albania and her neighbors should fail.[21] England backed up Greece in her proposals to bar Albania from becoming a member of international organizations. Shortly before the Conference of Paris, Bevin made a declaration that Greece's demands "will have a fair hearing."

Greece was of vital importance to England. If she lost her influence over Greece, she would be completely out of the Balkans and her Mediterranean communications would be jeopardized. Moreover, the support of the Greek claims would strengthen the parties in power, which were favorable to her, and would bring that country still further under her influence. Of course, the island of Corfu, which would become a strong base with the Greek acquisition of the opposite Albanian coast, was of strategic importance to her, especially with Saseno under Russian control. But Great Britain had to act prudently. Greek claims appeared ill-founded and Soviet opposition was stubborn. If England failed in a contest with Russia, Greek public opinion would be influenced unfavorably. In Greek eyes the Soviet Union would seem omnipotent in Europe, and the pro-Russian faction in Greece would find a more fertile ground for its propaganda.

In that period Secretary of State Byrnes was endeavoring to bring about a European settlement by compromises on the part of all the Great Powers. In Washington, however, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate had passed a resolution that Northern Epirus should be given to Greece. It was almost identical to that presented in 1920 by Senator Lodge. But the State Department did not express an opinion about the question of Northern Epirus, except to urge that a full hearing be given to both parties to the dispute. Apparently, its desire was to see Albania within the borders of 1913, but as friendly to the Anglo-Saxons as she was to the Slavs. The State Department hoped that the tradition of American friendship would be continued, at least in the cultural field, by the new Albanian régime. While England had withdrawn her mission from Albania, the United States had kept its own informal mission there until it was ejected by the Hoxha régime on November 15, 1946. America, as a peace-loving nation, was interested in seeing Albania in control of its own destinies and free at last

[21]London *Times,* Dec. 18, 1942 [5:3].

of the domination of any Great Power. Secretary Byrnes' influence was greatly felt in the withdrawal from the agenda of the Foreign Ministers' Council of the Northern Epirus question by the Greek delegation.

IV

The repeated claims of Greece to Northern Epirus, after the end of each successive war, have created a source of constant alarm for the Albanian people. They believe that beyond the Grammos Mountains there is a state hostile to them which tries to encroach upon their territory. In Greece these same demands have propagated the idea that the Christians of southern Albania are Greeks who must be delivered from the Albanian yoke.

During the war, when Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made the statement regarding Albania's boundaries, and immediately after Prime Minister Tsouderos renewed the Greek claims, the effect upon the Albanian people was depressing. The hope of collaborating with the Greeks in the resistance against the Axis Powers vanished. To the fear that Kossovo (a region in Yugoslavia, inhabited mostly by Moslem Albanians, annexed to Albania by Italy after the collapse of the Yugoslav State in 1941) would be lost to them, after an Allied victory, was added the risk of seeing southern Albania detached. The result was a confusion benefiting the invaders. In Greece, however, the effect was different. The demands of Northern Epirus intensified the nationalist spirit of those who wanted to see a greater Greece and increased their resistance to the Axis. But this contribution to the common struggle was counterbalanced by the resulting absence of cooperation between the non-Communist Albanian and Greek resistance forces.

The Northern Epirus claims were also a factor in the accession to power of Hoxha's party. A number of Albanians seeing the only hope for the preservation of the territorial integrity of their country in a Balkan federation, with autonomous socialist states, so adroitly preached by the Communists during the war, joined the ranks of Hoxha's movement. After the war, when Hoxha's régime was shaken because of the loss of Kossovo—the Albanian government helped Tito's forces to re-occupy that region—the Greek demands enabled it to come forward as the defender of Albania's national rights. They even served as a justification for support of Markos' Greek guerillas, since an extreme leftist government in Greece would, supposedly, abandon all claims to southern Albania. In Greece, on the other hand, the Northern Epirus question placed the Communists in a difficult position and accentuated the contrast between them and the other parties. When the Communist leader Zachariades, returning from Dachau in 1945, urged that Greece give up her demands to Albania's southern part for the sake of Balkan pacification and friendship, he was harshly criticized by the heads of the other parties for not knowing the deep feelings of the Greek people. The Northern Epirus issue was also used during the Greek elections for the benefit of the non-Communist parties.

But the most important effects of the Greek claims have been in the international field. In the Security Council and in the Assembly of the UN, Russia and her satellites have used them in order to attack Greece, bitterly accusing her of expansionist aims and presenting Albania as the intended victim of a planned aggression. Their offensive position was reinforced by the report of the UN Commission for the Investigation of the Frontier War in Greece which stated that Greece's claims against Albania tended "to increase tension between the countries,"[22] and by Dr. Evatt's laying the blame on Greece, in December 1948, for the failure of the endeavors of the Conciliation Committee to bring about a Balkan settlement.

V

It appears that there is no possibility, in the present international situation, that Northern Epirus might be given to Greece. "To the United States which has traditionally supported the right of all oppressed peoples to freedom and liberty, the tragic plight of the Albanian people is a matter of deep concern. . . . The United States recognizes that the problem of future relationship between a free and independent Albania and its neighbors is a matter primarily for bilateral discussion and solution."[23] However, it would be useful to see whether there would be any advantage to Greece, in case she ever achieved her ambition.

The Christian population of Northern Epirus, with the exception of 35,000 Greeks, is Albanian. When, in 1913, the Conference of Ambassadors sent an International Commission to delimit the boundaries on "ethnographic bases," the Commission declared that it was Albanian. Harold Nicolson, expert of the British Delegation at the Peace Conference of 1919, wrote in his diary: "I feel heart-heavy about Koritsa. I am convinced that it ought to go to Albania, Italians or no Italians."[24] The Greek cultural and religious influences, which in the past had created a certain hellenophilism among the Christian Orthodox population, have now disappeared. The new generation has been educated in Albanian institutions—today heavily under Russian influence—and knows no Greek at all, except ancient Greek, as taught in European schools. The Greek bishops, dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople, left in the early '20's, and Albania has her own autocephalous Church which was officially recognized by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1937, although at present the Church is subservient to Moscow. Greece, then, would take within her boundaries an alien population "turbulent and bold" and would create the problem of an *Albania irredenta*. In 1940 Italy used the presence of an Albanian minority in Çamëria (Chamuria), in the northern part of the Greek province of Epirus, as a pretext for aggression. Southern Albania, if transferred to Greece, might be the cause of another war in the future.

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[22] *United Nations Bulletin*, July 1, 1947, p. 22.

[23] Letter of John F. Dulles to Hasan Dosti, President of the National Committee for a Free Albania, August 26, 1953.

[24] H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, (London, 1933), p. 277.

Would the possession of southern Albania by Greece improve the latter's strategic position? Greece already has a strategic frontier with Albania, the Grammos Mountains, which partly thwarted the advance of the Italian troops and became later the stronghold of Markos' guerrillas. As to the island of Saseno, it was given to Albania by Art. 28 of the treaty with Italy: "Italy recognizes that the Island of Saseno is part of the territory of Albania and renounces all claims thereto." On the other hand, with the acquisition of Northern Epirus, Greece's common borders with Yugoslavia would run to the Adriatic, since the rest of Albania would not be able to live by itself and would be forced either to join the Yugoslav federative state or ask for its protection—if not for that of another power. The only strategic benefit which annexation of Northern Epirus could bring to Greece would be the control of the Strait of Corfu, but even that would be questionable with a crippled Albania within the orbit of a state stronger than Greece controlling Saseno.

It is only just that Northern Epirus should remain part of Albania. In spite of numerous invasions, the people of Northern Epirus have preserved their Albanian character. They have always revolted against foreign domination and have been lovers of liberty. It was in Northern Epirus that the nationalist movement began before the Balkan Wars, Korça (Koritza) having been its cradle. It was there that the resistance movement started, both nationalist and communist, which spread all over the country (1939-1944). Besides, Northern Epirus is the most important part of Albania. Because of better means of communication and better education, its people have always taken the lead in progressive movements. Detach Northern Epirus from Albania and the latter ceases.

VI

Are there any solutions for this controversy? The first that comes to mind is a plebiscite under UN supervision. Whenever in past Conferences the Albanian delegations have asked for a plebiscite, the Greek memoranda have remained silent about it. There is only one instance when Greece made an indirect proposal for a plebiscite, and that as far back as April 4, 1913.[25] Another solution would be to leave the question to the decision of an international investigating commission. Such commissions have made investigations in the past. The Protocol of Florence of 1913—a key document in the controversy of Northern Epirus—accorded to Albania a southern frontier regarded as definitive by her ever since. On July 30, 1926, another Protocol definitely confirming the new border line (i.e. of the Florence Protocol) was drawn up by the Ambassadors' Conference and it bore the signature, on behalf of Greece, of M. Carapanos.[26]

[25] P. M. Pipinelēs, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

A third solution—the real solution, imposed also by the present situation—depends on Greece herself. She should stretch out a friendly hand to the Albanian people and give up her claims as she officially did in 1926. A declaration on the part of the members of the Balkan Pact to this effect, with the reservation that a liberated Albania should give all guarantees for the free development as a minority of the 35,000 Greeks living in southern Albania (the number has now decreased because of flights across the border) would be a very advantageous step. It would also agree with United States policy which is "primarily for bilateral discussion and solution" and is expected to be as warmly welcomed as the "recent declarations by Albania's neighbors of their peaceful purpose toward Albania and their intent to support the right of the Albanian people to freedom and independence."[27] As for the guarantees, a liberated and democratic Albanian State should find no difficulty in giving them. Pre-war Albania observed scrupulously the Minority Treaties of the League of Nations. However, an exchange of population similar to that carried out by Greece and Turkey in the early '20's (for there are in Albania, according to the Tirana authorities, more than 20,000 Albanian refugees from Camëria, as a result of persecution by Greek nationalists) would be more advisable for the future. It would put an end to a controversy which has poisoned the relations of two peoples who have valuable links and sound reasons to be friendly.

But other advantages would accrue from such a solution of the Northern Epirus question. A Tripartite declaration for the recognition of Albanian territorial integrity would deprive the Tirana government of a weapon that has had great power and has contributed to its consolidation. The Albanian people would be encouraged to resist more actively the communistic régime which has brought them misery and slavery. The prestige of the National Committee for a Free Albania, (in spite of its present defect) supported by the West, would be raised and the Albanian democratic forces abroad would be incited to intensify their struggle against Hoxha's government. The road toward the liberation of Albania would be paved. Still more so, since the differences between Greece and Yugoslavia, stemming from the Northern Epirus claims, would automatically be eliminated and the Balkan Treaty would function smoothly. And the Pact has broad promises: a cooperation which would cover not only the political and military but also the economic and cultural fields.[28] A liberated democratic Albania would certainly join the Balkan Treaty. It would be a tangible proof that the Signatories of the Pact have no aggressive or expansionist aims; a setback for the Soviet Union and a victory for the West.

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[27]Letter of John F. Dulles to Hasan Dosti, August 26, 1953.

[28]Articles I and IV of the Treaty, *To Vēma,* March 1, 1953, p. 1; "The Balkan Pact—Beginnings of a New Era in the Balkans", an interview with Mr. Tsouderos, Vice-President of the Greek Government, *Review of International Affairs,* Belgrade, IV (August 16, 1953), p. 6.

SOVIET UNDERTAKINGS AND SOVIET MIXED COMPANIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

by *Nicolas Spulber**

1

BEFORE determining the structure and extent of the Soviet companies in Eastern Europe, some preliminary remarks appear in order on the types of "mixed companies" such as they crystallized from the experience of the Soviet Union itself.

Before World War II, various foreign companies and "mixed companies," i.e., companies with Soviet and foreign capital, functioned in the Soviet Union. In a documented study of these companies, S. K. Margold supplies the following definition for the "joint companies":

> A mixed company is a partnership between the Soviet Union and a foreign firm or a foreign government in which the Soviet Union retains 50 per cent. In this partnership the Soviet Union is represented by one of the State-controlled economic or trading enterprises. The company may be organized as a limited dividend corporation, a stock company or a corporation. Whichever it is, it is required to prepare annual plans and maintain definite import and export quotas as provided in the contract.[1]

Three basic types of joint companies functioned in the Soviet Union or with Soviet capital: 1. *Operating concessions,* i.e., concessions for mining, agricultural exploitation and transport in the U.S.S.R.; 2. *Technical aid contracts,* i.e., establishment and equipping of plants, patents, consultative services, etc., in the U.S.S.R.; 3. *Agency agreements,* i.e., companies for marketing Soviet merchandise abroad.

Anxious to obtain the cooperation of foreign capital, to master new technical skills and to break the economic isolation of the country, the Russians set liberal conditions for the foreign firms, granting profits ranging from 10 to 20 per cent per year, as well as the guaranty to the companies to buy a sufficient quantity from their own output so that the specified profit should be assured. Out of these companies, which were liquidated or had their interests purchased *in toto* by the Soviet Union in the thirties, the operating concessions and especially the technical aid contracts (for advice and assistance on a royalty basis) remained, however, limited in number

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[1]Stela K. Margold, *Let's Do Business with Russia,* (New York, 1948), pp. 71-72.

and played a minor role in the Soviet economy.[2] The most successful expansion was marked in the line of the *agency agreement* type company, for the marketing abroad of various Russian produce such as grain, eggs, etc.

This past experience of Soviet association with foreign firms, capital and governments, and of integration of joint companies in the planned structure, was put to ample use by the Soviet Union in the postwar period, in the establishment of various "partnerships," notably in the former ex-German satellites—Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. This time the prewar situation appeared, so to speak, reversed. It was now the Soviet Union who was assuming the role of the exporter of capital—not because she was actually exporting any funds, but because the heritage of German assets placed in her hands an already established network of all types of firms and companies. For their part, the East European countries appeared to play the former role of the Soviet Union, not so much because they were anxious to obtain Soviet "cooperation," but because there was no other way left for them but to accept this "partnership," given the extensive positions acquired by that country in their economies.

In the closing days of the war, the Soviet Union seemed to have little concern for the formation of interlocked companies in Eastern Europe. Political uncertainty about the postwar status of the region, as well as pressing, immediate, Soviet needs, encouraged first a policy of wholesale dismantlement of the former German plants and the transport towards the Soviet Union of any moveable "war booty." This policy was subsequently abandoned as the Russians realized that such transfers represented in most cases only the squandering of equipment[3]; even in the best case, i.e., the

[2]The data available on the percentagewise distribution by type of participants, of the Soviet foreign trade in the twenties, underlines this minor role:

Participants in the Soviet Foreign Trade 1924-27

	Exports			Imports		
	1924/25	1925/26	1926/27	1924/25	1925/26	1926/27
State undertakings	78.9	82.7	85.5	93.1	88.8	88.1
Cooperatives	12.5	10.4	7.8	3.7	7.3	6.0
Joint Companies with foreign capital participation	5.5	2.7	3.0	1.3	1.4	2.0
Foreign firms	1.1	3.1	2.9	1.3	1.3	2.1
Private firms and individuals	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.0
Others	1.3	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

G. P. Kaliuzhnaia, *Pravovye Formy Monopolii Vneshnei Torgovli SSSR v ikh istoricheskom Rasvitii* (The Juridical Forms of the Monopoly of Foreign Trade in their Historical Development), (Moscow, 1951), p. 104.

[3]After an inquiry in Hungary early in 1948, a French observer described as follows this first well-known period which left a trail of rusting equipment from the heart of Europe to the border of the Soviet Union: "The Hungarian entrepreneurs talk with reticence about the equipment and the stock of raw materials taken by the Russians at the time when Hungary was still a zone of war operations. They avoid making estimates.

successful transport of the equipment to the Soviet Union, obviously it was still necessary to construct a plant, to draw on Soviet labor, and to exert a drain on local resources in order to put this equipment to use. From this and other considerations (also of a political nature) evolved rapidly the conception of utilization of most of the equipment on the spot. Once the decision to abandon the dismantling of equipment had been reached, the Russians had to determine: (a) what undertakings should be kept as pure Soviet undertakings in the Eastern European countries; (b) which assets should be used as the Soviet contribution towards the formation of joint companies, i.e., of Soviet partnerships with the respective countries; (c) which plants, machinery, or movables, such as ships or rolling stock, should be sold back to the respective countries. The multifold nature of the German heritage made this choice a difficult one. In fact, the choice was neither immediate nor definitive for each and every case. After the establishment of an exhaustive inventory of the goods and assets considered as having been owned previously by the Germans, the Russians continuously revised the status of certain enterprises, keeping them for a while as Soviet undertakings, placing them eventually as the Soviet contribution in a joint company, swapping them against some other assets or simply selling them back to the local government.

Broadly speaking, the Russians retained as pure Soviet companies (i.e., directly managed by Soviet corporations) such undertakings as financial institutions and distribution companies. On the other hand, they used mostly the shares in mining and manufacture as contributions toward the formation of joint companies, a solution which left the problem of supplying raw materials and labor to the local partner.

2

The multifarious nature of the German heritage which became the property of the Soviet Union can be seen easily from the following table (Table I) based on an official list published by the Hungarian government early in 1947 on the occasion of the recording of claims referring to the German assets. There were transferred *in toto* to Soviet ownership: 17 financial institutions; 82 mining and manufacturing firms of all types; 2 electric power generating and distributing companies; 1 provincial railroad line; 2 shipping companies (operating lines); 31 commercial agencies and bureaus; and 63 miscellaneous businesses. Out of the total of 201 firms, 132 firms, organized as stock companies, were important in insurance,

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The total is perhaps of the order of $200 million which should be added to the $600-800 million worth of goods taken by the Germans. But, curiously enough, the machines taken by the Russians have only rarely reached the plants for which they were meant. Directed towards the East, the equipment has almost always been unloaded at various train stations every time that the Russian commander needed a train. We have seen pictures taken near the Csop region, in the Subcarpathian Ukraine: as far as the eye can see, dismantled machines rust on each side of the rails, lost for everybody . . ." *Le Monde,* Paris, February 9, 1948.

metal manufacturing, textiles, as well as in trade and commerce.[4] Among these firms some played a very considerable role: the First Danube Steamship Corporation, for instance, which had left the shipping business (which passed before the war into the hands of a purely Hungarian company), remained significant in the coal mining business thanks to its control of the coal mines in the county of Baranya; Felton and Guillaume Company had practically a monopoly position in the fields of steel cables, electrical insulation, and similar products; Domestic Textile Weaving and Cloth Manufacturing held a considerable part of the wool industry of the country; Linen, Jute and Textile Industry Corporation held an outstanding position in the jute business. The textile companies, when added up together, accounted for a considerable part of the textile industry, though individually only one of them was important. Companies in various branches, while not first rate, held a notable portion of the business in their field (e.g., Otis Elevator Company, European Freight and Luggage Company, etc.).[5]

Outside these companies the Russians also inherited various blocks of shares—such as shares of the National Bank of Hungary, a block of shares of the Hungarian General Credit Bank which had previously belonged to the Dresdner Bank, and some shares of key companies (such as the big metallurgical complex Manfred Weiss at Csepel).

While most of the companies figuring on the list mentioned above were used in the beginning as Soviet undertakings, the Russians moved early in 1946 toward the formation of some joint companies in the fields of transportation and mining. These companies were:

1. The Soviet-Hungarian company for river navigation, mainly on the Danube: MESZHART.[6] The Soviet contribution consisted both in some German shares and in former Hungarian vessels retaken from the Germans. For her part, Hungary placed at the disposition of the new company her port facilities, warehouses and buildings pertaining thereto. At its formation, *Meszhart* disposed in fact of the limited tonnage of 30,500 tons—i.e.,

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[4]The list was published on March 8, 1947, in *Magyar Kozlony,* Rendeletek Tara (Official Journal of Hungary, Collection of Decrees)—No. 56, Budapest, pp. 561-565. It comprised 201 names classified into three groups: (I) 95 stock companies; (II) 37 companies with state participation; (III) 69 firms belonging to individuals, cooperatives and societies with limited responsibility. Less than a year after the publication of that document, an order in the Council of Ministers *cancelled* all the claims arising against these companies before January 20, 1945. (*Cf.*: Order No. 15/720/Korm. of Jan. 4, 1948, in *Bulletin of the National Bank of Hungary,* New Series, Fourth Year, No. 1-2, Budapest, Jan.-Feb., 1948, p. 22.) In the autumn of 1952, a communique of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry indicated that Hungary had purchased "69 Soviet undertakings in Hungary" without revealing, however, either the names of the companies or the price paid. It is possible to infer that these 69 companies are the individual firms, cooperatives and societies with limited responsibility forming the group III of the list and representing the least important part of the German heritage.

[5]The author acknowledges with thanks the valuable comments on the importance and activity of the Hungarian companies kindly supplied by Dr. Victor Bator.

[6]Status fixed by order in Council of Ministers No. 4730/ME, Budapest, May 4, 1946.

HUNGARY: German Assets Transferred to the Soviet Union. Data from the Official List of March 8, 1947*

— Classification by type of business —

Stock Companies (Groups I and II of the official list)

Financial Institutions		Mining and Manufacturing		Fuel and Power		Transport		Trade and Commerce		Miscellaneous		Total
Banks	2	Metals, Metal Products	14	Electric		Railroad	1	Shipping		Miscellaneous	10	
Insurance		Mining, Mining Works	4	Power	2	Shipping		and		Not Classified	13	
Companies	11	Textiles	14	Charcoal		Cos.	2	Travel				
		Construction Materials	4	Prod.	1	Moving	2	Burs.	5			
		Chemicals	7					Commercial				
		Laboratory and Medical Supplies	6					Agencies	17			
		Electrical Appliances	5									
		Food Processing	3									
		Lumber	3									
		Paper and Packaging	1									
		Glass Manufacturing	2									
		Shoe Manufacturing	2									
		Ship Construction	1									
	13		66		3		5		22		23	132

Firms Belonging to Individuals, Cooperatives and Societies with Limited Responsibility (Group III of the official list)

Savings Banks	4	Metals and Metal Works	6	—		—		Commercial Agencies	9	Miscellaneous	10	
		Textiles	3							Not Classified	30	
		Insurance Supplies and Appliances	4									
		Other Manufacturers	3									
	4		16		—		—		9		40	69
GRAND TOTAL	17		82		3		5		31		63	201

*Annex to the Decree No. 3080-1947, *Magyar Kozlony,* Rendeletek Tara (Official Journal of Hungary, Collection of Decrees)—No. 56, Budapest, March 8, 1947, pp. 561-565.

TABLE I

one-fourth of the prewar Hungarian Danubian flotilla—consisting of various types of vessels, tugboats, etc.

2. The Soviet-Hungarian company for civil aviation: MASZOVLET.[7] The Soviet contribution consisted mostly in the aircraft; while Hungary, for her part, guaranteed the use of *all* the civil airports and hangars existing on her territory. The Soviet Union extended a similar guarantee, but only on the route connecting Hungary to the Soviet Union.

3. The Soviet-Hungarian company for the prospection, production, drilling (on behalf of this or any other company), and marketing of oil: MASZOVOL.[8]

4. The Soviet-Hungarian company for the processing of crude oil for *Maszovol* and other companies, and the marketing of oil products: MOLAJ.[9] The companies converted into *Maszovol* and *Molaj* respectively, were the former Manat Ltd. and Ornstein and Koppel Ltd.[10] The Soviet incorporators brought as their contribution the former German Crude Oil Company[11] and the concessions obtained during the war in the Bekes county by the German firm Wintershall A. G. As her contribution, Hungary also agreed to place at the disposal of these companies the oil royalties received from the Lipse oil fields (the latter not included in the agreement) which were estimated at some 15 per cent of the production of these fields.

5. The Soviet-Hungarian company for mining, by lease or purchase, and production of all kinds of minerals, especially bauxite, as well as the manufacture of alum earth, aluminum and alloys: MAGYAR BAUXITE BANYA (Hungarian Bauxite Mine)—SOVIET-HUNGARIAN BAUXITE-ALUMINUM CO.

6. The Soviet-Hungarian Bauxite Aluminum Company with objectives similar to those of the preceding one: DANUBE VALLEY ALUM EARTH INDUSTRY—SOVIET-HUNGARIAN CO., LTD. The interesting feature of this company is that its shares were held one-third by the Soviet Union, one-third by the Hungarian Treasury, and one-third by the *Magyar Bauxite Banya Joint Company*.[12] The Soviet contribution to these companies consisted mainly in the assets of the *Transdanubian Bauxite Corporation*.

Once constituted, the above-mentioned companies played an important role only in the fields of civil aviation or bauxite mining. (In the latter case the two companies just quoted controlled 40 per cent of the output).[13]

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[7]Status: Order in Council No. 4740/ME, Budapest, May 4, 1946.

[8]Articles of association of *Maszovol*: Order in Council No. 8170/ME, Budapest, July 23, 1946.

[9]Order in Council No. 8801/ME, Budapest, July 25, 1946.

[10]*Monthly Bulletin of the National Bank of Hungary*, New Series, No. 7-9, Budapest, July-September 1946.

[11]*Basler Nachrichten*, Basel, March 5, 1946.

[12]*Monthly Bulletin of the National Bank of Hungary*, New Series, No. 7-9, Budapest, July-September 1946.

[13]"L'Industrie Hongroise depuis la Fin de la Guerre," in *Etudes et Conjoncture*, Economie Mondiale (Studies and Business Trends), 4th year, No. 3, (Paris, May-June 1949), p. 35.

Their role was, to start with, rather modest in the fields of navigation and, even more so, of oil exploitation (where the Hungarian-American company, *Maort,* dominated the principal oil fields of Transdanubia).

According to data released early in 1948, the Soviet undertakings and the Soviet-Hungarian joint companies were employing in the manufacturing industries 2.6 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively of the total mass of gainfully employed. The Soviet share of the joint companies and the Soviet undertakings, taken together, were employing 3.1 per cent of the number of gainfully employed in manufacture, 1.7 per cent of the total number of motor developing energy, and 2.6 per cent of the operating electro-motors. The combined share of the Soviet undertakings and of the joint companies in mining and blast furnaces was evaluated for its part at 12.3 per cent of the total employed in these fields.[14]

The completion of the process of nationalization and of seizure of foreign concerns other than Russian ones enhanced the economic importance of the latter in various fields. The existing joint companies were consolidated and their field of operation extended. According to data released in 1952, four joint companies were then in operation: 1. MESZHART—whose importance in the Soviet navigation of the Danube will be discussed below; 2. MASZOVLET (civil aviation); 3. MASOLAJ—i.e., the consolidated group, *Maszoval-Molaj,* still confined outside the Transdanubian fields but accepted for contracting work on behalf of the Hungarian government in that region; 4. MASZOBAL—i.e., the consolidated bauxite-aluminum company superseding *Magyar-Bauxite Banya* and the *Danube Valley Alum Earth Industry.*[15]

The German heritage helped, moreover, in financing and consolidating the more thriving Soviet undertakings in Hungary. The agreement on the German debts supplied a fund of 30 million dollars for the financing of the companies with Soviet partnership. Another agreement, concluded in the autumn of 1952, provided, on the other hand, for the sale by the Soviet Union to Hungary of "69 former German assets located in Hungary" the least important part of the German heritage[16] which was thus also turned into ready cash for financing the Soviet undertakings or for new purchases. Thus, be it under the form of payments to the Soviet Union of the so-called "debts" to Germany, be it under the form of proceeds from the sale of secondary undertakings, be it finally under the form of profits, the Soviet enterprises feed upon themselves in order to consolidate their position within the Hungarian economy.

3

The Soviet succession to German assets was even more extensive in

[14] *Kozgasdasag* (Public Economy), Budapest, April 8, 1948, quoted in "L'Industrie Hongroise . . ." *op. cit.,* p. 36.

[15] Istvan Friss, article in the *Hungarian-Soviet Economic Review,* Budapest, April 1952. (Text translated by the Mid-European Research and Publ. Service.)

[16] See above note 4, page 157.

Rumania than in Hungary and rapidly played a decisive role. As can be seen from Table II, listing the 14 joint companies at present in activity and their respective dates of formation, the network of Soviet-Rumanian companies expanded, so to speak, by waves, of which the most important ones occurred in 1945 (at the close of the war) and in 1949 (on the eve of the first Rumanian Five Year Plan).

TABLE II

RUMANIA: The Soviet-Rumanian Companies in Activity in 1953.[a] Date of respective Soviet-Rumanian Convention[b] and fields of operation

No.	Companies	Date of respective Sov.-Rum. convention	Field of operation
1	Sovrompetrol	July 17, 1945	Oil exploitation
2	Sovromtransport	July 19, 1945	Road, river & marit. trans.
3	Tars	October 26, 1945	Air transport
4	Sovrombanc	October 26, 1945	Banking
5	Sovromlemn	March 20, 1946	Wood exploitation
6	Sovromchim	November 1, 1948	Chemical production
7	Sovromtractor	November 1, 1948	Tractor manufacturing
8	Sovromgaz	February 20, 1949	Natural gas exploitation
9	Sovromcarbune	July 4, 1949	Coal exploitation
10	Sovrommetal	July 4, 1949	Metallurgy
11	Sovromconstructii	July 4, 1949	Construction
12	Sovromasigurari	August 14, 1949	Insurance
13	Sovromutilaj Petrolifer	August 15, 1952	Oil equipment
14	Sovromnaval	August 15, 1952	Vessel construction

[a]A Soviet-Rumanian company, *Sovromfilm,* formed in 1949 was dissolved on July 20, 1952.

[b]The date of signature of the convention precedes, sometimes by months, the date of the establishment of the company and the beginning of its activity.

Among the most significant Soviet-Rumanian joint companies of the operating-concession type[17] must be noted the following:

1. The Soviet-Rumanian company "for the exploration, exploitation, refining and marketing of crude oil and its products: SOVROMPETROL."[18] The Soviet contribution consisted in the German oil shares of Rumanian companies transferred to Soviet ownership and representing in 1945 12.5 per cent of the total capital of the oil companies in activity in Rumania.[19] At its formation, this company played, apparently, a secondary role; the British and American companies, as well as the Rumanian ones not merged

[17]By extension we included in the operating concessions the financial joint companies, operating in the banking and insurance fields.

[18]The company was established at the date of October 24, 1945, by virtue of an order of the Council of Ministers No. 1337 confirmed by the decree law No. 1237 of March 30, 1946. *Cf.*: Banque Nationale de Roumanie, *Bulletin d'Infor. et de Doc.*, etc. No. 4-6, Bucharest, April-June, 1946, p. 67.

[19]Namely: Concordia, Colombia, Petrol-Bloc, I.R.D.P., Buna Speranta, Explora, Meotica, Sardep, Sarpetrol, Transpetrol, Continental. I. Schonfeld, "Problema Petrolului Romanesc" (The Problem of Rumanian Petroleum) in *Probleme Economice* (Economic Problems) No. 1, Bucharest, Feb. 1948.

with *Sovrompetrol*—namely the four big companies Astra-Română, Româno-Americana, Steaua Română and Unirea—were still accounting for 60 per cent of the total oil output, whereas all the others including the *Sovrom,* accounted for 40 per cent.[20]

2. The Soviet-Rumanian company for road, river and maritime transportation: SOVROMTRANSPORT. The Soviet contribution consisted *inter alia* in previously Rumanian-owned boats seized as war booty from the Germans by the Soviet troops. As appears from Table III, the *Sovromtransport* took over as its property probably the largest former Rumanian vessels. Effectively, from an average of 743 metric tons per inland waterway vessel in 1939, the Rumanian-owned vessels dropped in 1946 to an average of 370 metric tons per unit in 1946. The *Sovrom* exhibits for its part an average of 638 metric tons per unit. As the total number of inland waterway-vessels had been increased from 725 in 1939 to a total of 828 units, it can be assumed that the vessels added must have been of very small tonnage.

TABLE III

RUMANIA: Vessels Publicly and Privately Owned 1939 and 1946

Vessels	1939		1946	
	Number	Capacity Meter tons	Number	Capacity Meter tons
Rumanian vessels:				
Seagoing	25	120,732	2	—
Danube[a]	725	538,964	642	238,005
Sovromtransport:				
All types			186	118,694

[a]Passenger boats, tugboats, barges, motor tanker, oil tankers.

Sources: *Anuarul Statistic al Romaniei 1939* (Statistical Yearbook of Rumania), Bucharest, 1940. *Comunicari Statistice* (Statistical Information), No. 13, June 15, 1946, Bucharest. Also: Zeigher, "La Collaboration Roumano-Soviétique" in *Probleme Economice,* No. 3, Bucharest, 1948.

3. The Soviet-Rumanian joint company for civil aviation: TARS. The Soviet contribution consisted mainly in aircraft. Rumania placed at the disposition of the company all of its airports, hangars and similar installations and granted to the company the right of establishing aid routes over all the Rumanian territory. The Soviet Union granted to the company, for its part, the right of establishing civil air routes over the Soviet area of the Black Sea, "between the airports of Izmail-Odessa-Nikolaiev-Kherson-Yevpatoriia-Simferopol,"[21] (i.e., over the south of the former Rumanian province of Bessarabia and the shores of the Black Sea down to Crimea).

4. The Soviet-Rumanian joint banking company for the financing of Soviet undertakings and joint companies in Rumania and of commercial transactions between Rumania and the Soviet Union: SOVROMBANC.

[20]*Ibid.*

[21]Banque Nationale de Roumanie, *Bulletin d'Infor. et de Doc.,* 17th year, No. 10-12, Bucharest, October-December 1945, p. 23.

The company, with the capital subscribed in equal parts by Soviet and Rumanian incorporators, was formed on the Soviet side on the basis of the numerous banking shares inherited from the Germans.[22] From the beginning, *Sovrombanc* tied to itself a vast part of the Rumanian financial and industrial spheres.[23]

5. The Soviet-Rumanian joint company for the exploitation of coal: SOVROMCARBUNE. This company, created in the summer of 1949, has a distinctive feature: the Soviet contribution consisted in this case of the Petroszani coal mine shares obtained in the reparation account of Hungary in 1946 and 1947.

6. The Soviet-Rumanian joint company for metal and metal working: SOVROMMETAL. This company grew out of the holdings of shares, companies and agencies previously in German possession, i.e., the block of shares of Resitza and of the metal-working factory Malaxa, as well as the important German iron and steel distributing agencies located in Bucharest.[24]

7. The Soviet-Rumanian joint company for insurance: SOVROMASIGURARI. This company was formed on the basis of the very strong position held previously by Germany in this field. Here the Soviet Union inherited *in toto* four former German companies and important blocks of shares in various insurance companies, representing together over 20 per cent of the total social capital of the insurance companies operating in Rumania in 1945.[25]

Among the companies formed rather on the basis of technical aid contracts must be counted SOVROMCHIM, SOVROMTRACTOR, SOVROMUTILAJ, SOVROMNAVAL. However, in these cases too, some German assets were used but no data have been released on the form and size of the Soviet investment.[26]

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[22]Namely: Banca Comerciala Romana, Societatea Bancara Romana, Banca Hrissoveloni, Bancile Banatene Unite (Timisoara), Banca de Credit Roman, Institutul de Credit Funciar (Sibiu), Banca Romaneasca, Banca Generala de Economii (Sibiu and Brasov).

[23]The incorporators of Sovrombanc were: for the U.S.S.R.—*Vnieshtorgbanc* (Bank for Foreign Commerce) and *Prombank* (Bank for Industry); for Rumania—The House of Her Highness the Princess Elizabeth, N. Malaxa Co., *Usine de Fer si Domenii Resita* (the Iron Works and Domains Resita), *Banca de Credit Roman* (Rumanian Credit Bank), *Banca Horisoveloni, Banca de Scont, Inc.* (Discount Bank) and *Dacia Romania-Asigurari, Inc.* (Dacia-Romania Insurance Co.).

[24]Namely: 1. The steelworks "Poldihutte" (representing "Poldihutte" of Prague); 1. "Otelul Boehler," Inc.; 3. "Trei Inele," Inc. (representing "Usine Krupp"); 4. "Bancotescu si Nicolau" Inc. (representing "Alpine Gesellschaft"); 5. "Sarcomex" Inc. (representing "Schoeller Bleckmann Stahlwerke" of Vienna); 6. "Roechling" Inc. (representing "Rochlengestahl G.m.b.H Volklingen"); 7. "Rudolf Schmidt" Inc. *Cf.*: Ministerial Decision No. 54305 of Sept. 26, 1944, concerning the freezing of hard metals—Banque Nationale de Roumanie, *Bull. d'Infor. et de Doc.*, Bucharest, No. 5-6, May-June, 1945. p. 205.

[25]Namely: (a) *in toto*: Victoria (Life Insurance), Victoria (Fire Insurance), Alianta, Danubia; (b) in part: Vatra Dornei, Compania Europeana, Steaua Romaniei, Generala, Nationala, Dacia-Romania, Asigurarea Romaneasca, Agricola Fonciera, Britania, Transilvania, Jauch and Hubener.

[26]The real extent of Soviet technical aid is difficult to evaluate. The case of the

The joint Soviet-Rumanian company system has thus extended in Rumania up to the point where it inter-penetrates all the essential branches of economic activity, whether in finance, industry or transportation. It can be assumed that the German heritage served not only for the setting-up of this network, but also for its financing, through the system of agreements concerning the former debts to Germany, the liquidation of certain war booty,[27] and so on. The total of these so-called debts, increased by the obligation imposed on Rumania to refund the gold received from Germany in payment for the grain or oil removed by the latter from Rumania during the war years, has however not been revealed.

4

The Soviet Union entered into only a limited number of "partnerships" in Bulgaria. It formed early in 1946 the SOVIET-BULGARIAN MINING COMPANY[28] and only in 1949 the joint Soviet-Bulgarian civil aviation company TABSO.[29] As far as mining is concerned, the Soviet Union stepped into the position first held by the French and subsequently by the Germans. *Tabso* represented the Bulgarian counterpart of similar companies estab-

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Sovromtractor clearly illustrates this assertion. The official Rumanian press releases at the time of the formation of the latter company—i.e., in 1948—contained the following indications: "In a short time Romania will be supplied with an important number of tractors of the Soviet Union's most modern type. All the necessary implements for the construction of the factory will be supplied by the Soviet Union. The construction of the first units of caterpillar tractors will also begin. They will be supplied by the Soviet Union as unassembled parts." (*Romanian News*, No. 4, Romanian Legation in Washington, Nov. 21, 1948.)

Actually, almost two years before the formation of *Sovromtractor* the first Rumanian tractor had been already manufactured in the former aviation plant I.A.R. in Brasov—a plant which had previously worked with German patents. If it is possible that after the formation of *Sovromtractor* the Russians had extended their technical aid, it is doubtful that they had furnished "the implements for the construction of a factory" which had started to produce tractors two years before. Here is, effectively, a significant excerpt from another Rumanian newspaper, *Roumanie Nouvelle*, published in Bucharest on October 15, 1951: "On January 1, 1947, in the yard of the former aviation plant I.A.R. in Brasov, the first Rumanian tractor rolled out among the acclamations if thousands of workers. . . . In the streets of Brasov—now Stalintown—on May 1 of the same year, rolled out the first 35 tractors manufactured during the period fixed for the production of 20. . . . Since then, with the aid of the Soviet Union, the industry has increased its production from year to year. The launching of the five year plan (in 1950) has allowed the workers' collective of *Sovromtractor*—Stalintown, pride of the industry of the Rumanian Popular Republic—to obtain even more important results. On May 1, 1951, the first caterpillar tractor K.D. 35, manufactured according to the most advanced principles of Soviet technique, enthused the thousands of persons of Stalintown participating in the demonstration of May 1".

[27]Referring in 1949 to the aid extended by the Soviet Union from 1945 on, the official *Romanian News* listed (under the title "Romania's Economy Boosted by Soviet Help") the following items which involved dealings with war booty: "The restitution of the entire rolling-stock used by the Soviet Army; the *renting* for two years of 6,398 German cars belonging to the Soviet Union; the restitution of 35 warships and of 26 commercial ships." *Romanian News*, Aug. 21, 1949 (italics supplied).

[28]*Cf.* law relative to the establishment of this company in *Durzhaven Vestnik* (Collection of Laws), No. 71, Sofia, March 23, 1946.

[29]*Cf.* Registration Edict of "Tabso" in *Durzhaven Vestnik*, No. 120, May 28, 1949.

lished in Hungary and Rumania, ensuring Soviet control over all the air routes and airports of these countries.[30]

As for river navigation, the Soviet Union has not attempted here to set up a joint company, since the Bulgarian Danube flotilla was, and remains, negligible.[31] Almost all of the commercial river transport of Bulgaria is carried in Soviet-Rumanian ships (of *Sovromtransport*). Limited technical aid contracts seem to have been set up by the Soviet Union and Bulgaria in the field of vessel construction. Thus, for instance, it was mentioned in the spring of 1950 that the construction of the commercial Bulgarian maritime vessel "B. Kasabov," in the port of Varna (now Stalin), was achieved with "the technical aid of the Soviet Union."[32]

The financial claims of the Soviet Union against Bulgaria were settled for their part through a protocol signed in January 1948.[33] The amount due to the Soviet Union for various German assets transferred to Soviet ownership was reduced then from $9 million to $4.5 million. The Soviet Union waived her claims of 2,970 million *leva* ($10.4 million) for damages caused to the former German assets in Bulgaria during the period when they were under Bulgarian administration. Finally, as stated by the official communique, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer to Bulgaria the Soviet-owned commercial and transport enterprises in that country, including: a credit institution, two small power stations, various buildings and land, the total valued at 576 million *leva* ($2 million), for half that sum payable in Bulgarian *leva* at the disposition of the Soviet Union.[34]

The Soviet financial and economic interests in Bulgaria remain, however, quite strong, given the transfer to Soviet ownership of various shares in the banking and insurance companies—shares which have been preserved notwithstanding the nationalization of these institutions.

5

The network of Soviet undertakings and joint companies with Soviet participation described thus far has been established, as we saw, on the basis of the German assets in the former "ex-enemy" countries. The Soviet Union established, however, other joint companies in the sensitive fields of Danube navigation and civil aviation, also in an allied country, namely Yugoslavia, this time without the benefit of German assets.

Two joint Yugoslav-Soviet companies, the Yugoslav-Soviet Danubian shipping company JUSPAD and the Yugoslav-Soviet civil air transport JUSTA, were founded there early in 1947, and liquidated in the middle of

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[30] *Tabso* is now flying the route Sofia-Budapest-Prague, in cooperation with *Maszovlet*.

[31] Before the war, its tonnage was less than 10,000 metric tons or one-tenth that of any other East European country. The present tonnage is of the same order.

[32] E. Valev, *Narodnaia Respublika Bolgariia* (The Popular Republic of Bulgaria), (Soviet Ministry of War, Moscow, 1952), p. 116.

[33] *Free Bulgaria*, Sofia, August 1, 1948.

[34] *Ibid.*

1949.[35] Though short-lived, they furnished valuable insights on the role of the Soviet Union in this type of company; in effect, the Yugoslavs published various documents and stenographic reports, notably on the discussions exchanged with the Russians at the time of the liquidation of these companies.[36] The companies were organized on the already familiar pattern of stock companies, half of the stock being bought by the Soviet Union and half by Yugoslavia. The largest part of this stock was to be bought by each government through the investment of equipment, while a smaller part was to be paid for in money. At the time of the liquidation of *Juspad,* while the Soviet Union had not invested the nominal capital it was supposed to invest, the Yugoslavs had already pooled in this company's shipping pool 137 craft (i.e., 14 tugboats, 103 barges and 20 tankers) of the *best they had,* as they were chosen by Soviet experts from the Yugoslav flotilla. The rest of the Yugoslav vessels, in less good condition, were left for the utilization of the *Yugoslav State River Shipping Company.*[37] Until the end of 1948 "the Soviet partner paid only 9.83 per cent of its share to *Juspad,* while the Yugoslav partner paid at the same time 76.25 per cent of its share."[38]

Shortly after the formation of this company, and against the will of the Yugoslav organs of supervision, *Juspad* entered in practice into an agreement with other Soviet (joint) companies and ignored the *Yugoslav State River Shipping Company* interests. The companies which entered into this practical agreement were: 1. The SOVIET DANUBIAN STATE SHIPPING; 2. MESZHART (Soviet-Hungarian Shipping Co.); 3. DDSG (Soviet-Austrian Shipping Co.); 4. SOVROMTRANSPORT (Soviet-Rumanian Shipping Co.). The proposed draft of the agreement, though bilateral in form, meant in essence "the establishment of a cartel of the foregoing shipping companies with very broad cooperation in every respect—tugboating, mutual assistance, port services, tariff consultations, etc."[39] The Yugoslavs had proposed without success that the agreement should be signed jointly with each of the above-mentioned companies by *Juspad* and the *Yugoslav State River Shipping Company,* but the Soviet partner refused. The draft of the agreement was withdrawn, and *Juspad* entered as we said

[35]The companies were formed under a convention concluded on Feb. 4, 1947, on the basis of the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia of June 8, 1946. The proposal for liquidation of the companies was advanced by Yugoslavia in a note of March 16, 1949, accepted by the Soviet Union on March 25, 1949.

[36]"The Yugoslav-Soviet *Juspad* and *Justa* Companies as a Form of the Policy of Unequal Economic Relations." Section of: *White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania towards Yugoslavia,* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of FPRY, Belgrade, 1951), pp. 321-332.

[37]During the liquidation negotiations, the Soviet delegate noted in his answer that even the best Yugoslav craft were actually "obsolete and needed much overhauling." The Yugoslav replied that that was true, but they were however their *best. Ibid.,* p. 327.

[38]Declaration of Dr. Joza Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate, Second Committee of the 4th Session of the UN General Assembly, Oct. 7, 1949.

[39]*White Book . . .* , Document No. 195 of April 1, 1948, 321 ff.

into a tacit agreement with the above-mentioned companies. The results of this *de facto* understanding can be easily illustrated in such matters as tugging and freight rates. Avoiding recourse to the Yugoslav shipping company for tugboat services, *Juspad* exchanged such services with the *Soviet Danubian State Shipping Company* well entrenched in the Rumanian or Hungarian Danube ports. Thus during 1948, the *Yugoslav State Company* made 39,207 kilats for *Juspad* while the *Soviet Danubian Shipping Company* made 509,307 kilats. *Juspad* did in return a slightly larger amount of kilats for that latter company[40]—the profits accruing thus, at both ends, into Soviet hands. The Yugoslav barges had for their part to effectuate unloaded trips either by going or returning from certain assignments. As for the freight rates, the Yugoslavs could note that the transport of one *net-ton kilometer* of Yugoslav cargo in 1948 cost 0.40 dinars, while the transport of one net-ton kilometer of Soviet cargo cost only 0.19 dinars, and the freight of other East European countries only 0.28 dinars. The Soviet representative at the liquidation discussions having declared that evidently "the greater the transport distance, the less the charges per ton-kilometer," the Yugoslavs replied that there was no "need or reason for a difference so big that transport of Soviet freight cost less than half of the rate charged for transport of Yugoslav freight."[41]

Turning now to the operations of *Justa*,[42] it appears that this company had also tended to appropriate the most profitable lines inside the country, leaving the pure Yugoslav company to vegetate in a subordinate position. Moreover, the Soviet director of *Justa*

> . . . interpreting the [foundation] agreement arbitrarily . . . understood that *Justa* had received the right not only of commercial utilization of airports in FPRY, but also exclusive control of the entire air transport and even of all means of communication and radio-navigation.[43]

These are the highlights of the Yugoslav experience of partnership with the Soviet Union as they appear from Yugoslav sources.[44] Early in

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[40]The Soviet representative did not contest these facts; he underlined only that the tugging services of one company (*Juspad's*) were "compensated" for by the tugging of the other companies (the *Soviet Danubian Shipping Company*). *Ibid.*, p. 329.

[41]*Ibid.*, p. 332.

[42]The share capital of *Justa* was fixed at 100 million dinars ($2 million) for each side. Yugoslavia invested the airports, the means of communication and 5 million dinars ($100,000) in cash. The Soviet Union invested the aircraft and technical installations. The Yugoslavs contend that their assets were valued low (i.e., at 1938 prices when the dinar was stronger) and that, moreover, the Russians acknowledged only the value of ordinary land and not of landing strips (i.e., they did not acknowledge the labor invested in that land). On the other hand, the Russian share was allegedly estimated at the higher 1946-47 prices. Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito*, Simon & Schuster, (New York, 1953), p. 283.

[43]*White Book* . . . , p. 323.

[44]It should however be noted that the Yugoslavs had proposed at the negotiations for the liquidation of *Juspad* and *Justa* that *joint official records* be kept of the negotiations. This proposal having been turned down, the only available documents are now the published statements or shorthand records of the Yugoslav delegation at these negotiations. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

1946 the Russians had also submitted draft conventions for a series of other joint companies in Yugoslavia, notably for oil, banking, etc., but the negotiations did not succeed because of the Yugoslav dislike for the conditions offered.[45]

6

At the moment of their formation in the various Eastern European countries mentioned, certain joint companies with Soviet participation appeared, as we have said, of modest importance when compared to the established position of some other local or foreign concerns. Actually, this relationship of forces changed rapidly, given the elements built in the very foundations of the joint companies:

(a) *A standard clause in all the agreements concerning these companies is their complete exemption from taxes.*

Here is, for instance, a typical string of exemptions extended from the day of its foundation and for fifteen years to the Hungarian-Soviet crude oil company *Maszovol*:

> Exemption from the fees on documents, conveyances and legal charges in connection with the formation of the company.[46]
>
> Exemption from any customs or other charges collectable on the goods imported as the contribution of the Soviet partner.[47]
>
> Exemption from the company tax, the company assets tax, in respect of property for the purposes of the concern and the equipment, machinery, employees' dwellings and buildings for cultural and welfare purposes pertaining thereto, the fee on conveyance of immovable assets, the fee on contracts of leases, equivalent fees on workers' dwellings, all fees payable on increases of capital and the issue of new shares, the conveyance fee on property and appurtenances brought into the company as a contribution in kind, and the fee for entry in the land

[45]Concerning the negotiations for the proposed joint Soviet-Yugoslav oil company, Dedijer notes: "According to Soviet plans, the value of the oilfields in Yugoslavia was not to be recognized as Yugoslavia's share in the undertaking; he [the Soviet delegate Yatrov] invoked Marx, saying they were natural wealth with no direct social value. Our negotiators produced copies of agreements between the Soviet Union on one side, and Hungary and Persia respectively on the other. According to these agreements the Soviet Union had recognized the value of oilfields as representing 50 per cent of Persia's nominal share capital in the joint-stock company, and in the case of Hungary, as representing 15 per cent.

Moreover, the Soviets demanded that any oil products exported by Yugoslavia should go to the Soviet Union in accordance with Soviet requirements, free of all fiscal burdens and export duties during the first five years. The five-year period expiring, the Yugoslav government was entitled only to income tax and to no other fiscal dues or to customs. Yugoslavia could use the remainder of production for herself. . . .

On top of all this, the Soviet plan required that all oil distribution in Yugoslavia, that is, the whole retail network for gasoline and other oil derivatives, would be in the hands of this company. Vladimir Dedijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-279.

[46]Order in Council No. 9470/ME of Aug. 3, 1946. *Monthly Bulletin of the National Bank of Hungary,* New Series, 3rd year, No. 1-2, Budapest, January-February 1947, pp. 12-13.

[47]Order in Council No. 8710/ME of July 31, 1946, *loc. cit.*

register on debentures and bond issued for business purposes; if the taxation system should be changed in place of these taxes and fees, the above full exemption extends to such new or higher taxes and fees; if the exemption does not extend to the new taxes, the Minister for Industry will refund the new or higher taxes and fees thus payable to the company.[48]

All these exemptions amounted to a virtual subsidy by the local governments to each of these companies.

(b) *Complete latitude for these companies in the utilization of their foreign exchange as they consider fit.*

Here is a typical disposition taken from the agreement for the establishment of the Soviet-Rumanian Civil Aviation Company (TARS):

> In order to make expenditures abroad relating to the operation of the corporation, the acquisition of aircraft, installations and materials, the corporation shall obtain, without restrictions, from Rumanian authorities, foreign exchange out of the amounts realized by the corporation from its operations.[49]

Furthermore, whereas the lack of foreign exchange was preventing other companies from reconstituting their depleted facilities, the companies with Soviet partnership could be put back into operation by the retrocession of the installations taken by the Soviet Union as war booty, or eventually by some other installations supplied by the Russians.[50]

(c) High costs and high taxes were hampering the activities of the other companies, whereas *the spot prices paid by the local governments for the purchase of the output of the joint companies usually exported as reparations were yielding a profit to the tax-exempted joint companies with Soviet participation.* These profits were, furthermore, guaranteed to each and every one of the joint companies from the moment of foundation.

In fact, as far as all the other foreign companies are concerned, the completion of the nationalization process brought to an end a period of strain and hardship inaugurated immediately after the war.

(d) Finally, the joint companies were strengthened by the *fantastic facilities extended to each of them in their respective fields.*

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[48]Order in Council No. 1200/ME of January 30, 1947, *loc. cit.*

[49]Article XI. Banque Nationale de Roumanie, *Bull. d'Inf. et de Doc.*, 17th year, No. 10-12, Bucharest, Oct.-Dec. 1945, p. 23.

[50]In a study entitled "Some Post-War Aspects of Rumanian Oil Industry," the Rumanian oil specialist, Mihail Pizanty, wrote in the official *Romanian Review* at the close of 1946: "One of the factors preventing the realization of a large program of trial drillings, is the more and more pronounced scarcity of material implements and installations. Those required for new works are not available in satisfactory quantities and qualities. After all, it is not surprising that an industry which has discontinued relations with its suppliers and manages to live on only by utilizing its last remainders of stock and replacing the worn out material, cannot obtain the output ensured by a new and solid material.

The cooperation of the U.S.S.R. with the Rumanian oil industry through the intermediary of the 'Sovrompetrol' Company . . . was translated into fact by the supply of certain quantities of drilling material and of an important stock of motor trucks." *Romanian Review*, No. 7, Bucharest, November 1946, pp. 50-51.

In a concise summary of the facilities placed at the disposition of the (Soviet) joint companies for Danube navigation, the chairman of the United States delegation at the 1948 Belgrade Danube Conference, Mr. Cavendish Cannon, noted:

> Embarcation stations, factories, houses, warehouses, grain elevators, railway and communication routes have been placed under the control of these companies. This type of control has nothing to do with navigation. It is clear that this true monopoly can be used in order to put or not put the essential installations in the great Danube ports at the disposition of the ships of other nations, including the riparian nations.[51]

Thus, a virtual *subsidy* by the local governments under the form of complete and perpetual tax exemption, complete latitude in the utilization of their foreign exchange balances, the possibility of easily out-competing the other concerns, extended facilities in their respective fields. These are some of the essential elements which insured the automatic growth and prosperity of the companies with Soviet partnership as against the independent local or foreign-owned corporations.

In turning now to the elements which continue to favor the development of the joint companies as "against the local state-owned companies, it is interesting to recall the following Soviet contentions, and the realities behind them. Answering the critics who expressed doubts about the "equalitarian" bases of the joint companies, Mr. Andrei Vishinsky, then chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the above-mentioned Danube Conference, declared:

> Mr. Cannon has explained that he has seen the agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R., Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia on the creation of the joint companies for navigation. But it is necessary to examine more closely these agreements in order to see that the declaration of the American delegate lacks any foundation. If the text of these agreements is examined, it must be kept in sight that these companies *are not private companies,* but state companies. On the other hand, they are created on an *equalitarian basis,* with equal participation of representation of either country in the administration of the company in question, and are obligatorily and respectively *presided by the Hungarian, Rumanian, Yugoslav representatives and never by the representatives of the U.S.S.R.*[52]

Actually, it is quite true that the companies are presided over by the respective Hungarian, or Rumanian nationals, according to the case. But this president is only a figurehead since the real power, according to the status of all these companies, is vested in the hands of a *general manager, always a Soviet citizen.*

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[51]Intervention on August 5, 1948, of Mr. Cavendish Cannon, Chairman, U. S. Delegation at the 1948 Belgrade Danube Conference. *Duanaiskaia Konferentsia—La Conférence Danubienne* (Russian-French Official Texts), (Belgrade, 1949), p. 145.

[52]Intervention on August 6, 1948, of Mr. Andrei Vishinsky, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the 1948 Belgrade Danube Conference. *Ibid.,* p. 186 (italics supplied).

Here are, for instance, the typical dispositions of the Statutes of the Hungarian Soviet Shipping Company (*Meszhart*), as summarized in the bulletin of the National Bank of Hungary:

> There are an equal number of Hungarian and Soviet members on the Board of eight directors and the supervisory committee of four. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is chosen from its members at the proposal of the Hungarian shareholders and the deputy-chairman at the proposal of the Soviet shareholders. The general manager is appointed by the Board at the proposal of its Soviet members and the deputy general manager at the proposal of the Hungarian members. The sphere of authority of the *general manager* includes the making of contracts, the issue of obligations, the acquisition of movable and immovable assets, sea-going and river-craft and other means of transport, their leasing, encumbrance or disposal, the effectuation of all banking and credit operations, the issue of powers of attorney, the establishment of freight regulations, matters connected with personnel and in general disposal of matters not placed within the sphere of authority of the general meeting of the Board of Directors.[53]

Thus, for all practical purposes, the joint companies are entirely in the hands of the *Soviet managers.*

A simple understanding among Soviet managers of various companies either in the interior of a country or in various countries is sufficient to create a *cartelized group* able to isolate any local state-owned company, as we saw above in the case of the Yugoslav Shipping Company.

Enjoying complete *extra-territoriality,* they can cut across both the local frontiers and local planning; though in principle they are supposed to adjust themselves to the local economic plans, it is in fact the latter who have to try, to start with, to take into consideration their objectives.

Moreover, the process of cartelization and regional interlocking according to certain Soviet objectives intervenes not only *directly*—as in the "straight cases" where is involved only a tacit understanding between Soviet managers of joint companies with Soviet partnership—but also, *indirectly,* as a function of the positions acquired by one or another of these companies in a given field. Thus, the Soviet Union, which controls through *Sovromgas* the Rumanian gas fields, can "encourage" the development of a joint Rumanian-Hungarian company which will use gas facilities. Such a joint company, called *Romagchim,* was effectively constituted in 1952; the agreement calls for the creation of new branches of the chemical industries in Rumania and Hungary, on the basis of the utilization of natural gas in Rumania, and supplying of the needed installations by Hungary.[54] Other inner-East European joint companies—such as a *Rumanian- East German*

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[53]Order in Council No. 4730/ME of May 4, 1946. Concerning the Statutes of Meszhart. *Monthly Bulletin of the National Bank of Hungary,* No. 1-6, Jan.-June, Budapest, 1946, p. 12.

[54]The plans for *Romagchim* are still under elaboration. The *Hungarian Bulletin,* published in Budapest, writes in this connection, "Those engaged in preparing the plans are helped in their work by the experiences of experts from the Soviet Union and

joint company for the development of the chemical industry in Rumania on the basis of the local Rumanian raw materials (a field in which *Sovromchim* operates),[55] a Czechoslovak-Hungarian bauxite agreement[56] providing for the production of aluminum in Czechoslovakia from Hungarian bauxites, etc.—involve and serve indirectly Soviet economic interests in these fields.

The extraordinary powers vested in the hands of the Soviet managers who, in fact, run the "joint" companies all by themselves, the possibility of cartelization through a simple understanding among the managers, the *de facto* extra-territoriality of these companies; the possibility of extending directly or indirectly their control in any bilateral or regional agreements—those are the elements which give to the "joint" companies with Soviet partnership such strategical importance in these economies that they can force the local state-owned companies at the best to vegetate economically, at the worst to fold up and merge with the ever-growing "joint" companies.

7

The network of joint companies has until now grown essentially from the manifold nature and utilization of the German heritage. It is already clear, however, that new companies with Soviet partnership are developing and are bound to develop either as technical aid contracts or as agency agreements.

The tendency of each of these economies to engage in the more complex techniques and to develop the whole gamut of engineering industries on the one hand, and the isolation of these countries from the West on the other, opens new and promising perspectives for the setting up of Soviet (and possibly Czechoslovak and German) partnerships in the *least* developed countries of the Soviet orbit.

As far as the agency agreements are concerned, the falling off of trade with the West and the acceleration of inter-orbit commercial exchange facilitates the establishment of Soviet partnership for the marketing of certain produce in the orbit as a whole. In the long run, the overwhelming share of the Soviet Union in each of these countries' trade facilitates the crystallization of a multilateral pattern of trade and trade settlements.[57]

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the German Democratic Republic. . . . The preparatory work in the field is to start in 1954." *Hungarian Bulletin,* No. 142, Budapest, May 16, 1953. See also: *Agerpress* (Rumanian) *Inf. Bulletin,* 3rd year, No. 25, Bucharest, June 28, 1952.

[55]The agreement concerning this company was signed in Berlin on September 12, 1952. *Agerpress* (Rumanian) *Inf. Bulletin,* 3rd year, No. 36, Bucharest, September 30, 1952.

[56]Laszlo Gay, Hungarian Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, defines as follows the main features of these agreements: "(a) one country places part of its vital natural wealth at the disposal of the other country until this raw material is exhausted or its utilization becomes superfluous; (b) the two sides, by their common efforts, produce materials and industrial equipment necessary for the realization of the agreement, mutually help each other in planning and in placing their technical experience at each other's disposal; (c) one of the sides supplies industrial equipment on credit." *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy,* November 14, 1952.

[57]The profits accruing to these companies in Hungary and Rumania could, for instance, be used for the payment of export to the Soviet Union from other countries

The prospect of the simultaneous development of the *operating concessions,* of the *technical aid contracts,* and of the *agency agreements,* portends their mutual assistance in the consolidation of Soviet positions in these countries. It is in this development that are contained some of the strongest "integrating" factors at work in the orbit.

Issued from the German heritage; financed by this succession itself; their output exported free of charge, for eight years, to the Soviet Union, in the reparation account; finally growing automatically as their own output is growing[58]—the joint companies have been a source of exogenous accumulation for the Soviet Union, without involving any export of funds on her part.

Year by year, the companies have become growing cancers eating up the economies wherein they are set. The fact that they are practically beyond the control of the respective countries, that they are virtually above local planning and that they are destroying the rival companies in the fields where they are penetrating, make them as little desirable as possible for the countries of the orbit, as proved by the fact that Czechoslovakia and Poland have tried, and manged thus far, to shun them.

It should be noted in conclusion that, just as with reparations, the joint companies are not only an expression of integrating elements but also an expression of clearly delineated *autonomous* interests of the U.S.S.R. in relation to all other economies—whatever their economic and social structure may be.

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and furnish the basis for a multilateral structure combining with the trade currents. See the comments on papers on intra-orbit trade in *Soviet Economic Growth* (edited by Prof. Abram Bergson), (Evanston, Illinois—White Plains, New York, 1953), pp. 348 f.

[58]The more their output grows and the more the profits accruing to the Soviet partner increase, the stronger the pressure on the balance of payment of the respective countries.

RESEARCH REPORT

RECENT GERMAN HISTORY IN GERMAN UNIVERSITIES, 1945-53

by John L. Snell

PROFESSOR Gerhard Ritter, addressing the first post-war congress of German historians at Munich on September 12, 1949, recommended, among other things, that his colleagues undertake serious study of the recent past as an imperative necessity.[1] Study of twentieth century affairs in German academic circles had barely been inaugurated prior to 1933, and that which followed reflected the taint of Nazi favor or the limitations of Nazi restrictions. The physical conditions of German scholarship after 1945 ill equipped German historians for brilliant and definitive performances, but the same physical conditions impelled them to pioneering efforts in a relatively unexplored field, hitherto left to the unscientific cultivation of political journalists and demagogues. A number of established scholars have turned their attention to themes from contemporary history, Ritter himself among them; and in the universities there has been no dearth of student interest. Through his dissertation, like most others done in post-1945 Germany, may not be published, the young scholar who elects to write on twentieth century history can expect an outlet for his productions. Since its reappearance in 1949 the *Historische Zeitschrift,* in interesting contrast to its counterparts in France and Great Britain, has shown an unaccustomed interest in the history of the last half-century. More encouraging, the year 1953 brought into print the first complete volume of a new journal, the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* edited by Hans Rothfels and Theodor Eschenburg, and published under the auspices of the (Munich) Institute für Zeitgeschichte, this journal is specifically devoted to historical developments since 1917. While German affairs will undoubtedly continue to receive fullest treatment in its articles section and in its excellent bibliographical section, the editors have announced an interest in non-German themes and have demonstrated their willingness to publish the contributions of non-German scholars.[2]

Beside the Institut für Zeitgeschichte a number of other institutions in present-day West Germany serve to stimulate the interest, advance the training, and publish the output of young scholars who specialize in twentieth century history. Among these are the Forschungsstelle des Instituts für Völkerrecht an der Universität Göttingen, the Abteilung für Zeitgeschichte im Institut für politische Wissenschaft, Berlin, and the Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte Hamburgs von 1933 bis 1945.[3] As a kind of central "clearing

[1]Gerhard Ritter, "Gegenwärte Lage und Zukunftsaufgaben deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft," *Historische Zeitschrift,* CLXX (1950), 1-22.

[2]E. g., John L. Snell, "Dissertationen zur deutschen Zeitgeschichte an amerikanischen Universitäten 1933-1953," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* I (1953), 289-96.

[3]For additional information of these institutes see the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* I (1953), 194-96, 396.

house" for the development of study and research in political history since about 1848, a "Commission for the History of Parliamentarism and Political Parties" was organized in 1951 under the auspices of the federal Ministry of the Interior. It is managed by a number of German academicians, with Professor Alfred Hermann as chairman. The manager of its business office, Dr. Alfred Milatz, is himself a specialist in twentieth century history, whose post-war dissertation is noted in the list which follows. The objective of the Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien is to give sustained encouragement to the objective study of political history. It is attempting to do this by publishing source collections, bibliographies,[4] and the monographs of younger German scholars,[5] and by providing up-to-date information about current research within its designated field of interest both in and outside of West Germany. A list of dissertations released by the Commission late in 1953 provided the basis for the selective bibliography which appears below.[6] It is to be hoped that this partial list may illustrate the rapid growth of academic interest in recent history in Germany since 1945, and suggest to American scholars the possibility of comparing and supplementing their research findings with those of a new generation of German scholars who are seeking to rediscover and reevaluate their troubled heritage at mid-point in a troubled country.

Tulane University

Selected Dissertations on Twentieth Century Germany, Completed in German Universities, 1945-1953

Ackermann, Karl: Organisatorische Streitigkeiten in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1890-1914. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des 4. August 1914. *Heidelberg,* Phil. Diss., 1946

Abbes, Gerhard: Die Planwirtschaft der "Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" und der "Union der sozialistischen Sowjet-Republiken." *Heidelberg,* Phil. Diss., 1951

Assmus, Erhard: Die publizistische Diskussion um den Militarismus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Geschichte des Begriffes in Deutschland und seiner Beziehung zu den politischen Ideen zwischen 1850 und 1950. *Erlangen,* Phil. Diss., 1951

Auerbach, Philipp: Wesen und Formen des Widerstandes im 3. Reich. *Erlangen,* Phil. Diss., 1949

[4]The first of these is by Gerhard Zwoch, *Gustav-Sresemann-Bibliographie* (Düsseldorf, 1953).

[5]Two studies in this series had been published by the end of 1953, the dissertations by Helga Timm and Hans Georg Wieck, both of which are noted in the list which appears below.

[6]Alfred Milatz, ed., "Verzeichnis abgeschlossener and begonnener Hochschularbeiten zur deutschen Parlaments—und Parteiengeschichte (1945-1953)," a mimeographed report, compiled at the business office of the Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Bonn, In der Sürst 1.

Barth, geb. Haberland, Brigitte: Die Innenpolitik des Reiches unter der Reiches, unter der Kanzlerschaft Bethmann-Hollwegs 1909-1914, *Kiel,* Phil. Diss., 1951

Basler, Wersner: Deutschlands Kriegszielpolitik 1914-1918. *Kiel,* Phil. Diss., 1951

Bauch, Joseph: Die Staatsrechtliche Entwicklung der bayerischen Kammer der Reichsräte während der Zeit ihres Bestehens von 1818-1918. *München,* Jur. Diss., 1948

Bauer, Franz: Französischer Syndikalismus und deutsche Gewerkschaften. *Heidelberg,* Phil. Diss., 1948

Beerk, Georgs Das parlamentarische System der Weimarer Reichsverfassung. *Hamburg,* Rects-u. Staatswiss. Diss., 1948

Blieffert, Gunther: Die Innenpolitik des Reichskanzlers Fürst Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst 1894-1900. *Kiel,* Phil. Diss., 1950

Boms, Hans: Die Deutschkonservative Partei. Preussischer Charakter, Reichsauffassung und Nationalbegriff. *Köln,* Phil. Diss., 1953

Bremer, Johann-Cord: Osnabrück im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung. Struktur und Wandel der sozialen Gliederung von 1871 bis 1914. *Göttingen,* Phil. Diss., 1951

Bronder, Dietrich: Organisation und Führung der socialistichen Arbeiterbewegung im Deutschen Reich, 1890-1914. *Göttingen,* Phil. Diss., 1952

Broszat, Martin: Die antisemitische Bewegung im wilhelminischen Deutschland. *Köln,* Phil. Diss., 1953

Bruhn, Wolfgang: Die NSDAP im Reichstag 1930-33. Eine Studie zur parlamentarischen Wirksamkeit einer politischen Partei. *Berlin, F.U.,* Phil. Diss., 1952

Brunzel, Hans Paul: Die "Tat" 1918-1933. Ein publizistischer Angriff auf die Verfassung von Weimar innerhalb der konservativen Revolution. *Bonn,* Phil. Diss., 1952

Bünemann, Richard: Hamburg in der deutschen Revolution von 1918/19. *Hamburg,* Phil. Diss., 1951

Christ, Hans: Verfassung und Verfassungsentwicklung in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1945-1950. *Köln,* Rechtswiss. Diss., 1951

Demmler, Herbert: Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Bonner Grundgesetzes. *Köln,* Rechtswiss. Diss., 1951

Deutz, Josef: Adam Stegerwald. Gewerkschaftler, Politiker, Minister 1874-1945. Ein Beitr. zur Geschichte d. christl. Gewerkschaften in Deutschland u. zur politischen Entwicklung in d. Weimarer Republik. *Bonn,* Phil. Diss., 1950

Dierkes, Hans Herbert: Die evangelisch-soziale Bewegung und der sozialdemokratische Arbeiter 1896-1914. *Freiburg,* Phil. Diss., 1949

Donath, Friedrich: Ein Wendepunkt in der Weimarer Republik. *Leipsig,* Phil. Diss., 1951

Düx, Heinz: Die freie Gewerkschaftsbewegung und ihr Einfluss auf die Rechtsentwicklung von der Gründung bis zum Ausbruch des 1. Weltkrieges. *Marburg,* Rechts-und Staatswiss. Diss., 1948

Ebeler, Ilse: Stellung der öffentlichen Meinung in Deutschland zu den deutsch-englischen Problemen 1898-1904. *Kiel,* Phil. Diss., 1950

Eberz, Willy: Die Stellungnahme der sozialdemokratischen Reichstagsfraktion in der Zeit von 1900-1933 zu den familienrechtlichen Bestimmungen des BGB. *Mainz,* Jur. Diss., 1952

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NOTES

An *ad hoc* subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies has had under consideration for some time a report on area studies in East Europe. As a part of what, it may be assumed, will be a broad-scale guide for the American academic approach to the complex problems of this area, the Mid-European Studies Center, Columbia University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Joint Committee are cooperating in the preparation of a roster of personnel, skills, research projects and research facilities. Mr. Stetson Holmes, Director, of Mid-European Studies Center, 4 West 57th Street, New York, 19, is the clearing point for information destined for this roster.

* * *

The Department of State has deposited in the National Archives a further collection of approximately 75,000 frames of microfilm of documents from the archives of the former German Foreign Ministry. This collection consists mainly of material on the period from the autumn of 1937 to March 1939 and includes the files from which the documents published in the first five volumes of *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945* were selected. Certain files in addition to those previously released from the period of World War I and earlier are also included.

* * *

The importance of the recent (1953) Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia to each of the signatories can be measured by their respective interests in their own security. A double number, 91-92, of volume V (Feb. 1, 1954) of the *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade) is devoted to the first anniversary of this Treaty. The contributors to the issue, the respective foreign ministers, ministers of defence, party chiefs and other officials, journalists and academicians, all emphasize the need of the three contiguous countries for cooperation and mutual understanding, and gratification at having achieved this arrangement in a period of such general nervousness. A not insignificant note in their comments is the expression of an awareness that peace and security in this sector are necessarily related to the peace of the world. The Balkans have not always been so minded. Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Foreign Minister, significantly remarks: "Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece are situated on one of the most sensitive points in the peace and security front . . . The hopes for linking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to this Treaty in some satisfactory manner that may command the approval of both the said Organization and Yugoslavia, will undoubtedly be realized. This, the indivisibility of peace and security requires."

* * *

The centenary of the death of Adam Mickiewicz comes in 1955. In anticipation a Polish American Committee has been organized under the chairmanship of Professor Waclaw Lednicki, to prepare the festivities and celebrations appropriate to such an occasion. As of the present an international symposium on Mickiewicz and his influence has been planned,

also under the chief editorship of Professor Lednicki. Similar cooperative groups have been organized in England and on the Continent.

* * *

Harvard University anounces the establishment of a Center for Middle Eastern Studies under the directorship of Professor W. L. Langer and with an advisory body chosen from related faculties, including the Law School, the Littauer Center for Public Administration, the Graduate School of Business Administration and the School of Public Health. The Center has in view three possible areas of training and research: (*a*) an orthodox regional studies program for the Middle East, similar to Harvard programs now in operation for the Soviet Union and East Asia: (*b*) an academic program adapted to the conventional doctoral programs in history, languages, economics, anthropology, etc.: (*c*) a focal point for post-doctoral research in Middle Eastern Studies. From the brochure sent out by the Center, the program would appear to be a focussed ultilization of the rich course-resources of Harvard offerings, bound together around a central core of Middle Eastern interests.

Further information may be obtained from the Director of the Center, Room 22, 16 Dunster Street, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

* * *

The Institute of East European Studies of Indiana University has sent out a formal announcement of its program. As of this announcement, training is on the undergraduate and master of arts level, and is centered on one of the usual fields of history, language, geography, economics, sociology or government. The resources of the Indiana University Libraries in this field have been markedly increased in recent years. The brochure gives no detail of faculty personnel or specific courses.

BOOK REVIEWS

BAKER, L. M., *The Letters of Elizabeth Queen of Bohemia.* London: The Bodley Head, 1953. Pp. 362. 30 s.

This volume of letters written by Elizabeth, the daughter of James I, is not for the exclusive use of historians. The editor adopted a method which the pioneers of critical scholarship would most likely find objectionable. No footnotes have been appended to the text to identify people or places mentioned in the correspondence or to explain the Queen's references to current affairs or to her personal problems. No attempt was made to find answers to letters from Elizabeth's pen or to reconstruct documents to which she, here and there, alluded. The collection is divided into several sections and each of them has a short introduction. In this manner a biography has been compiled. The Queen tells her own story in her letters to relatives and friends, and Mrs. Baker connects the loose pieces by her own narrative. Miss C. V. Wedgwood, the author of a book on the Thirty Years War, provides an introduction which, too, helps the reader to follow the tortuous course of the Queen's life.

Elizabeth was a diligent and faithful correspondent. Some of her letters were brief, containing bare facts, while in others she commented freely on her illustrious contemporaries or presented in terse and incisive words her point of view. She had enough time to write. In many cases correspondence was the only means of contact with the distant centers which she was unable to visit. She was married to Frederick of the Palatinate in 1613, at the age of seventeen. She left Heidelberg for Prague in September 1619. In November 1620, after the defeat of the Protestant army in Bohemia, began the long period of exile, spent mostly in the Netherlands. In May 1661 the Queen was able to return to London to re-establish contacts with those of her relatives and contemporaries who survived the successive storms and upheavals.

There are in this collection some letters from the early period before her arrival in the Netherlands in 1621. The greatest portion, however, were written during the years of exile when isolation and material problems weighed heavily on her mind.

The principal correspondent was, for over twenty years, Sir Thomas Roe. "Honest Thom", as Elizabeth used to address him, served for many years in the diplomatic service and his last post was Constantinople. In the latter part of his life he worked assiduously on behalf of Frederick and Elizabeth without accomplishing any visible results. But in her widowhood—Frederick died in 1632—the Queen counted Sir Thomas among her best friends and treated him with almost filial affection until his death in 1644.

Six years later Elizabeth entered into another regular exchange of letters. By the treaty of Westphalia the Palatinate was restored to Charles Louis, her second son, to whom the right of succession had passed after the death of the Crown Prince, in 1629. Elizabeth's first letter to Charles Louis was dated August 1, 1650. The relationship was cordial but often strained, as the mother and the son failed to agree on many practical matters. Elizabeth was in no hurry to move from the Netherlands to the Palatinate, and Charles Louis found her repeated demands for financial aid excessive and embarrassing. But the correspondence was not broken off. Elizabeth never tired of reporting current developments, friendly visits or pastimes, interspersing, at opportune moments, practical hints for the conduct of public affairs or advice concerning the son's family life.

Elizabeth wrote some of her letters in French, and when she was young she occasionally used Italian. The greatest part of her correspondence was in English. Her command of her native tongue improved remarkably with the passage of time. Letters to members of the famiily or to devoted friends have a conversational flow, and colloquialisms are not infrequent. She had words of affection or appreciation for her benefactors, but was mercilessly sharp when referring to adversaries or personal foes. Reporting from Heidelberg to Sir Dudley Carleton on the election of Ferdinand II as Emperor, she added sarcastically: "They have chosen heare a blinde Emperour, for he hath but one eye, and that not verie good. I am afrayed he will be lowsie, for he hath not monie to buy himself cloths." When Prince Charles Louis encountered difficulties in France, Elizabeth wrote of some earlier developments and dropped a remark: " . . . this ulcerous preest was not then Son Eminence . . . " meaning, of course, Richelieu. The Queen's adversaries in England did not fare better. The letter to Sir Edward Nicholas of January 4, 1655, closed with these words: "Sure, Cromwell is the beast in the Revelations that all kings and nations doe worship: I wish him the like end and speedilie, and you a hapie new yeare." The epithet "that exceerable villan" was of the same coinage.

Frederick's reign in Bohemia was cut short by the defeat on the White Mountain, after little more than one year. Yet both he and Elizabeth continued to use the royal title. Contacts with Bohemia were severed soon after the arrival of the royal couple in the Netherlands. Elizabeth retained a lively interest in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe. She followed closely the developments in Poland. "I pittie the poore king of Poland," she wrote to Sir Edward Nicholas in October 1655, alluding to the Swedish invasion of the Polish lands. She sympathized with the Princes of Transylvania in their struggles with the Habsburgs. Her third daughter, Henriette, was married, in 1651, to Sigismund Rákoczy, and John Amos Comenius, then living in Sarospatak, blessed the marriage, only to see it soon dissolved by Henriette's death. There is a passing reference in the correspondence to Russia. In October 1649, the Queen wrote to the Marquis of Montrose: "Culpepper is gone for Muscovy. The spices and aquavitae will burn him quickly up."

Some political refugees from Bohemia lived in the Dutch residence of the royal family or corresponded with them. As Mrs. Baker supplied only a list of persons to whom Elizabeth wrote and as the book has no index, some readers may find it difficult to identify the Bohemian names. The spelling was changed when they settled in the western countries and first names were seldom mentioned in the letters. The Count of Tour, of whom Elizabeth wrote to Sir Thomas Roe in December 1622, is Henry Matthias of Thurn, a staunch supporter of the Protestant cause in Bohemia. He spent several months in Constantinople as an envoy of the Transylvanian Prince Bethlen Gábor. From Turkey he brought Elizabeth seeds of "the musk mellion that grows verie well and it is a fruite that I love exceedingly," she reported after Thurn's visit.

Slavata, whose good tidings from the King of Sweden were expected in January 1632, may have been Count Albrecht Henry Slavata. The name appears again in a letter to Charles Louis, April 1658, in connection with the Brederode family. It is known from other sources that Slavata established family relations with the Brederodes. It is not difficult to identify Caplier, mentioned in a letter to Charles Louis from London, July 29, 1661. A member of the Bohemian Kaplíř family, of Sulevice, resided at Elizabeth's court for several decades. He sent her, as we know from another source, on New Years day, 1662, two statuettes of ivory with the greetings of the season and good wishes.

A romance is hidden behind the name Rupa, which occurrs often in the correspondence. In about the year 1630 Sir Thomas Roe adopted Joan, the middle daughter of the late William of Roupov (Rupa), once supreme chamberlain of Moravia. The Roupov family lived in the Netherlands for many years. Since 1636, Joan, together with her elder sister Dorothy, resided at Elizabeth's court. Elizabeth, who became very fond of Joan, gave her the sobriquet "Queen Mab." References to Rupa in Elizabeth's letters to "honest Thom" must be interpreted in the light of other documents, or they would remain obscure. Sayers, a member of Elizabeth's entourage, courted Joan, but Dorothy stirred up trouble, reporting to a friend of the Roupov family Zdeněk of Hodice, that the bridegroom was of low birth. Zdeněk of Hodice (comte d'Hodites, Haudits in Mrs. Baker's collection) was a Moravian nobleman who served with distinction in the Swedish army and was killed in battle in 1641.

There are numerous cases to which the published letters refer, in about the same manner as to the love affairs of "Queen Mab." Both the beginning and the end of the story are lost and a thorough search of other documents would be needed to fill in the missing data. Those who read Mrs. Baker's compilation without at least some acquaintance with members of Elizabeth's circle will, undoubtedly, miss many connections or allusions, as the Queen expected that facts mentioned by her in passing would mean something concrete to the addressee.

The last letter of January 10, 1622, was short, but it had the quality of style for which the correspondence deserves to be known outside a limited group of scholars. The Queen was ill of a cold, and the physicians prescribed treatment which made her "as sick as a dogg." She felt better when she wrote to Charles Louis but complete recovery never came. A few weeks afterwards, on February 23, 1662, the Queen of Bohemia died. The longing for burial in native soil, so common among exiles from all countries and of all ages, was thus realized.

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

KOHN, HANS, *Pan-Slavism: its History and Ideology*. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1953. Pp. 356. $6.25.

In this volume of modest size but encyclopedic scholarship, one of the most distinguished students of nationalism presents "the first attempt at a comprehensive survey and analysis of the history and ideology of Pan-Slavism in the English language," and the first of such scope for twenty-five years in any language. The book is divided into three chapters, "Pan-Slavism and the West, 1815-1860," "Pan-Slavism and Russian Messianism, 1860-1905," and "Pan-Slavism and the World Wars, 1905-1950." Essential to his task has been his deep knowledge of the cultural history of all Slavic peoples and nations, as well as that of the nations of Western Europe from which the ideological virus of nationalism sprang, in such fashion that "all the peoples of Europe east of the Rhine and the Alps shared a common fate: they entered the age of nationalism at a time when the nation-state solution of the West was no longer applicable."

The book had therefore to some extent to be a history of Polish, Czech and Slovak, Serb and Croat, Bulgarian, Ukranian, and Great Russian nationalisms; and it is that predominantly. Few if any of the thinkers analyzed were before all else pan-Slavist. Instead, they usually were first of all nationalists of their respective peoples or countries; second Austroslavists or Russophiles; third pan-Slavists, by which they meant a variety of things. In one or another of the forms mentioned, national issues were thus uppermost in the minds of many of them; but often

social issues were also of profound interest. Mr. Kohn quite defensibly neglects discussion of the latter for the former, though he might have reminded the reader of the fact at the outset.

Among the western Slavs, Mr. Kohn begins with Obradovich rather than Rajich for the Jugoslavs, Hutza rather than Paisii for the Bulgars, Kollár and Šafařík rather than Dobrovský and Jungmann for the Czechoslovaks. Of course he must start somewhere, but in any revision a bit more space would be welcome for this complex early period when rationalism and romanticism were still struggling with each other, sometimes within the same breast or brain.

Nationalism within Russia, the only largely Slavic independent state in the nineteenth century, did not have the particular overtones of political passion present in the nationalism of her unfree neighbors. The phrase "Russian messianism"—which Mr. Kohn uses in recognition of this peculiarity—is sufficiently vague that it becomes difficult to analyze accurately the issues separating the steadfastly anti-pan-Slav Imperial government, the Slavophiles, the pan-Slavists, the Westernizers, and the later ideologists of Russian expansion into Asia instead of into Slavia.

On the rock of Communism the book very nearly flounders. The neatly parallel titles of the two last sections, "Triumphs of the Western Slavs after World War I" and "Triumphs of the Eastern Slavs after World War II," may come as a surprise to the ordinary Russian, whose present sufferings under Communism are probably greater than that of the ordinary Czech if only because the Prague régime has had less time to perfect its tyranny. Nationalism, as the author knows and regrets as much as anyone, is not yet dead, but its partial conversion into a tool of the Soviets is a phenomenon not directly analyzed in this book. It is not the existence of nationalism behind the Iron Curtain, but its role, which is here at issue. The Communists are neither nationalist nor anti-nationalist, they are *a-nationalist*. For the Soviets, pan-Slavism, pan-Russism, and many non-Slav nationalisms have been simply instrumental to the securing of Communist hegemony, to be used or discarded at will according to the needs of the moment. Nationalism just does not have the same function in the thought of Malenkov or Bierut as it had in the thought of Mickiewicz or Aksakov, and this point needs to be stated in the book.

Since the volume is likely to be indispensable to scholars for a long time, in the next edition the many typographical errors in several languages will need correction, and this reviewer would like to make a strong plea for joining to the body of the text the severed appendages which the splendid footnotes now constitute.

University of Washington DONALD W. TREADGOLD

HANTSCH, HUGO, *Die Nationalitätenfrage in Osterreich.* Vienna: Harold Verlag, 1953. Pp. 124. 34 s.

This well annotated study offers within very limited space an impressively rich and colorful survey of the nationality problem in the Habsburg monarchy from its very beginnings until 1918. Chief emphasis is properly laid on the nineteenth century. Considering the vast amount of material to be covered, it is understandable enough that Hantsch's approach is more of a descriptive than of an analytical character. Here the graceful and lucid style of the author, his felicitous gift for presenting various patterns of political thought in a succinct and yet easily comprehensible manner, is particularly welcome.

As for the content itself, the western half of the empire receives more atten-

tion than the eastern, a common approach in works of this type, and understandable if measured by the yardstick of cultural contributions, though an analysis of the reasons for the national crisis might recommend a reversal in emphasis. Possible criticism of topical balance does not apply, however, to the matter of presentation itself. The author's survey of the trends and ideas differing from his own enlightened conservative Christian philosophy is of exemplary fairness.

In providing ample room for possible modifications in emphasis, though not for serious disagreement, the author has allowed the Austrian nationality question to appear formidably complex. This is especially true in his re-examination of the Great Austrian reform plans centered around the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on the basis of his *Nachlass*. The author seems overly optimistic in his statement of the similarities between the views of Renner and Seipel and in his assumption that Bauer gave unqualified endorsement to the empire idea prior to 1914.

As to the selection of material, on the whole very fortunate, a discussion of Eötvo's views would have been very desirable, obvious limitations of space notwithstanding. Furthermore a new edition of the study would gain much by the addition of an index and a partial reorganization of the third chapter, "Die Völkerkarte Osterreich-Ungarns," in chart form.

An overall evaluation of Hantsch's basic views as expressed in this study may be summarized by the following observations: firstly, proper stress has been given to the wealth and strength of the political experience and tradition accumulated in the Habsburg monarchy. Uncritical glorification of the past is, however, wisely avoided. Secondly, a definite shift from the former Austro-German centralistic historiography to a more well balanced kind of presentation is apparent. Here the path taken by Hantsch should be followed and widened by others. Finally, if it had not been for the tie of the Austrian national question with extraneous problems of international relations and integral nationalism, the peoples of the Danube monarchy, in spite of all internal difficulties, might have continued to coexist within the old frame to this very day, to theirs and everyone else's benefit. True as this conclusion may be, the obvious rub rests in the fact that the tie-in with international relations is an essential factor in every large-scale national problem. No solution of national issues without the consideration of concomitant international realities is conceivable.

Hantsch notes, correctly, that the failure to settle national issues by constitutional reform led to the hopeless attempt to solve them by administrative manipulation. Nevertheless, in a way, old Austria's chief contribution to the handling of the nationality problem rests precisely in the administrative field, for it was in this area that the monarchy in many respects set an example of political integrity, humane moderation and a cautious and mature application of treasured experiences.

The spirit of these imponderabilia of a true political science is harder to convey in print than any other kind of ideological blueprint, yet Hantsch's excellent study gives some of its essence.

Rutgers University ROBERT A. KANN

BUSSMANN, WALTER, *Treitschke, sein Welt- und Geschichtsbild*. Göttingen: "Musterschmidt" Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952. Pp. 479. DM 30.

This is a study of Treitschke's thought and of the influences that shaped its development. The author emphasizes the significance of deafness (almost complete) with which Treitschke became afflicted in his childhood and which pro-

foundly affected his outlook. Although as a young scholar he displayed some liberal tendencies, the trend of his later years was one of a steady drifting into a strongly conservative position. Bussmann indicates that in the 1870's Treitschke's views of parliamentary government became more and more negative, but he states that to discuss these would exceed the scope of his task which is to examine the evolution of Treitschke's philosophy in connection with the unification of Germany. With considerable urbanity he contends that in many respects Treitschke has been misrepresented and misunderstood in the West. He does not deny certain negative elements in his *Weltanschauung*. Thus he shows Treitschke's impatience with constitutionalism, his lack of social vision and his generally hostile opinions about the non-German peoples. Behind these, however, he discerns a man of noble motives and of high moral and aesthetic principles. The picture of Treitschke that emerges from Bussmann's pen is one of a lofty, if sometimes mistaken and inconsistent, conservative of the Aristotelian type.

Contrary to prevalent notions, "Treitschke was not a nationalist" (p. 240). One of the proofs offered is Treitschke's statement rejecting "the intoxicating doctrine of the rights of nationalities" (ibid.). Yet, the author tells the reader earlier that Treitschke was inclined to "assume the attitude of national superiority" (p. 141) and elsewhere points out that during the controversy about Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 he advocated that annexation even of those territories that were French in speech or sentiment (p. 323).

Treitschke's emphasis upon power has likewise been falsely interpreted in the West. He was anxious to provide for the spiritual well-being of the people, and his cultural demands upon the state were so exacting that he believed only a powerful state could satisfy them (p. 224). This we ought to bear in mind, the author warns, when we consider his remark that the state is "not an academy of arts, but above all power" (ibid.). Is it possible, however, to put such a generous interpretation upon Treitschke's words? At best they would seem to indicate that while he wanted to promote cultural schemes he wanted even more to promote the absolute power of the state. This is evident from a similar comment he made a few years later: "The State is not an Academy of Arts. If it neglects its strength in order to promote the idealistic aspirations of man, it repudiates its own nature and perishes" (*Politics,* Vol. I., p. 24). And in the same context he writes: "The sentimentalist may bewail the overthrow of cultured Athens by Sparta . . . but the serious thinker must recognize its necessity" (ibid.). The author further records Treitschke's assurance that a united Germany "will never conduct a policy of conquest" and that "the interests of nations are harmonious" (p. 265). In this he sees evidence that Treitschke's philosophy was one of peace which he hoped would be secured for Europe by the unification of Germany (ibid.).

Treitschke wrote profusely all his life and it is possible, on the basis of isolated evidence or unrepresentative samples, to attribute to him a variety of opinions. There are many aspects of Treitschke's thought which the author neglects to discuss and which would considerably alter the picture he presents. While at the University of Berlin to which he was appointed in 1874, Treitschke delivered a course of lectures on politics which became famous in Germany and which was posthumously published. Inasmuch as these lectures were delivered at a time when his views finally assumed a fixed form and were given repeatedly for a number of years, they may be said to embody the most mature and definitive expression of his outlook. Here Treitschke declares that "Submission is what the State primarily requires" and that to the state "it does not matter . . . what you think, so long

as you obey" (*Politics,* Vol. I., pp. 23-4). He proclaims that "We have learned to perceive the moral majesty of war through the very processes which to the superficial observer seem brutal and inhuman. The greatness of war is just what at first sight seems to be its horror—that for the sake of their country men will overcome the natural feelings of humanity, that they will slaughter their fellow-men who have done them no injury . . . " (ibid., Vol. II., p. 395). According to Treitschke "war is both justifiable and moral" and "the ideal of perpetual peace is not only impossible but immoral as well" (ibid., p. 599). Elsewhere he laments the sullying of German life "by the filth of Judaism" and urges that Germany must "see to it that the outcome of our next successful war must be the acquisition of colonies by any possible means" (ibid., Vol. I., p. 302, 119). Treitschke's *Politics* and other works are replete with such statements. With this may be compared Bussmann's conclusion that Treitschke was not a nationalist, that he did not desire conquest of foreign territory, and that his idea of power was merely "the sum total of social forces", its concept being "completely devoid of the aggressive element" (p. 250). For a balanced picture of Treitschke, the reader would do well to supplement Mr. Bussmann's work with his own study of Treitschke's writings.

University of Colorado STANLEY Z. PECH

BARDOUX, JACQUES, *Quand Bismarck dominait l'Europe.* Paris: Hachette, 1953. Pp. 325. Fr. 750.

This is the second volume of a series of three called *Les Qrigines de la Guerre de Trente Ans,* the author's somewhat fanciful title for the period 1914 to 1945 cevering two world wars. Volume I (*La Montée Prussienne, l'Aide Anglo-Francaise*), which this reviewer has not seen, covered the years 1864 to 1875; the present volume covers the period 1875 to 1882 (although it actually reaches the year 1884), and Volume III (*La Défaite de Bismarck—l'Empire Français et l'Alliance Russe*) the period 1882 to 1893.

The present volume makes use of the principal series of French and British diplomatic documents, the *Documents Diplomatiques* and *Foundations of British Policy,* as well as a series called *La Politique Extérieure de l'Allemagne.* As no bibliography appears in this volume (one assumes that it did in the first volume), the reader is reduced to depending on the footnotes, which give the titles in such greatly abbreviated form that references are often unclear. The author also uses Buckle's *Letters of Queen Victoria,* and standard biographies like Moneypenny and Buckle's *Disraeli,* Morley's *Gladstone,* Lady Gwendolen Cecil's *Salisbury,* as well as biographies of Lord Granville and Lord Lyons. Though the names of the authors of these last works do not appear, they are presumably the standard biographies by Newton and Fitzmaurice, respectively.

Bardoux's work is of value chiefly as a repository of source material. The reviewer has rarely seen a book that contained so many and such lengthy excerpts from sources. A good deal of the material from the French documents seems to have been used for the first time, and on the whole a mass of information is brought to light. As an impartial history, however, the book leaves much to be desired. In the first place, his sources are entirely French and English. No biography of Bismarck appears, not even the excellent one by the Frenchman Paul Matter, and his point of view throughout is thoroughly French, i.e. anti-Bismarckian. The book is divided into four chapters, entitled respectively "Lord Salisbury," "Avant Berlin (Juin 1875—Juin 1878)," "Après Berlin," and "Le Déclin de

Gladstone et la Domination de Bismarck," and in all of them the German chancellor comes off second best.

In fact, one of his principal theses is that if Russia and England had been wise, they would have prevented the creation of the German Empire by intervening in 1866 and 1870, for the good of the world. This is a theme that has won many adherents ever since the First World War, and particularly since the Second. Of course no one denies the large (though not exclusive) responsibility of Germany in the First World War, not to mention the Second, but it is not likely that a historian would now agree that a balance of power based on the weakness and disunity of a great people would have been an acceptable way of realizing historical justice.

Bardoux's principal "bête noire," besides Bismarck, is Disraeli, toward whom he exhibits a considerable amount of anti-Semitism, constantly referring to him as "ce juif vénitien," whereas his heroes are Salisbury, who is credited with nearly all the success achieved by the British at the Congress of Berlin, and the Comte de St. Vallier, French ambassador at Berlin from 1877 to 1881. Little account is taken of the rather malevolent activities of the Duc Decazes, the French foreign minister, or of Gorchakov, the Russian premier. And in various other ways the book presents an extremely one-sided view.

In this and in a number of his conclusions Bardoux is at odds with the best scholarly opinion on the subject, as represented in America for example, by Langer's *European Alliances and Alignments* and *Franco-Russian Alliance,* and particularly in Fay's masterly summary of the diplomatic situation of the '70's and '80's, given at the beginning of his *Origins of the World War.* Although these works are twenty years old and more, and their authors consequently had no access to some of the documents used by Bardoux, this reviewer sees no reason for changing the conclusions reached by these earlier writers.

West Virginia University J. C. Easton

Browder, Robert Paul, *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. Pp. 256. $5.00.

This is a good book. The author has used a variety of materials, both Russian and American, and it seems to this reviewer that nothing more of significance could be added to the story at this time. Mr. Browder readily concedes that much of his account is not new, but he manages to give the subject freshness by the use of recently published materials, occasional personal interviews, and his own objective analyses. Throughout the book the reader is impressed that Mr. Browder has considerable familiarity with the ways of the Kremlin, as well as with those of the State Department and the White House.

Despite the somewhat misleading title the book is essentially a survey of Soviet-American relations from the Revolution to the middle thirties. The main theme, to be sure, is woven around the causes, course, and consequences of United States' recognition of the Soviet government. The first decade after the Bolshevik accession to power is pictured as a period of general political estrangement, albeit one marked by considerable commerical interest on the part of large American industrial firms. Two factors then led to a cautious rapprochement—the common danger to both powers by the Japanese attack in Manchuria, and the fact of depression in the United States. American protagonists for a resumption of diplomatic relations argued their case both from a strategic and an economic point of view. Soviet spokesmen stressed the fact that the United States was blindly fore-

going a market which might relieve her current domestic distress, although Mr. Browder points out—rather convincingly—that the Kremlin was not a little disturbed about her Far Eastern outposts. The final act of recognition seems to have been the logical consequence of a juxtaposition of events which, at the moment, gave the two powers common economic and strategic interests which outweighed their ideological differences.

The subsequent disillusionment over the nearly fruitless discussions of debts, credits, trade and Comintern propaganda is faithfully portrayed. Browder implies, even where he does not state specifically, that official Washington was never too hopeful about these matters, although he does not hesitate to give full play to Mr. Bullitt's initial enthusiasm. President Roosevelt is accorded a mild rebuke for assuming that he would be able to persuade the Russians to the American viewpoint. On the other hand, there is much in the book which might irritate the Roosevelt-haters, for there is nothing to substantiate their frequent charge that he eagerly clasped the Bolsheviks to his bosom. The action was initiated in agreement with, and in large part negotiated by, Secretary Hull and other responsible officials of the State Department. Fellow travelers, and many liberals, applauded the act of recognition, but no single group was more articulate in its approval than those whom Roosevelt in a later moment of irritation once labelled the "economic royalists".

University of Nebraska ALBIN T. ANDERSON

ANDREWS, THEODORE, *The Polish National Catholic Church in America and Poland.* London: S.P.C.K., 1953. Pp. 117. 12s, 6d.

In this slender but scholarly volume the reader will find an account of the movement (whose antecedents go back to the sixteenth century) for a Polish National Church, begun late in the nineteenth century in the U.S.A. and deriving fresh stimulus from the liberation of the Mother Country in 1918. There are in all twelve short chapters, followed by three appendices dealing respectively with liturgy, creed and personnel. A three page bibliography concludes the whole, containing works published in English, Polish and German. This last is far from satisfactory. Dyboski never posed as a historian, and newer works should have been used in his place. The Encyclopedia Britannica materials are out of date, and its place should have been taken by the new Chambers. Further, the author does not seem to know the treasury of materials relating to Reformation problems to be found in the periodical *Reformacja,* edited by Dr. Stanisław Kot.

Chapter I deals very cursorily with the Reformation and its failure; Chapter III with movements for religious independence before the end of the nineteenth century, in particular with the break made by Father Stanisław Kozłowski in 1895 in Chicago, who was consecrated Bishop by the Old Catholics two years later, and was succeeded in 1907 by Father Hodur.

We then have chapters describing the nature and growth of this National Church, its doctrine, worship and organization. In Chapter XI we read of the mission to Poland of Father "Krupski" late in 1919, approved by Bishop Hodur, and of the parish formed four years later in Cracow. In 1928 a General Synod was held in Warsaw and, in spite of keen opposition, the cause prospered. It seemed to get a new lease on life after the war, but in 1951 the Soviet régime tightened up its program of church controls and all contact with the outside world was cut off.

For many reasons thinking Poles had long been unhappy about the depen-

dence of their religious life on Rome. They recalled how the Vatican had never protested against the Partitions; they saw Pope Gregory XVI come to terms very quickly with Tsar Nicholas I after the stamping out of all freedom in 1831; and they did not like the way the Hierarchy showed its hostility to some of the finest religious thought of Poles in modern times. On the other hand no one could deny that, threatened by Lutheran Prussia on the west and by Orthodox Russia on the east, the Polish nation found in Catholicism an indispensable weapon of national defence right through the post-partition years.

In the New World, the Polish immigrant, mostly of peasant origin, found himself regarded rather as a second-class Catholic, since most of the clergy were of German origin, or were Irish in their outlook—something that made no appeal, and even tended to alienate the humble folk from their faith. Where they aspired to be partners they were treated as apprentices.

All this does indeed explain why the movement for a National Church was bound to come; but it also indicates the measure of opposition with which it would have to reckon. Only the blessing of exceptional leadership—men of crystal charter, good intellect and enduring devotion—could hope to achieve their end. There can be no question that something of note has been attained, and this is soberly appraised in Chapter XII, where the author writes of the new body's relations with other churches. He does note that, being neither Roman nor Protestant, its position seemed equivocal to many. Only the future can tell us just what results may come of it all.

University of British Columbia WILLIAM J. ROSE

BRETTON, HENRY L., *Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953. Pp. xii, 199.

From the point of view of the techniques and the immediate objectives of Stresemann's foreign policy, this brief, well organized and presented study is, for the most part, a useful addition to the serious literature of international relations and of the diplomatic history of the Weimar Republic. Mr. Bretton, a member of the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, has chosen the analytical approach with minor concessions to biographical and historical methods. After a brief biographical sketch, he examines the formative years to Stresemann's chancellorship in 1923, the period of extreme nationalism, annexationist purposes, and of adjustment to Germany's defeat in search of the origins of later policy and methods. He then analyzes Stresemann's efforts to secure the revision of the Treaty of Versailles in connection with the indirect campaign against Article 231, the so-called "war-guilt clause," the attempts to remove or nullify the legal basis of sanctions and their substantial success in the Locarno Pact, and the protracted but successful maneuvers for the evacuation of the Rhineland. The failure to achieve the revision of the Western and Eastern frontiers and the use of the German minority in Poland for this purpose receive subordinate attention, and there is a compact chapter of summary and conclusions. The appendices reveal the secret funds at Stresemann's disposal for the furtherance of his policy. Bretton's demonstration of the statesman's skill in maintaining a parliamentary majority in support of that policy is especially effective.

Within the indicated limits, Bretton makes a convincing case, but he is chiefly engaged in knocking over a man of straw. Given Germany's military weakness, Stresemann had no other choice than to seek his objectives by peaceful means. In regard to the only conceivable alternative, an all out association with Soviet Russia.

the author's estimate of Stresemann's policy seems basically sound: while willing to use this frightening possibility to secure concessions, Stresemann was undoubtedly a Westerner in his orientation. Nevertheless, he went considerably further in approving cooperation with the Soviets than Bretton is prepared to admit. Despite the additional information from the Stresemann papers deposited by Henry Bernhard, the statesman's devoted secretary, in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry and recently released to the National Archives by the Department of State in the form of microfilms (information, incidentally, that might well have been presented more completely) it is simply not true that Stresemann succeeded in remaining "aloof from the entire conspiracy" between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. Gustav Hilger is quite correct in writing in *The Incompatible Allies* (N. Y., Macmillan, 1953) that he knew of and approved all of these arrangements.

Praiseworthy as this study is, the assumption that Stresemann's revisionist policy was justified and the rosy picture of his ultimate intentions cannot be allowed to pass without question. In regard to the first point, he was surely sufficiently realistic not to count solely upon Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations for the recovery of the Danzig Corridor or to rule out forever the use of force. To accept without question his unqualified attachment to the Weimar Republic of such derogatory evidence as the curious interest Bretton has discovered in the *Nachlass* in the fate of individuals implicated in the Kapp Putsch, in the Feme murders, and in the famous letter to the former Crown Prince, either as surviving commitments from a rejected past or as political maneuvers. Bretton makes a good deal of Stresemann's fondness for quotations from Goethe, but he says nothing at all of Stresemann's life-long interest in Napoleon.

Duke University E. Malcolm Carroll

Clauss, Max Walter, *Der Weg nach Jalta. Praesident Roosevelts Verantwortung.* Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1952. Pp. 276.

The author, a well known foreign and diplomatic correspondent of the Nazi press, though not of the party, contributes yet another dossier to the intensive white-washing campaign which is under way in present-day Germany. In that campaign there are those who do not hesitate to state that Hitler has been proven right by post-war developments; those who admit that Hitler may have been wrong, but that most of the men around him had been right; and those, like the author of the present volume, who prefer to speak about the responsibilities of the enemies of the Third Reich, because that dispenses them from acknowledging the guilt of the fatherland.

A central theme of the book is to stress similarities between Hitler and Roosevelt, accusing them both of having been masters of hatred and mass-seduction. When Hitler is indicted for his cruel extermination of European Jewry, Roosevelt has to take the blame for having followed the advice of American Jews who wished to exterminate the Germans. So it all balances out. Much of this is stated only by innuendo, and the author shows himself altogether as a master in the art of insinuation and implicit rather than explicit statements.

For his narration of the history of lend-lease, of the major war-time conferences, of the formulation of war aims, unconditional surrender, and of the Morgenthau-Plan, Clauss uses as sources the memoirs of the major Allied leaders and observers on the spot. There seems to be not a single instance where he has falsified the facts as presented by the British and American authors. His technique consists in making a rather judicious selection of all those passages which show the

Western Allies unprepared to face political decisions, overly distrustful of the Russians, here frivolous, there emotional (and sometimes, it must be admitted, outright silly). Roosevelt's main guilt? That "the President never even considered the necessity of protecting the German people and the German country from Russian vengeance nor the advisability of saving the German potential (sic!) as a protection against future Russian threats in Europe" (p. 208). The author never seriously considers the question of how to square the circle, namely how it would have been possible to do what he proposes and still defeat hitlerism.

Clauss has read George Kennan's thoughtful analysis of the problems here involved. But he avoids discussing Mr. Kennan's proposition that most of the tragedy that has befallen the Western world stems from the fact that after 1936 it was no longer possible to defeat one dictatorship without the aid of the other.

Because of the author's crisp journalistic style, his ability to digest, however superficially, a vast amount of bulky historical materials, and because of his special pleading, his book was bound to have a considerable success, at least in Germany. It is water on the mills of those Germans who pride themselves, even if they admit responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War, not to bear any such responsibility for the settlement that followed. Will they ever admit that there would not have been a "Yalta" or an "iron curtain" running through the heart of Europe, if there had not been aggression by the German leader to whom Mr. Clauss refers with cheap aristocratic contempt as the "corporal"?

University of Colorado HENRY W. EHRMANN

FEJTÖ, FRANÇOIS,, *Histoire des démocraties populaires.* Paris: Editions du Seuil. 1952. Pp. 447. Fr. 600.

Mr. Fejtö, whose work on the revolutions of 1949 is available in English, was engaged in writing this book from 1949 until early in 1952. A tremendous labor of collection and sifting has gone into the work, and the result abundantly justifies the effort. There have been other works in the western languages that set out to survey the developments in politics, economy and culture in the states under Soviet control since the end of the war with Germany, but none, it would appear, written so comprehensively and solidly based. The work was not written in anticipation of the death of Stalin, but it loses none of its value for that lack of prophetic vision.

The work is organized in six broad sections: the pre-war and wartime developments, the immediate post-war period of reconstruction under a form of uneasy communist-democratic coalition, the turning point, which the author sets late in 1946 until the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the structural evolution of the Cominform countries since 1948, which covers the various purges, the economic travail and communist solutions since 1948, and lastly—the domain of the mind. Several other possible organizations of the subject suggest themselves, but this one has the advantage of allowing the author to keep constantly in mind comparable factors in the various countries and to relate them to a supposed overall Soviet plan for the area. The temper of the presentation is cool and objective. It is clear, however, that Mr. Fejtö would count the negative aspects of these years of Soviet control to outweigh the positive gains in almost every field. On the other hand he makes it equally clear in his summary that the pre-1939 Central Europe is gone beyond recall, and quite properly so.

To set the stage for the post-war development it was necessary to sketch the story of German conquest and occupancy (of her own three satellites), and the attempt by the Big Three to provide a fine new world for these peoples by recarving

its boundaries and setting benevolently the boundaries of their own zones of interest. This is a subject hardly any historian can approach without a feeling of deep chagrin—that the victorious chiefs of state with so much power were so oblivious of the simplest lessons of history as recent as 1919-39. The naive thought that Germany could be left a vacuum seemed to be the key of all their deliberations. The description of the restoration of anti-Nazi governments in these countries in 1944 and 1945 is described as well as the proportion of the book would permit. Much that is relevant has had to be telescoped to allow for the broader design. The rejection by Soviet Russia of all real efforts by Central European peoples to get together in lesser federations is treated as a central doctrine in Soviet policy, as indeed it was. The *fact* was clear as early as 1941: the reason was to become clear in 1948.

Mr. Fejtö has seen, and clearly expressed, the tragedy of the bankruptcy of Central European Social Democracy, perhaps the only possible antidote to Communism for such countries. But under pressure it crumbled almost instantly. This failure may well be subjected to searching historical and psychological analysis at some later time when the facts are clearer and emotions less disturbed, but of its costliness in psycho-political terms at the present, we are only too aware. The general treatment of the purges and the various trials—Rajk, Kostov, Gomulka, Clementis, Slansky—is excellent, and the close connection between them, their conduct, and timing, is well brought out. The attention given to the economic aspects of this new world is quite effective. As Marxism is ostensibly an economic gospel it should be content to be judged by the yardstick of its economic performance, and Mr. Fejtö finds it wanting. Yet though the statistics are of production of economic units, the reality behind the figures is psychological: the desire to work and produce for a state which orders performance and punishes for non-compliance. Exploitation remains—only now the exploiter is the powerful state that makes and administers the laws and not an isolated "capitalist" who has also to live under the law. Just how this psychological obstacle is to be overcome has not yet been discovered. Perhaps the "new Soviet man" will be more responsive to orders and less sensitive to the discouragement of punitive measures awaiting his non-compliance. The basic failure of the economies of these countries, in spite of some accomplishments of real merit, is clear. The contrast between Eastern and Western Germany are indisputably available.

Perhaps the best part of the book is the treatment of the "Domaine de l'Esprit," about which the author writes with even-handed penetration. The spread of education, the drive for increased literacy, the open-handedness to teachers and artists, the emphasis on art and letters is all portrayed, and then weighted against the motives behind the drive: the control of the mind of the people by increasing the media for imparting the knowledge that it is desired to impart, the eventual sterilization of the artist by dictation of the subjects he may take in hand, the ultimate and absolute control of all intellectual activity. The terror of this absolutism seemed to occur late to many of the intellectuals. It takes an effort of the will to understand how intellectually gullible many "intellectuals" in these countries were in the first years after military victory.

In a number of details it might be possible to differ from Mr. Fejtö's presentation. He must not have seen UNRRA at work to remark on American insistence (p. 133) on the source of 73% of the gifts as American. The populace knew where it came from without being told. Most of the directors of UNRRA were not American and not a few were Russian. He does not give enough attention to the

mental and physical fatigue of the Central European population by 1945. He uses a formal but erroneous valuation of the Polish *złoty* (p. 163), and accepts the figures of the Polish government in his calculations—which the government itself smiled at. It was known in May, 1948 (p. 241), that the coming split in Yugoslavia would call for Soviet support of Hungary. At least it was common gossip in Budapest at that time. The Soviets were urging the Slav states before 1948 to accept some Germans back into their economies (p. 264). The reasons for the surrender by the Protestant churches to the Communist governments (p. 386) are not too clearly presented. The small number of their adherents, their relative poverty as compared with the Roman Catholic Church, and the apparently generous terms offered by the governments, and, in several almost scandalous cases, the advice of American churchmen, made further resistance seem pointless. Certainly they had no tight ties and consequent support from outside their countries to encourage them to seek martyrdom. The Bulgarian ministers offered a vivid contrast to the conduct of many Protestant clergy in Central Europe. On p. 418 Mr. Fejtö concludes that it was the resistance of the Western powers to her expansion that made her determine to consolidate her gains. This has only to be stated to appear naive. The various corps of trained officials that the USSR put into each of the countries here considered would indicate that a long-considered and well prepared plan was being carried out. Any other explanation would be unthinkable.

University of Colorado S. Harrison Thomson

Meyer, Peter, B. Weinryb, E. Duschinsky, N. Sylvain, *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1953. Pp. 637. $6.35.

In 1951 there appeared under the auspices of the American Jewish Committee the comprehensive and scholarly study by Dr. Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, which has been accorded a uniformly favorable reception in the United States and abroad. The collective work under review can be considered as its companion and continuation. It is the first full-scale attempt in English to present, on the basis of careful and solid scholarship, a detailed account of the fate of the Jewish communities in the Soviet satellite states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria; a supplementary chapter is devoted to Eastern Poland after its occupation by the Soviets in 1939. A long (48 pp.) and illuminating introduction summarizes the essential features and conclusions of the single chapters. In its totality, the book presents a thorough, well documented and convincing picture of Jewish life in five countries under Communist governments.

It does even more than that. The authors do not begin their presentation with the moment of the establishment of the Communist régimes in these countries. They give a comprehensive background for every country and deal succinctly with the position of the respective Jewish communities before World War II; they describe wartime persecutions, the impact of German occupation, the shortlived hopes of the first postwar years and the disillusionment which has befallen hundreds of thousands who have remained behind the Iron Curtain. The first postwar governments, though Soviet-dominated, seemed to be full of good intentions toward the remnants of their respective Jewish minorities. The Jews expected that they would be given a chance of rebuilding at least partly some of the existence destroyed by the Germans and/or German-dominated régimes. The new rulers have outlawed anti-Semitism and promised both economic rehabilitation and religious and cultural freedom. It was mostly because of these prospects that many Jews did not make use of the early opportunities for emigration. They stayed on in

the hope that in the emerging intermediary type of economy, with nationalization of industry just beginning, they could find a place for themselves. The reestablishment of Jewish communal institutions seemed to provide an opportunity to freely develop national culture.

All these hopes quickly and pitifully collapsed with the Soviets seizing full control of their satellite states. A full-fleged Soviet pattern was inexorably introduced and applied. The Jews very soon felt the destructive impact of Sovietization. Says Peter Meyer in his introduction: "The modest restitution claims of the Jews clashed from the beginning, with the vested interest of the nationalizing bureaucracy. The restitution laws were first sabotaged, then revised and finally abolished. Jews who after the liberation had established new enterprises were expropriated again, certainly not as Jews, but as capitalists."

On the cultural front, the policy also followed Soviet Russia's "general line" of ruthless denationalization. Jewish cultural institutions have been gradually liquidated. Those who have been allowed to continue have degenerated into mere centers of anti-Western and anti-Zionist propaganda, into obedient tools of Communist demagogy. The anti-Jewish prejudices of the local population were revived. Jews were increasingly discriminated against in public office. Jewish longing for emigration was intermittently tolerated and suppressed in Rumania. Czechoslovakia and Poland; it was consistently forbidden in Hungary and consistently permitted in Bulgaria. The authors offer no explanation for this lack of common policy in the single satellites.

The material on which the study is based is on the whole both vast and reliable. Utilized were mostly first-hand sources—official documents, local press and publications. There is, however, no proper balance in the presentation. One hundred and fifty-five pages are devoted to the estimated 54,000 Jews now living in Czechoslovakia while the present 345,000 strong Jewish community of Rumania is discussed on 66 pages only; 257,000 Jewish survivors of Hungary are allotted the same number of pages (120) as the 30-40,000 Jews remaining in Poland, while the 7,000 Jews who stayed in Bulgaria are dealt with on 80 pages. The presentation is uneven not only in quantity but in quality as well. The best chapters are those devoted to Czechoslovakia (by Peter Meyer), Bulgaria (again by Peter Meyer), and Poland (by Bernard D. Weinryb); the chapter on Hungary by Eugene Duschinsky is satisfactory, but the chapter on Rumania by Nicolas Sylvan is definitely poor. Peter Mayer's introduction is truly brilliant. This reviewer does not agree with some of the author's conclusions, but he sincerely admires the sober clarity of his summary.

By initiating the study, sponsoring the research and making possible the publication, the American Jewish Committee has undoubtedly made a valuable contribution to the knowledge and understanding of the Jewish problem and of the effect of the Soviet system on the life of 700,000 Jews living in the five Communist satellites.

New York City JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN

HISCOCKS, RICHARD, *The Rebirth of Austria.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. Pp. 263. $3.50.

"The enigma of the future is the whole World's burden" (p. 99). This enigma is hardly anywhere else in the world more immediately felt than throughout those 32,369 square miles of Austrian area which is geographically the most eastwards, while historically and socially among the westernmost political units of

free Europe. Owing to the present circumstances it does not participate in any of the supra-national blocks and regional agreements; since 1947 it has been on the waiting list for admission to the UN.

Professor Hiscock's book offers the best available and most conclusive, condensed information about postwar Austria in her political, economic, social and international aspects. It is a well substantiated, impartial, readable and friendly analysis, written by a scholarly diplomat about a country he knows from personal experience and to which he obviously remains mentally and emotionally attached.

As such it is a unique treatise which, because of the competence and sincerity of the author, his fact-finding efforts and use of the available sources, and his completely unprejudiced judgment, deserves full credit and attention.

The main problem Professor Hiscock (now at the University of Manitoba, between February 1946 and October 1949 on the staff of the British High Commissioner in Vienna) witnessed in his official mission was, besides immediate relief action, the desperate plight of a long-term program for economic recovery. Economic considerations (food, shelter, raw materials, equipment) were given clear priority, first among them the thorny problem of rebuilding and stabilizing the national currency under extremely difficult conditions. No doubt that these most pressing requirements, and it may be added the presence of foreign authorities and occupation, facilitated political compromise. Its indispensable result was a coalition régime between basically antagonistic but responsible mass parties (People's Party and Socalists) and consequent stability of government, based on more than 80% of the Austrian electorate. This made for a positive democracy, hitherto for different reasons practically unknown or at least superseded by negative features during the first 20 years of republican Austrian history. Contrary to other countries in a similar situation, Austria thus far has not yet abandoned the strict and unmodified principles of proportional representation. Since no single party ever gained a substantial majority and the numerical strength of the smaller groups remained insignificant, the present régime, while far from being considered an ideal solution by both partners, remains for all practical purposes the only possible and reasonable Austrian answer.

Hiscock stresses—and rightly so—the spectacular success in Austria of the Marshall Plan, to which the country owes not only recovery, but survival within the family of free nations. An abundance of impressive statistics (production figures, wage scales, cost-of-living index) shows the benefits Austria derived under the ERP through direct aid, indirect aid, and the use of "counterpart funds." "By 1951 the Austrian gross national product had more than doubled since 1946 and was approximately 18% above the prewar level" (p. 119).

For Austria, as for all other small countries, foreign trade is of vital importance. "Before the war her foreign trade quota per head of population was one of the highest in Europe" (p. 97). This and similar carefully substantiated references are apt eventually to rectify certain widely popularized reporter versions and oversimplifications which depict prewar Austria, not without Austrian connivance, as a sympathetic but hopelessly anachronistic little country "which used to live on charity and a little tourist traffic" (Sebastian Haffner, *London Observer,* in syndicated articles, December 1953); in the postwar years she was occasionally reported in the USA to "live on foreign aid and jodel-industry."

The material presented by Hiscock makes it clear enough that what Haffner refers to as an Austrian miracle has two solid, equal, interdependent and thoroughly down-to-earth components: efficient American incentive and equally efficient Aus-

trian initiative; the latter was responsible for the new and bold lines and directions of an active trade policy which opened overseas markets in the Far East and Africa as well as in the Americas, formerly virtually closed to Austrian goods. As a matter of fact, skilled trade delegates often accomplish more for a small country than its conventional foreign representation. It goes without saying that, in the long run, Austria can hardly do without her traditional two-way traffic with eastern European neighbors, now cut down (by 1952) from 27% (1937) to 12.3% on exports and from 31.5% to 9.9% on the import side of her total foreign trade volume (p. 73). These figures do not include USSR, but only the former central eastern European market, now politically organized in the "People's Democracies."

Contrary to common opinion, Hiscock insists that the after-effects of the Anschluss were not entirely bad. Not economically, because certain capital investments developed sources of natural wealth more quickly than otherwise would have been possible. This holds true despite ruthless and damaging methods in the service of the German war effort and despite the fact that, at least so far as the oil fields are concerned, the former German exploitation was replaced for the time being by an even more disastrous Russian one. Politically the Anschluss experiences helped the Austrian people to become a self-conscious political nation, "confident in their destiny" (p. 248) and no longer reluctant to live as a so-called independent state. Furthermore the Anschluss made clear what any student of central European history should have known anyway: that Austria's *raison d'être* was to serve as mediator and exchange post for Central-Eastern Europeans. Taken as isolated, she does not make sense. Once established as a western bulwark against eastern agressive expansion, Austria became the neutralizing zone between potential German expansionist trends and autonomous non-German central eastern European nationalities. Modern Austria is definitely built on the groundwork of a basically German cultural tradition; it would be ridiculous and dangerous to forget this heritage for reasons of expediency. The important thing is that the Austrian version of German political civilization and spirit abhors those ideas of national hegemony which time and again, in German or Russian form, have constituted a mortal threat to central eastern European national freedom. Therefore Austria through her mere existence calls for a supranational formula. As an independent state she makes sense only as a stepping-stone on the way towards USE, and as a grammar school for the historical education of convinced Europeans.

There are some minor points where Professor Hiscock's excellent study perhaps might gain by some implementation. Among the subjects which could profitably be discussed within the broader framework of a treatise dealing with the rebirth of Austria are such decisive questions as the purpose of an Austrian state within the international fabric; the possible future reorganization of the Danube nations on a regional basis; the sociological structure of the Austrian people; the reformulated Austro-German relations; and also topics like the advisable and possible constitutional amendments; the ideological metamorphosis of the main political parties.

Furthermore, it seems to this reviewer that in some instances of minor importance the author accepted the inaccuracies of secondary sources; this might easily have happened in cases where he was no longer in a position to get first-hand information. Thus the present Chancellor Ing. Julius Raab (in office since April 1953) can hardly be called a "leading industrialist and typical right-wing leader" (p. 67). He never belonged to big industry or its organizations and never displayed any strong views. Leading industrialists in Austrian active political ranks

are and always have been a rare exception. Like the overwhelming majority of Austrians, irrespective of their party affiliations, Raab belongs to the "little bourgeois class." The statement that Raab "is temperamentally less fitted for compromise than his conciliatory predecessor" (p. 67) was definitely not warranted by his record in office. More successful compromises—even with the Russians—were concluded during his term than during the preceding years.

Professor Hiscock correctly refers to the fact that the recovery of agricultural production lagged considerably behind and did not reach the prewar level before 1952. He attributes this shortcoming to the marked privileged position in Marshall aid granted to the industrial sector, particularly to investment goods production. Another explanation lies with the Russian element which by 1951 still held about 279,000 acres of highest grade arable land under its control for mostly military purposes.

These few marginal notes do not intend to undervaluate the high standard, exactness and objectivity of the book under review. The author sometimes goes out of his way to avoid the slightest semblance of political bias. He does not use the handy black-and-white cliché. With his efforts to be factual, accurate and fair, he offers all the information a student of central European affairs may want about the economic, political and social aspects of the Austrian picture. His fervent endeavors to encourage a realistic approach, an optimistic outlook and a true humanitarian spirit of reconciliation among his Austrian friends, become manifest from the dedication to the fairly comprehensive and helpful bibliography.

Saint Louis University KURT V. SCHUSCHNIGG

LYONS, EUGENE, *Our Secret Allies: The Peoples of Russia.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1953. Pp. 376. $4.50.

There are few American writers and scholars who have contributed so much to an understanding of Russia as has Eugene Lyons with his latest book, *Our Secret Allies: The Peoples of Russia.* Most recent researches on Soviet affairs, unfortunately for American readers and students, have been devoted to a pragmatic history of the Soviet régime, its growth, foreign relations and ruling clique, to feuds within the Party and rightist or leftist opposition, neglecting the millions of people dominated by the Marxist masters in Moscow and their struggle against communism. This disregard for the mind of the people of the Soviet Union and their attitude toward the Red dictatorship has been based on two fundamental postulates: (1) that the Soviet régime, despite the hardships it has imposed upon the people of its empire, has constituted nevertheless a progressive evolution in comparison with the tsarist system; and (2) that the people of the Soviet Union accepted the régime imposed upon them by Lenin and, later, Stalin, and feel themselves solidly in accord with their government and the ruling party.

In his book Eugene Lyons destroys both of these myths. He proves that Russia under the tsars was by far more progressive than the present Soviet Union. Even in the field of education, the object of Soviet boasts, litle new has been accomplished since the revolution. Toward the end of the reign of Nicholas II eighty-two percent of the male population in European Russia was already literate and a large number of provinces had introduced compulsory education. National schools for the minorities had been created in the Russian empire long before the revolution, and after 1905 their existence was legalized for nearly all national groups. In the Moslem schools, which had existed since the late eighteenth century, not only were all subjects taught in the native tongue, but the Russian language

itself was usually not offered. By 1914 nearly one hundred per cent of the Moslem Tatar youth was literate.

Lyons reminds the reader of the rapid but forgotten economic evolution of tsarist Russia, which certainly compares most favorably with accomplishments under the Soviet five-year plans and was achieved without purges and forced labor. Equally forgotten is the degree of political freedom which existed in pre-revolutionary Russia, where after 1905 all opposition parties had their own press. At that time even the Bolsheviks officially published, under the editorship of Molotov, their organ, *Pravda*. Under Alexander II only one capital sentence for a political crime was pronounced, and it was only after 1905, when the wave of Red terrorism forced the imperial government to undertake more severe protective measures, that "the toll of the hangman began to run into hundreds." Even in these years, however, the number of victims of imperial courts never surpassed that of the subsequent Red terror. It is of interest to note that during the last one hundred years of the tsarist régime the total number of revolutionaries sentenced to death did not exceed one-fifth that of the Communards shot by the troops of Thiers in 1871 after the quelling of the revolt of the Commune.

More vital is the second problem discussed by Mr. Lyons, that of the attitude of the Soviet Union toward their rulers. No people has contributed so much to the fight against communism than the peoples of Russia. Three years of terrible civil war, when on many occasions the Soviets were in mortal danger, provide the best proof of the initial resistance of the Russians and other subjects of the former tsarist empire against the Reds. Even when the Bolsheviks attained final victory over the regular White armies in the fields, the peasants and workers continued to resist, not infrequently armed. The great peasant uprising of Antonov in the Tambov region, almost at the gates of Moscow, in which over forty thousand peasants organized themselves into a regular army, was the most striking event of rural resistance against the Reds. Less spectacular but no less intense was the peasant opposition which lasted well into the thirties. The Soviet concentration camps, still filled with workers and peasants, representatives of the intelligentsia and even former Party members, are the most impressive evidence of the continued struggle within the Marxist state. During the last world war large sections of the population demonstrated their unwillingness to fight for Stalin and his lieutenants, and over seven million Red Armists surrendered to the Germans during the first months of the war. The inhabitants of Russian and Ukrainian cities and towns greeted the invading German armies as liberators from the Soviet yoke. As early as Christmas, 1941, however, the mood and attitude of the Russian people and the Soviet armies changed radically. Russian, Ukrainian and other Soviet soldiers preferred to die fighting rather than starve in German prisoner of war camps or suffer bestial treatment at the hands of invaders. It was the Germans' behavior which finally determined their own fate and brought to an end the Third Reich.

Our Secret Allies is not a historical research. It is a polemic work intended to refute established myths and reveal the mood and minds of the people of Soviet Russia. Some of the author's deductions appear overly optimistic, however. The factor of time works not against the Reds but for them, and there remain always fewer and fewer people who have known another system than the Soviet and who are able to compare it critically with régimes in other countries or in Russia in the pre-revolutionary period. The bitter experience of war when the supposed liberator treated the population more heinously than the Communists themselves, assisted in dispersing the illusions of Soviet citizens. The attitude of the Allies in the early

post-war period also strengthened the standing of the Soviet government. The Allies' extradition of General Vlassov and his troops to the Soviet Union further undermined the faith in Western democracy of many Red officers. In the case of a conflict between the West and Communism the attitude of Soviet soldiers, potential allies of the Western democracies, would depend greatly upon the West's policies toward the peoples of the Soviet Union and on its understanding of their desires, hopes and needs.

Indiana University SERGE ZENKOVSKY

FAINSOD, MERLE., *How Russia is Ruled.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Pp. xi, 575. $7.50.

A spectre of Soviet power is haunting the world and it is only natural that the haunted world is keenly interested in the nature of this power. How Soviet power operates inside and what can be done to tame or disarm it is the main theme of this rather impressive work. This is the eleventh volume in the series of works turned out by the Harvard Research Center. The present volume fits neatly into the general aims of this ambitious undertaking at Harvard—"the study of Russian institutions and behavior in an effort to make for better understanding of international actions and policy of the Soviet Union."

The volume reviewed contains four parts. The first part deals with the period immediately preceding the Communist ascent to power; the second is devoted to the role of the party; the third discusses the "instruments of rule," such as the employment of constitutional shams, the bureaucracy, the use of terror, and of the armed forces; finally, the fourth part describes what might be called Soviet action and counter-action in agriculture and in industry.

This is no mean assignment. Beginning with a graphic historical sketch, Professor Fainsod then proceeds to examine the very roots of Soviet power, analyzes the stem, its branches, the bitter fruit it bears, and, finally, indulges in some predictions. The outlook is not a bright one: the cold and undeniable fact remains that the régime has created a vast bureaucratic class, the interests of which are tightly interwoven with the existence of the régime. This class has learned to balance on a tight rope and maintain itself by a whip and carrot policy. When the moment is opportune the whip is cracked; when tension rises and threatens the state with nation-wide eruption the carrot is held out. But the carrot should deceive no one, for this is only a palliative measure; the return of the whip policy is as certain as night follows day.

Metaphors aside, and to be more precise, the Soviet régime, by its very nature and the fact of its entrenchment throughout its period of existence, is unable to shed its totalitarian characteristics and assume the pattern of a free democratic society. Isaac Deutscher's contention as expressed in his latest book, *Russia, What Next?,* is not at all shared by Fainsod. Fainsod does not believe that Stalinism must necessarily die with Stalin or that Russia is bound to return to a form of Soviet democracy. Fainsod's thesis can be best expressed in his own words, namely, that the régime will die only when its power "is wrenched from its hands."

To the student of Russian history the verdict of the Harvard Professor of Government is interesting in the extreme: it carries a curiously familiar sound of the proclamations of the Narodniks (Nihilists?) of the eighties and of the Social Revolutionaries of the early decade of the present century. One might even detect a similarity with a manifesto of an earlier date which proclaimed that the "ends

can be attained by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." Indeed what odd twists, turns and somersaults history is able to present us with!

So much for the general contents. But the work has numerous detailed studies of a most informative nature that pertains to the functioning of the Soviet apparatus. The reader will find an illuminating account of the varied agencies with their social groupings that constitute the basis upon which Soviet power rests. These are the classes which have vested interests in the welfare of the Soviet system. The fall of the system must entail the doom of these classes. They are the large contingents that make up the civil service, they are the highly-paid "spets" or specialists in the various fields of public administrations, in industry and agriculture, and the high ranks in the armed forces. This is all true, but it is to be regretted that Fainsod has overlooked one more important group which lends itself to a most interesting study. This group has been neglected by many other foreign writers and Russian emigrés. It is an intangible group; nonetheless it represents a nation-wide sentiment and fear best expressed in the disturbing question which one invariably hears: "If the régime collapses, what next? What will take its place?"

It seems to me that the weakness of Professor Fainsod's otherwise impressive work lies in the fact that to this most significant query he gives no answer, nor is there even any indication that he is aware of such a query. It has been sadly overlooked by the keenest foreign observers as well as by emigré engineers who are preoccupied with drawing blueprints for a future "Free Russia." Should the Soviet régime vanish tomorrow, what will fill the created vacuum on the day after? This is no idle question.

Regardless of what the Russian people think or feel about the totalitarian régime, they endure at present, they have no desire to bring into the country all squabbles and interminable debates that splinter the emigré organization abroad. All the futility of recent debates between Kerensky and Nikolaevsky, between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, Georgians and others only alienates the emigré leaders from the people of Russia. All the hair-splitting discussions about centralized and federalized statehood leave the nation inside Russia totally indifferent. They are weary and fearful of the preposterous claims of various minorities which must result in a Balkanization of Eastern Europe, not to mention the awakening of the most tantalizing issue of Polish Irredentism whose advocates remember everything and learn nothing from history. Alas, there is an increasing number of statesmen who seem to embrace the view that every means that can serve to demolish present conditions in Eastern Europe must benefit the West. This is a fallacious impression, unfortunately, conveyed by many current writings. Such a policy might leave Eastern Europe in the throes of chaos, civil strife and confusion, and engulf eventually the rest of the world. There is every indication to justify the belief that within the Soviet Union are millions of people who live in the hope of regaining freedom. But they would rather linger under present condition than bring upon themselves the dismemberment of the state and plunge into the chaos that might ensue from such a disastrous course.

In summary let me state that Professor Fainsod has accomplished an adequate task in diagnosing the inner political illness of the Soviet system. But he has as yet to add perhaps another thesis which would convince the patient that his offered remedy will cure and not kill him. It is not merely a matter of wrenching power from the Soviets; it is far more important to know what will ensue *after* the power has been wrenched from the present masters. This pertinent question remains unanswered.

Stanford University ANATOLE G. MAZOUR

SETON-WATSON, HUGH, *From Lenin to Malenkov*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. Pp. 377. $6.00.

While not profoundly analytical, although at times most thought-provoking, *From Lenin to Malenkov* deserves the highest commendation. It is primarly a survey of world communism, and the author freely admits that theory has been left to others. At a time when the history of world communism is subject to distortions of truth from both right and left, Hugh Seton-Watson is able to devote himself objectively to a sound comparative analysis.

His method is simple. Although partially chronological, the author wisely avoids the artificial limitations imposed by strict adherence to such a system. Thus, he proceeds from area to area and back again, overlapping time spans when necessary and interjecting pertinent chapters on the crucial influencing factors in the Soviet Union. In discussing European communism in its earliest period he cogently compares the German and Hungarian revolutions with the Russian; and in dealing with Asia, while stressing communism in China, he does not ignore the important related events in the Southeast.

On the subject of Chinese communism the author is most exacting, and it is only when he becomes concerned with United States' policy in post-war China that some may take issue with him. Even here, however, he leaves much up to future historians and wisely avoids a deep embroilment in a subject still enmeshed in subjective appraisals.

As in other areas, the author's penetrating summation of the Asian social structure, political system, and nationalist movements provides unusual insight into the forces that preceded, if not generated, Asian communism. In Europe, too, the author brilliantly examines the distribution of power and the social forces favorable or unfavorable to the breeding of communism. Included, too, is a succinct survey of world communism today.

It is in the final chapter that the author is at his best. In analyzing the social factors influencing communist development, he differentiates between the "advanced" and "backward" societies, and observes that in the former there is much to hinder the growth of communism. It is in the advanced societies that workers have grown prosperous and have ceased to be a revolutionary force, and it is the author's contention that where, despite a high level of prosperity, the majority of workers have supported communism, this has been for political and cultural reasons, not for economic.

The author is his most sobering in his lucid consideration of resistance to communism. Here, he sees three aspects—external defense, internal defense, and the treatment of social conditions. Though perhaps a reflection of a natural British outlook, but nevertheless sound, he reminds us that it is a fallacy to believe there are only two powers in the world and that all other states are helpless, and cautions that the United States would lose the world struggle if it did not have the support of the lesser powers. In discussing the internal threat, he discards the clichés on both sides of the political chasm and warns that fascists must not be allowed to assume the leadership of the struggle against communism.

Like all good histories, the principal merits of this book are a sound narrative of events and a style that enables the reader to appreciate the theme. But even more, for those who want to appraise objectively the origins of the "cold war" and more intelligently meet the latest threat to a decent civilization, *From Lenin to Malenkov* may be considered a trustworthy guide.

Mexico City, D. F. JOHN BARTÁK

SHORTER NOTICES

WILLAN, T. S., *The Muscovy Merchants of 1555*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953. Pp. viii, 141. 16s.

The "Muscovy merchants" described by Dr. Willan in this book are the members of the company chartered in London in 1555 following the return of Richard Chancellor from Russia. This company, commonly known later as the "Russia Company" or the "Muscovy Company", played a very important role in Anglo-Russian relations in the second half of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries, and its activities are of considerable interest to both English and Russian historians. Dr. Willan in his little monograph set for himself the task of investigating the founders of the Russia Company to determine what the position of the individual members was in the English social hierarchy, what their origin was, what the ties were that brought them together, what role they played in English government and in the City of London, in what branches of foreign trade they participated, whether they were members of other trading companies, and whether any of them were interested in industrial enterprises. Furthermore, Willan was interested in determining the amount and form of the wealth of individual members, whether they owned houses, employed servants, had any country estates, as well as how they disposed of their property in their wills and bequests.

The book consists of 74 pages of text, 57 pages of biographical appendix dealing with the individual members, and 8 pages of a name and place index. The chief merit of this obviously laborious and painstaking investigation seems to be its contribution "to that large and neglected subject, the merchant class of Tudor London, which still awaits its historian." Incidentally, the author corrects the date of the issuance of the company's charter which should be February 26, 1555, and not February 6 as it is printed in Hakluyt.

University of California GEORGE V. LANTZEFF

HÖCKER, WILMA, *Der Gesandte Bunsen als Vermittler zwischen Deutschland und England (Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft,* Heft II). Göttingen: "Musterschmidt" Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1951. Pp. 155. DM 6.80.

Christian Karl Josias Bunsen's earlier life receives more attention than his period of diplomatic service in London, 1841-1854, the title of Dr. Höcker's monograph notwithstanding. Of his diplomatic activities there, notice is taken only of the curious affair of the Anglo-Prussian bishopric in Jerusalem. There is nothing at all on the great political problems of the time, the Revolution of 1848, the Schleswig-Holstein question and the London Convention, 1852, and the Crimean War in connection with which his advice to side with England brought about his recall and the termination of his diplomatic career. The author is solely concerned, in this period, with Bunsen's cultural interests, doubtless because of the inaccessibility of his official correspondence in the Prussian *Geheime Staatsarchiv* presently in Russia's control. From Bunsen's own published letters (the differences between the England and German editions are duly noted) and those of his English friends, notably Julius Hare, Bishop Thirlwall, and Thomas Arnold, Dr. Höcker demonstrates the high esteem in which Bunsen was held in English social and intellectual circles, thanks to his personal charm, the solid family connections of his English wife, and to his admiration of the English way of life. He made a real contribution to the sympathetic interest in German thought and letters.

Whether or not Bunsen was even aware of the forces that were working toward the alienation of the two countries may, however, be doubted. Pointing out his prolonged absence while profound changes were taking place in Prussia and Germany, Dr. Höcker tacitly admits her lack of understanding of them. Moreover, Bunsen's mind was more scintillating than penetrating or constructive. In

view of his peasant lower middle-class origins in a largely feudalistic society, and his failure to translate his philological and historical learning into solid achievements, the key to his remarkable advancement in the Prussian diplomatic service (he was minister-resident in Rome at the age of thirty-six) is to be found in his personal relations, first with Niebuhr, the historian, and then with Frederick William III, due to Bunsen's ideas about liturgy, and with Frederick William IV, as crown prince and king. In general, the judgment of historians has been pretty devastating. To the nationalist Heinrich von Treitschke, he was a "darling of fortune," "frivolous minded," and of "boundless conceit." To the moderate Franz Schnabel he was "a many-sided amiable, and brilliant dilettante, and "no diplomat," as indeed his negotiations with the Vatican on the question of the mixed marriages showed. This study does not require the reversal of these judgments.

Duke University E. Malcolm Carroll

Lawrynenko, Juris, *Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy toward the Ukraine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1917-1953*. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1953. Pp. 454. $4.75.

This is one of those rare books which arouses not only a reviewer's interest but his unqualified enthusiasm. It brings to a neglected field of study an indispensable tool of scholarship. The tool has been fashioned with the assistance of a group of scholars whose names are a guarantee of thoroughness and integrity and who represent some of the most important centers of Slavic studies in eastern America. The author, himself a distinguished Ukrainian scholar, who had an active literary and teaching career in the Ukraine before finally arriving in the United States in 1950, was particularly well fitted to carry out this difficult assignment in bibliography.

To use the words of the Introduction, the bibliography is an attempt to make a systematic compilation of books and articles which deal directly or indirectly with the question of Ukrainian national communism (1918-1933) and Soviet Russian policy toward the Ukraine (1917-1953). The work is divided into eleven parts dealing with the main aspects of the subject. These are preceded by short introductions which are themselves brief but valuable guides.

One of the most vulnerable aspects of the Communist system is its corrupt and mendacious historiography. The only way to expose and defeat this deliberate distortion of truth is by patient, careful and conscientious scholarship. The foundation of scholarship is bibliography. This book now gives us a wide and sound basis for the study of the Ukrainian question as an integral part of the Soviet problem. Is Ukrainianism a dream, a ghost or an important actuality? It is a question to which American scholars might well devote more of their attention. In view of the tremendous handicaps under which emigrant Ukrainian scholars are working this book represents an ideal cooperative effort in which native learning and dynamic are coupled with intelligent and generous American aid.

University of Saskatchewan George W. Simpson

Rendulic, Lothar, *Gekämpft, gesiegt, geschlagen*. Heidelberg: Verlag Welsermühl, Wels, 1952. Pp. 384. DM 19.50.

One more volume has been added to the ever increasing number of memoirs written by Hitler's generals, this one by Lothar Rendulic, Austrian career officer and uncritical admirer of the Führer to the bitter end.

His story meanders through the battlefronts where he commanded troops, and the rather tedious day by day account of his activities is interspersed now and then by vivid descriptions of the beauties of the countryside and its history, which reveal that the author is well-read and observant. But, on the whole, the book lacks any comprehension of the issues at stake and the political implications; in fact, Rendulic never sees more than his particular section of the front, be it in Russia, the Balkans, Lapland, Norway, Kurland or Austria.

Although the major part of his book is memoirs written in a somewhat disjointed way, the author cannot refrain from dogmatizing and moralizing. When he utters opinions, he often contradicts himself or leaves out pertinent facts, whether intentionally or from ignorance is difficult to judge.

Of course, he is proud of his profession, and the whole book is an apologia for his actions, but at the same time he claims that the book does not glorify war, and that no soldier wants war. Yet, he is convinced that war brings out the highest virtues in men, that wars occur because no government has ever kept a treaty, and no country has ever been motivated by anything but a desire for powers. To him the Nazi attack on Russia was justified because Germany thereby avoided war on two fronts. He calls the war against Russia a preventive war, and conveniently quotes a phrase from a book on the Law of Nations written by an Englishman, to prove that an attack may be construed as defense if aggressive designs on the part of a potential enemy have to be forestalled. His involved reasoning on this subject is surpassed by his rationalizing on the "justice" of the shooting without trial of all political officers attached to the Red army, and by this insistence that this order of Hitler's was never carried through and that he personally knew of no case where a political instructor was made a prisoner. Another example of his credulousness and confusion is his reply to the question whether the Nazis had destroyed the churches of Germany. He not only denied that there had been any undermining of the Christian faith and destruction of synagogues, but claimed that the questioner had heard a distorted version of what was going on in Germany.

At rare times the author criticizes the men surrounding Hitler, but never Hitler or his actions. Rendulic belongs to the rare species of Nazi generals who do not blame the loss of the war on Hitler's faulty military intuitions, as most of his colleagues do today. He, in turn, belongs to that school of thought which blames Western military and political leadership for not having joined the Nazi armies in May 1945 to drive the Red Army back to the borders of the Soviet Union. At the time of his surrender in Austria, he claims to have warned the U. S. officers that they would have a much harder time fighting Soviet Russia later on and alone. With the remark that the Americans would remember his gloomy forebodings he concludes his book, convinced to the end that Nazi Germany fought the war, was victorious, yet beaten in the end.

Vassar College ALMA M. LUCKAU

HASSMAN, HEINRICH, *Oil in the Soviet Union*, Transl. by Alfred M. Leeston. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. Pp. xvi, 173. $3.75.

Dr. Hassman has succeeded in producing a small encyclopedia on the development of the Russian oil industry (Part II), the chief regions of the Soviet oil industry (Part III), and various problems of Soviet oil economy (Part IV). He has almost exhausted the published Soviet sources, as a result of which his book is likely to be, for many years to come, a valuable source of authentic information on this vital subject matter. The author also attempts to assess the Soviet oil situation from a political aspect, and concludes his study with the following statement: "If some day the (oil) production of the Middle East, which will exceed 100 million tons in the years to come, should be added to Russian oil production, presently at 40 million tons, this should mean such an increase in economic power for the Soviet Union that the political aspect of the World would be altered too" (p. 143). The value of this book has been further enhanced by an appendix, valuable charts and numerous explanatory notes which the translator—Alfred M. Leeston—has added to the American edition of Hassman's study.

The author would, however, appear to be well advised to consider a few changes in an eventual new edition of his book. On the one hand, Part I (pp. 1-19) of this study might well be entirely omitted. It attempts to deal with too many great issues, such as Soviet territory, population, history, constitution, economic

theory, achievements, etc.,—none of them directly related to the oil problem—to do justice to all of them. Moreover, this part contains a number of serious errors (on p. 6, Cossacks have been mistaken for Kazakhs, and on pp. 10-12, dialectical materialism for Soviet economic theory). On the other hand, the author might bring his list of the Soviet oil-*objedinenia* (groups) and their trusts (p. 34) up to date by including, for example, the Azmorneft group (organized since 1949 on the basis of the trust Artemneft of the Azneft group), and by mentioning, for example, the trusts Siazanneft, Kergezneft, Neftechala, and others of the Azneft, and the trust Novogrozneft of the Grozneft group. Finally, chief problems of the administration of production, and especially, of the distribution of oil in the Soviet Union should also be discussed so as to round off the survey of this vital branch of the Soviet industry.

University of British Columbia HANS E. RONIMOIS

YOUNG, GORDON, *Stalin's Heirs*, London: Derek Verschoyle, 1953. Pp. 156. 12s 6d.

Gordon Young, a newspaper man, has published a short book containing brief biographies of leading Russian statesmen and politicians. The book's merit lies in that it directs our attention to "particulars," to living and acting men who make history rather than toward ideologies, trends, or 'universals." Besides the dead Stalin and Beria, we find therein accounts of the lives of eminent as well as young and less familiar figures: of a Khrushchev and a Gromyko, a Malenkov and a Saburov, a Molotov and a Pervukhin; of Generals Bulganin, Zhukov, Voroshilov, and others; of a Kaganovich and Kruglov, a Mikoyan and Ponomarenko. The descriptions are factual, free of speculation, and they give solid data about those who rule the Soviet Union today. The author does not attempt to be exhaustive or to give penetrating psychological analyses, but he affords us a useful picture not only of the men, but also of the types which have come to the fore. As the publisher points out, the book, which is well written, renders a service to scholar and layman alike by constituting a "Who's Who" of Russian leaders of today.

University of Delaware WALTHER KIRCHNER

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